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Abstract
How should democracy be thought? How do we go about organising its concept?
On what basis? And to what end? Rather than confine democracy to an ancient
political constitution or modern system of government, this dissertation pursues a
conception of democracy often concealed by the customary institutional analysis.
Written  as  a  sustained  appraisal  of  the  often  antagonistic  encounter  between
philosophy  and  politics,  as  a  strategy  to  reframe  democracy  an  emancipatory,
transformative agency of the demos, it  is proposed that the topic of democracy be
initiated according to what democracy is against.  This approach serves to entirely
reconsider the question of democracy, engendering a renewed interpretation of what
the “power of the people” can mean. Through a series of detailed studies of Jacques
Rancière,  Claude  Lefort  and  Miguel  Abensour,  it  is  argued  that  democracy
invariably appears as a counter or objection to an established social order in which a
spectrum of familiar modes of domination are already in place. As the initiation of a
unique  political  controversy  and  dispute,  democracy  is  presented  as  an
unprecedented  challenge  to  unrestricted  and  arbitrary  rule,  concentrations  of
authority, strategies of inequality and hierarchies of all kinds. It is identified with
the forces that seek to expose, contest and transform oppressive and exclusionary
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arrangements  and  practices  from  below,  from  the  outside,  from  a  minoritarian
positionality.  Ultimately  seeking  more  inclusive,  participatory  and  egalitarian
institutions  and relations,  democracy is  consequently conceived as the perpetual
democratisation of society. 
After  a  preliminary  reflection  on  the  Hellenistic  roots  of  politics  itself,  the
dissertation  undertakes  an  extensive  analysis  of  what  is  determined  to  be
democracy’s  most  general  form:  its  being-against  the  archê  (the  underlying
principle that divides governor from governed, ruler from ruled). It then proceeds to
consider  two contemporary theoretical  models  that  uncover  the  against  in  more
distinguishing  terms:  Rancière’s democracy  against  the  police  and  Abensour’s
democracy against the State. It concludes that contrary to its long tradition since
Plato, philosophy can enhance and embolden an emancipatory politics, as Lefort
demonstrates,  when  it  ventures  to  advance  a  radical,  “savage”  conception  of
democracy organised to critique the here and now.
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1Introduction
The trials of thinking against
Thunder on! Stride on, Democracy! Strike with vengeful stroke!
-Walt Whitman
Aristotle’s  Constitution of Athens is often read as a sustained, undeviating
chronicle  tracing  the  punctuated  democratisation  of  Athens  by  a  succession  of
prominent reformers from Solon to Cleisthenes to Pericles. This reading lends itself
to  the  view  that  the  formal  institution  of  Athenian  democracy  may  largely  be
attributed to a few exceptional visionaries whose unrivalled status and influence
permitted  the  dramatic  transformation  of  the  Athenian  political  landscape  from
above. And yet, interwoven with this familiar narrative, fragments of another may
be extracted and assembled from Aristotle’s text. This is the narrative of a vibrant,
vocal and discontented demos whose persistent, often tumultuous activity played a
decisive role both in the creation and preservation of the democratic institutions of
their city. Let us consider but a single example. While the profound achievements of
the Cleisthenian reforms rightly occupy a pivotal place in Aristotle’s account of the
constitutional evolution of the city,  the unique series of events that would place
2Cleisthenes in the position to realise such reforms is far from overlooked in the text.
As Aristotle recounts, with the demise of the tyranny of Hippias (510  B.C.E.),  a
bitter struggle for control of the city would unfold between Isagoras, a notorious
Athenian  aristocrat  and  Cleisthenes  of  the  distinguished  house  of  Alcmaeonid.
Although Cleisthenes had won great support of the demos, vowing to transfer the
seat of government to them, Isagoras’ alliance with Cleomenes soon brought the
Spartan king, accompanied by an armed entourage, to Athens to help secure the
uncompromised rule of his long time ally. With the backing of Cleomenes, Isagoras
successfully  forced  his  rival  Cleisthenes  into  exile,  proceeded  to  dispossess
hundreds  of  prominent  Athenian  families  of  their  homes  and  poised  to  install
himself  as  tyrant,  moved to dissolve the citizen’s  administrative council  (boule)
established by Solon himself.  However,  according to  Aristotle,  in  a  moment  of
remarkable  fortitude,  the  council  resisted  the  assault  and the  people  of  Athens,
although without  a  leader  or  organisational  direction,  nevertheless  assembled in
opposition  to  Isagoras,  declaring  their  unwavering  support  for  the  council.  The
spontaneous revolt forced Isagoras, Cleomenes and his band of Spartan forces to
retreat to the Acropolis where they were besieged for two days by the insurgency.
On the third day, a truce was negotiated, Isagoras and Cleomenes were permanently
expelled  and  Cleisthenes  was  summoned  to  return  to  the  city.  Only  then  did
Cleisthenes, remaining true to his commitment to the demos, proceed to introduce
his historic  reforms that  would ultimately come to mark a new era of Athenian
democracy. As Aristotle remarks: “The people had taken control of their affairs, and
3Cleisthenes was their leader and champion of the people [...].”1
While  the  significance  of  Cleisthenes’  monumental  reforms  remains
undisputed both historically and politically, the question of how to incorporate such
direct  emancipatory  acts  of  the  demos  in  a  broader  theoretical  construction  of
democracy often receives far less consideration.  Are examples of such defiance,
confrontation  and  opposition  merely  illustrative  of  the  revolutionary  prelude  or
“democratic excess” of a properly instituted democratic constitution from which we
must ultimately derive its concept, or do such events remain indicative of something
essential to the meaning of democracy itself? Echoing this somewhat alternative
reading of Aristotle’s Constitution, in a series of writings that aim to reevaluate the
legacy  of  democracy’s  often  discordant,  “fugitive”  character,  Sheldon  Wolin
certainly  wishes  to  remind  us  that  beyond  the  accomplishments  of  the  great
reformers, Athenian democracy was considerably shaped by the regular disruptions
and interventions  of  the  demos.  From recurring  class  conflicts  to  disputes  over
exclusion to campaigns against those with extraordinary influence in the assembly
(ecclesia),  Wolin maintains that the perpetual democratisation of Athens was the
result  of  a  succession  of  popular  uprisings  that  would  repeatedly challenge  the
limits and conventions of existing institutions and relations.  Far from the fixed or
settled constitutional form we find in the political philosophy of Plato or Aristotle,
Wolin sees the story of Athenian democracy as one of a dynamic and ever evolving
1 Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 225.
Also see Josiah Ober, “The Athenian Revolution of 508/7 B.C.E.: Violence, Authority, and the Origins of
Democracy,” Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics, eds. Carol Dougherty and
Leslie Kurke (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4political  culture  that  not  only  culminates  in  the  popular  control  of  its  major
institutions  of  government,  but  also  includes  those  intermittent  acts  of  social
upheaval  as  well.  It  is  from these  resurgent moments  of  defiance  and  dissent,
however episodic or ephemeral, that the political or libertarian spirit of democracy
is collectively renewed and regenerated. For this reason, Wolin suggests, perhaps
democracy must ultimately be understood more as a force than as a form.2 
It  is  precisely  these  democratic  forces  or  agents  that  Claude  Lefort’s
extraordinary allusions to “savage” democracy invite us to consider. Although at
times Lefort is presented as merely contributing a formal theory of the democratic
society,3 his work will prove invaluable in the philosophical exercise of constructing
a  concept  of  democracy  capable  of  tracing  or  mapping  its  more  creative  and
transformative  dimensions  and  capacities.  Scattered  across  his  later  writings,
Lefort’s recurring reference to a savage democracy, although never defined, will
tend to evoke those revolutionary moments in which democracy, hardly reducible to
a form of government or set of institutions, manifests as a profound challenge to
oppressive,  hierarchical  and exclusionary arrangements  and  practices  in  society.
Perhaps less a description of democracy than an experimental strategy for thinking
about it, Lefort’s savage democracy not only functions to open up the concept of
2 Many  of  these  themes  cut  across  Wolin’s  writings  on  democracy.  See  “Norm  and  Form:  The
Constitutionalising  of  Democracy,”  Athenian  Political  Thought  and  the  Reconstruction  of  American
Democracy, eds. J. Peter Euben, John R. Wallach and Josiah Ober (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994),
“Fugitive Democracy,”  Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla
Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and “Postmodern Democracy: Virtual or Fugitive?,”
Politics  and  Vision:  Continuity  and  Innovation  in  Western  Political  Thought (Princeton:  Princeton
University Press, 2004). 
3 For example, this is how Slavoj Žizek evaluates Lefort in his Afterword to Jacques Rancière’s The Politics
of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Continuum, 2004), 73.
5democracy so that it may be considered in entirely new ways, it challenges us to
explore the limits and potentials of what the power of the people can mean. As the
“libertarian  idea”  of  democracy,  it  calls  into  question  everything  about  how
democracy  is  typically  represented,  interpreted,  perceived.  Thinking  democracy
savage demands that we distance its concept from those mitigated, domesticated
representations  of  democracy so ubiquitous today,  allowing us  to  rediscover  the
radical imperative that remains at  the root of democracy itself. It compels us to
conceive democracy in terms of what it can do, what it can become and what it can
transform. Accordingly,  what  Lefort’s  savage democracy may ultimately seek to
liberate is the way we venture to think about democracy and the process through
which we come to organise its concept philosophically.
It  is  for  this  reason  that  Lefort’s  savage  democracy,  however
unconventional,  provides  an  ideal  vehicle  through  which  we  may  pursue  a
conception of democracy formulated according to those moments of contestation
and dissensus,  according to  what  it  counters  and disputes,  according to  what  it
renders irreducibly politically problematic, according to what it posits itself against.
If democracy can be understood to represent an unprecedented political challenge to
unrestricted and arbitrary rule, concentrations of authority, strategies of inequality
and elaborate exclusionary practices, it is because democracy contains within it the
agents of an against, an against which is not simply a consequence of democracy,
but forms the basis and substance of its very politics. Despite its neglect by many of
even the most exhaustive studies of democracy, this against remains integral to its
6constitution, orientation and institutional expression. It is what propels democracy
forward,  what  informs its  targets  and objectives,  what  galvanises  its  unyielding
resolve towards a more participatory, more egalitarian society. Perhaps this is how
democracy’s power of the people should be understood. 
Why is  it  that  democracy invariably appears  in  the  form of  an  against?
Contrary to Tocqueville, who discovers the epitome of the natural conditions for
democracy  in  the  open  and  unobstructed  plains  of  the  uncultivated  American
landscape,4 historically, democracy is never constituted in a void, but manifests in a
dense  social  field  in  which  various  orders  of  rule,  modes  of  domination  and
hierarchies of all kinds are already very much established. Democracy emerges as a
particular  response,  an  emancipatory  act,  a  transformative  agent  in  society.  It
initiates a unique political controversy and dispute. It renders the foundations of a
given  social  order  or  system  of  rule  intrinsically  problematic.  Consequently,
democracy’s very form may be understood to be determined by the context of its
inception, by the particular social order which it comes into being to confront and
dispute. This is why it is possible to identify, in different places, at different times,
the manifestation of a democracy against oligarchy, a democracy against monarchy,
a  democracy against patriarchy,  a  democracy against  colonialism,  a  democracy
against  capitalism.  If  democracy cannot  be isolated  from the  objects  it  appears
against, it is because those objects form the basis of its particular incarnation, its
particular mode of  being-against. What democracy is against is never extrinsic or
4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. I (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), chapter 1.
7secondary to  democracy itself.  What  it  is  against  remains  immanent  to  its  very
form.
It  is  precisely the  nature  of  this  against  that  interests  us  here:  its  logic,
politics and broader social and philosophical implications. Moreover, given that the
bibliography of sources which consider such questions is in fact quite limited, this
is  a  theme  that  will  naturally  draw  our  research  to  a  very  particular  body  of
literature. And yet, this study is not a monograph of any single author, nor does it
ultimately locate its theses within the conceptual framework of any single theory or
work.  Instead,  it  is  composed  of  a  series  of  immanent  critiques,  extracting,
developing  and  evaluating  particular  concepts,  arguments,  analyses  and
terminologies  from a  selection  of  authors  whose  work  will  serve  to  illuminate
various  facets  of  this  larger  topic.  Although the  question  of  democracy will  be
situated in the broader context of the history of political thought, I will primarily be
drawing from the writings of three figures in contemporary continental philosophy
whose work has only more recently begun to be considered by a rigorous Anglo-
American  scholarship:  Jacques  Rancière,  Claude  Lefort  and  Miguel  Abensour.
While their projects differ considerably and conform to no single tradition, perhaps
what their respective theories of democracy all have in common is something of a
shared heritage. The mature work of Rancière, Lefort and Abensour would emerge
from  a  quintessentially  French,  anti-totalitarian,  post-Marxist,  post-May  ’68
environment in which a generation of young philosophers, political  thinkers and
activists  would  put  their  entire  inherited  tradition  of  the  left  (from the  PCF to
8Trotskyism  to  Althusser  to  Marx  himself)  into  question.5 One  of  the  many
consequences of this experience,  it  would appear,  was a renewed interest  in the
question  of  democracy.  And  yet,  of  those  who would  go  on  to  pursue  a  more
rigorous and sustained theoretical evaluation of democracy—Rancière, Lefort and
Abensour included—many would come to reject its  standard “Statist” definition
which tends to confine its meaning to a collection of institutions, periodic elections,
rule of law and the rights of man. Furthermore, perhaps more problematic, it was
clearly recognised that any proposal for an alternative, more nuanced conception of
democracy would inevitably have to confront and contradict an entire discourse that
since  the  second  world  war  had  regularly  employed  the  term  “democracy”  to
engineer and organise consent, justify often violent imperialist policy abroad and
expand  capital’s  uncompromising  dominion  over  society.  Finally,  given
democracy’s  rather  contentious  position in  the history of  political  thought  since
Plato, the proponents of the so-called “return to political philosophy” in the 1970s
and  1980s—insofar  as  it  described  a  contemporary  return  to  the  established
practices and attitudes of its orthodox tradition—could not be entrusted to deliver
the concept of democracy from this precarious status.6 In this regard, if Rancière,
Lefort and Abensour can be read collectively, perhaps what their work serves to
demonstrate is that democracy is a question that necessitates an altogether different
5 Consider  for  example  Cornelius  Castoriadis,  “Marxism:  A Provisional  Assessment,”  The  Imaginary
Institution of Society (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1987),  Claude Lefort, “The Contradiction of Trotsky,”  The
Political  Forms of  Modern  Society:  Bureaucracy,  Democracy,  Totalitarianism (Cambridge:  MIT Press,
1986) and Jacques Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson (London: Continuum, 2011). 
6 See Miguel Abensour, “Pour une philosophie politique critique?,” Pour une philosophie politique critique
(Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2009), 265-7. Also see Jacques Rancière’s comments in “Ten Theses on Politics,”
Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics  (London: Continuum, 2010), 42-4 and  Disagreement: Politics and
Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 92-3. 
9approach.  Carefully navigating both history and the  history of  philosophy,  their
writings  provide  us  the  necessary theoretical  tools  to  effectively disentangle  its
concept, so that it may be radically reconstructed, engaged in new ways and placed
against a prevailing order that limits and confines its powers and potentials. Indeed,
the  emancipation  of  democracy  in  thought is  precisely what  Lefort  elicits  with
savage democracy. Therefore, perhaps we may decipher something of an against
inscribed in their very approach: a certain resistance or objection to both the State’s
appropriation of a compromised, domesticated democracy on the one hand and a
philosophical tradition that abandons it a disruptive, disorderly and degenerate form
on the other. By positing a figure of democracy that refuses this position, perhaps it
is this approach that would ultimately yield the first of traces of democracy’s own
being-against.
We shall begin our analysis in Greece, organising our preliminary questions
and  basic  theoretical  framework  largely  according  to  the  context,  terms  and
experience particular to ancient democracy. Throughout Part One it is Plato who
will  dominate  our  attention.  Although  Plato’s  criticisms  of  democracy are  well
known, often regarded as the archetype of what would prove to be philosophy’s
rather  consistent appraisal  of democracy throughout  its  long history,  particularly
when expressed in a somewhat veiled allegorical form, his disparaging portrayal of
democracy  will  prove  to  reveal  far  more.  While  often  directed  at  its  more
epistemological,  sociological  and  psychological  implications,  Plato’s  persistent
attacks on what he identifies as democracy’s underlying “anarchic” condition, its
10
lack of any proper foundation or principle, will not only inform the basis of our
approach to democracy more generally, but inadvertently uncover what is essential
to the meaning of politics itself. Politics is not the foundation upon which one rules
another.  It is the condition in which the foundation of rule is called into question.
This revelation will  serve to initiate a necessary preliminary analysis  of politics
right from the start. Revisiting the Hellenistic roots of this ancient term (politikos),
we will pursue its basic ontology not according to any philosophy primarily, but as
prompted  by Hannah  Arendt,  through  a  predominantly  historical  account  of  its
cultural origins.7 This will provide something of a consistent conceptual background
which the more specific interpretations of politics particular to Rancière, Lefort and
Abensour may all interact and negotiate with throughout the course of this study.
Inextricably bound to  the  Greek  invention  of  politics,  a  condition  we will  find
unique  to  democracy  alone,  keeping  with  our  analysis  of  Plato,  we  will  then
encounter  our  first  substantive  example  of  democracy’s  against  in  what  will  be
determined to be its most universal or general form: its being-against the archê. As
Arendt  and  Rancière  both  develop  through  close  readings  of  Plato’s  Laws and
Republic, the archê represents the underlying theoretical principle that functions to
simultaneously  establish  and  justify  the  essential  divide  that  separates  governor
from  governed,  ruler  from  ruled.8 Whether  it  installs  the  rule  of  the  king
7 I will largely rely on  Christian Meier’s monumental study  The Greek Discovery of Politics  (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990).
8 This problem is discussed across many of their political writings. See for example Jacques Rancière, “Ten
Theses on Politics”  and  Hatred of Democracy (London:  Verso,  2007),  as  well  as  Hannah Arendt,  The
Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) and  The Promise of Politics (New York:
Schocken Books, 2005).
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(monarchy), the rule of an opulent minority (oligarchy) or the hypothetical rule of
the wisest among us (Plato’s own ideal city), the logic of the archê is the same. In
all  its  forms,  it  is  this  very  logic  that  democracy  will  render  intrinsically
problematic  wherever  and whenever  it  appears.  As Plato clearly recognises,  not
only does democracy itself lack an archê, its defiant claim of an anarchic equality
operates  to  undermine  those  very  hierarchies,  divisions  and  social  conventions
constructed  upon  the  foundations  of  the  archê  itself.  Therefore,  contradicting
philosophy’s  rather  monotonous  catalogue  of  constitutional  forms,  unlike
monarchy, oligarchy and the philosopher’s own imagined utopian city, democracy
does  not  simply  represent  yet  another  regime  of  rule.  Instead,  it  represents  an
unprecedented challenge to the very division between ruler and ruled. This is the
basis of its politics.
Building upon these arguments, we will return to this line of inquiry in Part
Three,  drawing on more modern implications of democracy and broadening our
analysis  considerably.  While  democracy  always  appears  against  the  archê  that
underlies so many regimes of rule, this in no way exhausts the objects it can be
understood to reject, dispute and render politically problematic. Although the forms
of  its  against  likely  remain  innumerable,  here  we  will  advance two  theoretical
models  that  formulate  democracy’s  being-against  in  more  distinguishing  terms:
Rancière’s democracy against the police and Abensour’s  democracy against the
State.  While not entirely compatible,  these two models will  serve to inform and
enhance the basis of our critique substantially, introducing new terms, broadening
12
our perspective and clarifying our theses.  We can only briefly survey their  core
arguments here. First introduced in his volume Disagreement, Rancière will clearly
posit a concept of democracy in direct opposition to what he outlines generally as
the  “order  of  the  police.”  Largely  drawing  from  Foucault’s  late  work  on
governmentality,9 Rancière  understands  the  police  in  its  most  comprehensive
definition,  much closer  to  its  original  meaning in  17th and  18th century Europe.
Conceived as a vast set of rationalities, institutions and processes that govern over
both the organisation and representation of a community, covering everything from
the distribution of roles, functions and spaces to the exercise of authority itself, for
Rancière, the police is emblematic of the ubiquitous practice of social ordering, of
implementing the proper order of society without interruption and without dispute.10
For this reason, Rancière sees the police as intrinsically hostile to the agents of
politics.  Inversely,  he  identifies  democracy’s  logic  of  equality  as  an  analogous
counter to the logic of the police. It is this tension, nexus or point of intersection
between democracy and the police that Rancière will position at the very centre of
his  political  theory.  In  this  context,  Rancière  elaborates  democracy’s  against  in
terms of a defiant act  of  subjectivation in which the manifestation of a political
subject  initiates  a  polemical  scene  challenging  the  categories,  identities  and
classifications  of  the  police  distribution,  frustrating  its basic  symbolic
representation  of  society.11 Therefore,  beyond  his  indispensable  analysis  of  the
9 See Michel Foucault,  Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 (New
York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
10 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 28.
11 Ibid., 35-42.
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archê, what Rancière contributes to a theory of democracy’s against is a description
of the principal agent through which this against tends to be expressed: the political
subject.  By inventing new ways  of  seeing and new ways  of  thinking about  the
community,  its  parts,  places and roles,  democracy’s act of subjectivation creates
new possibilities  for  both the  organisation  and representation  of  the community
itself.  Likewise, at the very same time as Rancière juxtaposes democracy and the
police, Abensour will develop a theory of democracy that explores its inherently
antagonistic relation to the State. Working primarily through Marx’s early critique
of Hegel12 and therefore revisiting the somewhat heterodoxical question of Marx’s
own  contribution  to  democratic  theory,  Abensour’s  appropriately  titled  volume
Democracy  Against  the  State perhaps  represents  the  most  sustained  theoretical
assessment of democracy’s formal opposition to the principles of the State. Situated
against the backdrop of Lefort’s Machiavellian conception of the political, through
a  series  of  close  textual  readings  of  the  young  Marx,  Abensour  extracts  and
develops that enigmatic reference to “true democracy” in which Marx postulates the
formal disappearance of the State itself. Reading Marx, if Abensour understands
democracy and the State as fundamentally antithetical, antagonistic and ultimately
irreconcilable, it is because he identifies the State-form as the political alienation of
the self-determination of the demos, as the formal separation of the constitution of
the social from the originary subject that institutes it. Democracy is the agent that
resists  this  operation.  Accordingly,  Abensour  interprets  true  democracy  as  the
12 Karl Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,” Early Writings (London: Penguin Books, 1992).
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permanent  reduction of  the State  as an abstract  constitutional  form.13 It  is  what
blocks or obstructs the State as a unifying, totalising principle. It is what generates
social  forms  other  than  those  mediated  by  the  State.  Hence,  through  a  rather
idiosyncratic  examination  of  Marx,  Abensour  is  not  only  able  to  untangle  and
distance the concept of democracy from that of the State, but at the same time, to
bind it categorically to the perpetual struggle for social emancipation. For Abensour,
a democracy against the State conceives a democracy that cannot be defined by a
constitutional  form,  but testifies  to  the  “always  possible  emergence  of  human
struggle.”14 To this struggle, he will at times give the name “insurgent” democracy.
Finally,  located at  the heart  of  the dissertation,  Part  Two, structured like
something  of  an  intermezzo,  will  be  dedicated  to  those  larger  philosophical
questions  initiated and set  in  motion by Lefort’s  savage democracy,  particularly
centred around the pivotal  theme of the French Revolution.  In part,  to conceive
democracy according to its being-against is an attempt think democracy  anew or
think  democracy  otherwise.  In  this  regard,  perhaps  the  underlying  problem that
occupies us throughout this study is one that ultimately remains philosophical in
nature. In its simplest formulation, we are concerned with a series of very basic
questions,  but  questions  that  often  go  overlooked  nevertheless:  how  should
democracy be thought? How do we go about  organising its  concept? On what
basis? And to what end? If we accept Lefort’s most elementary position that modern
13 Miguel Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment (Cambridge: Polity,
2011), chapter 5.
14 Ibid., 100.
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democracy’s symbolic displacement of the body of the king opens to a condition of
indeterminacy,  lacking any fixed or absolute  foundation,  then we must  likewise
accept that insofar as democracy remains inextricably bound to this condition, there
is  no  immutable  basis  from  which  we  may  definitively  derive  its  concept.
Democracy  is  a  phenomenon  that  deposits  our  concepts  in  a  place  of  radical
uncertainty and thus compels a mode of thinking characterised by a persistent and
interminable questioning.  No  doubt,  this  explains  why philosophy discovers  its
origins  with  ancient  Greek  democracy.  According  to  Lefort,  philosophy  strives
towards  that  “unlocalisable  and  indeterminable  question,”  animating  a  form  of
interrogation that must likewise remain just as indefinite and open-ended in scope.15
This  is  precisely  what  Lefort  incites  with  savage  democracy.  As  Abensour
demonstrates in his own analysis, the savage not only functions to keep the question
of democracy unsettled and unresolved in any absolute sense, urging us to push our
thinking of democracy ever further, it simultaneously orients that concept towards
its most uncompromised and resilient incarnation: its political acts of emancipation,
its endless capacity for conflict and contestation, its enduring momentum towards a
more democratic society.16 This is imperative for thinking the against. Therefore,
tracing those savage democratic moments across his writings and interviews, it is
with Lefort that we will ultimately bind and intersect what is most imperative to our
15 Claude Lefort, “Philosopher?,” Writing: The Political Test (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 248-9.
Also see  Oliver  Marchart,  “The Machiavellian Moment Retheorised: Claude Lefort,”  Post-foundational
Political  Thought:  Political  Difference  in  Nancy,  Lefort,  Badiou  and  Laclau (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh
University Press, 2007), 88.
16 See  Miguel  Abensour’s  indispensable  essay  “‘Savage  Democracy’ and  the  ‘Principle  of  Anarchy’,”
Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment.
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own  conceptual  construction  of  democracy  here:  the  savage,  the  against and
democratisation. It is for this reason that Lefort’s savage democracy forms the basis
of our approach to the generation of its concept. 
Consequently, if this study contributes to the field of political philosophy as
opposed to political science is it because it is primarily concerned with democracy
at  the  level  of  the  concept.  Throughout,  I  shall  largely  adhere  to  the  general
formulation of philosophy as expounded by Gilles Deleuze. Following Deleuze, if
philosophy does not simply correspond to some vague notion of contemplation,
reflection or  communication,  it  is  because  philosophy  is  primarily  a  practical
exercise in concept construction. Concepts are given neither by nature, nor by the
heavens above. They must be produced, fabricated, composed. This is a creative
process. Deleuze sees the history of philosophy as a history of provocations,  of
encounters in which a series of problems present themselves to philosophy from a
place  outside  of  philosophy  itself.  Philosophy  navigates  and  evaluates  these
problems by inventing and engineering concepts and relations of concepts through
which the contours and complexities of these problems may be thought in coherent
and productive  ways.17 For  this  reason,  although concepts  may be  adopted  and
developed  by  later  philosophers,  they  will  always  bear  a  trace  of  the  original
historical problems that initially provoked them. We will discover one of the earliest
surviving examples of such a provocation in the work of Plato. As we shall see,
17 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994),
chapter 1. Interestingly, in a rare moment, Rancière appears to identify something of his own method with
Deleuze’s general approach to philosophy as concept construction. See Jacques Ranciere, Max Blechman,
Anita Chari and Rafeeq Hasan, “Democracy, Dissensus and the Aesthetics of Class Struggle: An Exchange
with Jacques Rancière,” Historical Materialism vol. 13, iss. 4 (2005): 298-300.
17
what Plato’s epistemology and political philosophy have in common is that they
both offer a particular solution to an identical problem, the predominant problem
that presented itself to Plato in classical Athens: the problem of democracy. Just as
his concept of the Forms represents a particular navigation and evaluation of the
problem  of  democratic  doxa,  the  condition  that  appears  to  circulate  opinion
infinitely without  standard  or  measure,  his  concept  of  the properly ordered city
(governed  by  a  privileged  class  of  philosopher-rulers)  likewise  represents  a
particular navigation and evaluation of the problem of democracy’s radical claim of
equality,  an  anarchic  equality  applicable  to  both  “equals  and  unequals  alike.”
Therefore, according to Deleuze, whether it be Plato’s Forms, Leibniz’s monads or
Bergson’s  duration,  concepts  are  not  structured  to  reference  external  objects  or
states of affairs and cannot be evaluated in terms of true and false. Rather, as the
basic tools of philosophy, concepts represent ideal constructions that help us map,
formulate and think through problems posed to us by our own historical milieu. And
yet, for Deleuze, it is not Plato, as something of a reactionary, who grasps the true
political potential of philosophy’s practice of concept construction, but Nietzsche.
Reading Nietzsche, Deleuze explains that if philosophy does not strive to represent
the world in thought, it is because its first task is to organise concepts that act upon
the world, that counter the world in its present form and help us to think against it.18
This is precisely what Nietzsche understands as philosophy’s critical or “untimely”
18 Gilles Deleuze,  Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 107. Also see
Bryan Nelson, “New Earth, New People: Deleuze, Democracy and the Politics of the Future.” Movements
in Time: Revolution,  Social Justice  and Times of  Change  (Cambridge:  Cambridge Scholars  Publishing,
2012), 79.
18
vocation.  In the foreword to the second essay of his own  Untimely Meditations,
Nietzsche distinguishes an untimely philosophy as: “acting counter to our time, and
thereby acting on our time, and let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come.” 19 In
Nietzsche’s view, it is not enough for philosophy to simply represent the present in
thought; it  must  resist it.  As Deleuze reiterates: “This is why philosophy has an
essential relation to time: it is always against its time, [a] critique of the present
world.”20 An untimely philosophy is one that realises its capacity to resist, to think
against, to critique the present world as we find it and as we have inherited it. This
is  the  use  of  philosophy.  This  is  when  philosophy  becomes  political.  Properly
speaking, political philosophy is not a genre or category of philosophy; it is not the
philosophy that reflects on the topics of politics. Rather, in the spirit of Nietzsche,
philosophy  only  becomes  political  when  it  renders  itself  untimely,  when  the
concepts  it  generates  are  created  to  counter,  to  challenge  the  conditions  of  the
present time, in the hopes of changing them, of participating in shaping a new and
better world than the one we have today.21 In this respect, as a philosophy devised
not only to interpret,  but to engage and critique our present conditions,  perhaps
Deleuze’s general take on  political philosophy will not be found dissimilar from
what  Abensour,  drawing  not  from Nietzsche,  but  from Arendt  and  Lefort,  will
describe as a critical political philosophy.22 Perhaps, in our own time, such a critical
political engagement begins with a new concept of democracy.
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 60.
20 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 107.
21 Nelson, “New Earth, New People: Deleuze, Democracy and the Politics of the Future,” 79-81. 
22 See Abensour, “Pour une philosophie politique critique?”
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Therefore,  building a  concept  of  democracy need not  be concerned with
devising a blueprint for the “perfect” democratic society, a democracy only suitable,
as  Rousseau  has  it,  for  the  gods.23 Nor  should  we  concern  ourselves  with
deconstruction’s messianic promise of a transcendent “democracy to come,” a pure,
untarnished democracy posited in an ideal horizon and perpetually projected into a
future that never arrives.24 Rather, a critical, untimely or “political” philosophy is
the one that creates its concepts in the present time, for its  time, and following
Nietzsche,  against its time.  As Lefort repeatedly submits in his monumental work
on Machiavelli,  the point of departure for any exercise of political  inquiry must
always be the problems and dilemmas particular  to  the “here and now” (hic et
nunc).  Clearly,  such  an  approach  to  philosophy is  imperative  for  our  study of
democracy  here.  For  what  we  shall  postulate  as  democracy’s  being-against,  its
challenge to what it objects and disputes in society, is neither arbitrary, nor an end
in itself; it makes no promises, projects nothing into the future, but is concerned
only  with  the  democratisation of  the  present,  the  ongoing  battle  for  more
participatory  and  egalitarian  institutions  and  relations.  This  is  very  much  the
democracy that we discover in the theories of Rancière, Lefort and Abensour.
For  this  reason,  this  study cannot  claim to  offer  a  “complete”  theory of
democracy.  In  many  ways,  it  remains  fundamentally  incomplete.  Important
questions regarding the nature of democracy’s own institutions have largely been
23 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 114.
24 See  Jacques  Derrida,  Specters  of  Marx:  The  State  of  the  Debt,  The  Work  of  Mourning,  and  the  New
International (New York: Routledge, 2006), 81.
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placed aside and postponed. This does not intend to disregard these institutional
problems, but simply attempts to initiate and frame the question of democracy in a
different  way,  from  a  different  starting  place.  For  example,  what  Aristotle’s
Constitution  of  Athens appears  to  demonstrate  is  not  so  much  that  democracy
simply resides in a particular set of institutions, but that it is something that plays a
decisive role in shaping them. Accordingly, although I will maintain that democracy
remains irreducible to its institutions, this does not intend to imply that democracy
is  contrary  to  them  (a  concept  of  democracy  that  remains  incompatible  with
institutions really must be considered futile and counterproductive from the start—
Rancière is occasionally interpreted in this manner).25 However, if democracy does
remain  irreducible  to  its  institutions,  however  assembled  or  arranged,  this  does
suggest that the problem of its institutions does not logically come first, but second.
Here, we are interested in those questions that precede the problem of democracy’s
institutions, questions that, if addressed beforehand, will undoubtedly recast those
institutional problems in a very different light.  
In  all  likelihood,  this  study  will  be  approached  as  a  topic  of  radical
democracy.26 But as Abensour reminds us, what terms like “radical” democracy,
“savage” democracy, “insurgent” democracy all share in common is that rather than
narrow or specify the meaning of democracy, they call on us to resist its ideological
appropriation and to prevent its confusion with very different problems, however
25 Rancière will respond to this criticism in La méthode de l’égalité (Montrouge: Bayard, 2012), 216.
26 See  C.  Douglas  Lummis’s  helpful  clarification  of  this  term  in  Radical  Democracy (Ithaca:  Cornell
University Press, 1996), 24-5.
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important in their own right (such as representative government or rule of law).27
Therefore, as adjectives, as qualifiers, the radical, the savage, the insurgent appear
to have a very unique function: unlike “liberal” democracy or “social” democracy,
they do not intend to modify, adjust or redirect our concept of democracy in any
particular way, but only to draw us towards democracy  in itself, towards its truly
exceptional nature, its powers and potentials. 
Against  all  those  shrewd,  bickering  politicians,  against  all  the  apathy he
witnessed around him and against all the hostility and bloodshed it was claimed to
justify, it is this democracy, turbulent, resilient, that Walt Whitman captures in the
poem Rise, O Days From Your Fathomless Deeps (1865): “Thunder on! Stride on,
Democracy! Strike with vengeful stroke!”28
27 Miguel  Abensour,  “Insurgent  Democracy and Institution,”  Democracy Against the State: Marx and the
Machiavellian Moment, xxiii. Also see his comments in  Miguel Abensour, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques
Rancière, “Instances démocratiques,” Vacarme vol. 48 (été 2009). 
28 Walt Whitman, “O Days From Your Fathomless Deeps,” The Complete Poems (London: Penguin, 2004),
318. 
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Part One | Dissolution of the archê
1
Towards democracy’s anarchic
condition: allegorical origins
 
...it is a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning 
a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike.
-Plato
The whole political project of Platonism can be conceived as an anti-
maritime polemic.
-Jacques Rancière
“Imagine, then, that something like the following happens on a ship or on
many ships.” With this Socrates momentarily suspends dialogue with his small, but
acquiescent congregation and once again turns to allegory to elucidate his argument.
In what follows, Socrates proceeds to narrate a short tale set upon the deck of a
naval vessel at sea. What he describes is a vulgar scene of ignorance, bickering,
deception and brutality. A bitter rivalry, the many sailors on board, none who have
any experience with navigation, quarrel amongst themselves regarding who should
take the helm and captain the ship. They boast that navigation is not a teachable
skill, that sailing requires no understanding of the seasons, the skies, the stars, the
winds,  but  rather  remains  a  task  that  anyone  can  perform.  Dismissing  the
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philosopher a mere stargazer, the sailors clash amongst themselves, throwing each
other overboard and threatening to cut one another into pieces. Socrates continues:
“I don’t think that you need to examine the simile in detail to see that the ships
resemble  cities  and  their  attitude  to  the  true  philosophers,  but  you  already
understand what I mean.”1 Indeed, the allegory of the State as a ship would not be
unfamiliar to his interlocutors, the trope having already appeared both in the lyric
poetry of Alcaeus and in the opening speech of Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes.
But in Plato’s account in Book III of the Republic, this chaotic scene, described in
vivid  detail  by  Socrates,  in  which  the  wisdom  of  persecuted  philosophers  is
undermined by a savage band of drunken sailors who blindly rule an aimless vessel
in choppy seas, is intended to represent a particular constitution, one which would
be well known to his fellow Athenians: a democracy. 
What is it about democracy that evokes this image of the sea? As Rancière
astutely observes, this is not the only occasion in which Plato’s political philosophy
will include such allusions to the maritime experience.2 Is it an implicit reference to
democratic Athens, the coastal city with an unmatched naval fleet whose economic
prosperity,  imperial  rule  and  glorious  victory over  the  Persians  at  the  battle  of
Salamis depended so considerably upon its intimate proximity to the Aegean Sea?3
Or does the seascape allude to something more ontological: a shifting surface in
1 Plato, Republic, III, 488a-489d. All references are to Plato, Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and D. S.
Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). 
2 Also see Gorgias and the Laws.
3 M. I.  Finley argues that in many respects,  the success of Athenian democracy was contingent upon its
imperial power which itself relied upon its naval capabilities at sea. See Democracy Ancient and Modern
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985), 87. 
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constant motion, a great depth upon which no foundation can be established, a vast
abyss which cannot be mastered or contained, a wild, unpredictable experience of
changing winds and turning tides which lacks all the stability and security of dry
land?4 
Perhaps every appraisal of the  Republic’s objections to democracy will be
struck by how little Plato offers in terms of any substantial institutional analysis of
the  spaces  and  operational  practices  that  facilitate  public  participation  in  the
governance  of  the  city.  Instead,  according to  Rancière,  what  we encounter  (not
unlike the famous study by Tocqueville) is something which resembles more of a
sociological evaluation of the culture and personality discovered in a democratic
society:  “Plato  is  the  first  one  to  invent  that  mode  of  sociological  reading  we
declare to be proper to the modern age, the interpretation that locates underneath the
appearances  of  political  democracy  an  inverse  reality:  the  reality  of  a  state  of
society where  it  is  the  private,  egotistical  man who governs.”5 Consequently,  it
would appear that the object of the ancient philosopher’s vehement attacks is less
democracy as  a  set  of  institutions  than  as  a  state  of  society,  a  style  of  life,  a
psychological  orientation.  And in this  respect,  the conduct  of the sailors aboard
Socrates’ allegorical  ship  will  in  many  ways  anticipate  Plato’s  more  sustained
4 It is often argued that every political theory implicitly or explicitly alludes to an underlying ontology. See
for example  Carol C. Gould, “Ontological Foundations of Democracy,”  Rethinking Democracy: Freedom
and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
91 and Alexandros Kioupkiolis, “Keeping it Open: Ontology, Ethics, Knowledge and Radical Democracy,”
Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 37, no. 6 (July 2011): 692.
5 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London: Verso, 2007), 35-6. That Tocqueville offers a “sociology
of democracy” is a position supported by Castoriadis as well.  See “What Democracy?,”  Figures of the
Thinkable (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  2007),  120-1.  For  a  more  substantial  analysis  of  the
sociological basis for Plato’s rejection of democracy see Thanassis Samaras,  Plato on Democracy (New
York: P. Lang, 2002), chapter 2.
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criticisms of what he calls “democratic man” subsequently in the dialogue.6 
Plato assumes a certain isomorphism between a city’s constitution and the
psychology or sensibilities of the inhabitants who dwell there. In an oligarchy we
find  the  oligarchic  soul,  in  a  timocracy  the  timocratic  soul,  in  a  tyranny  the
tyrannical soul, each psychological type corresponding to a particular organisation
of  the  soul  in  which  a  spectrum  of  values  or  desires  become  subservient  or
subordinate to one: the accumulation of wealth (the oligarch), the pursuit of honour
(the timocrat), the aspiration for authority and dominion (the tyrant).7 But when the
discussion  inevitably  turns  to  democracy—which  so  often  seems  to  maintain
something  of  an  exceptional  status  throughout  philosophy’s  rather  monotonous
exercise of constitution classification—the problem becomes less straightforward.
While  Plato  will  regularly  cite  equality  as  democracy’s  most  distinguishing
attribute,  it  is  not  some  egalitarian  sensibility  that  his  psychological  typology
ultimately understands to dominate the democratic soul, but rather something which
remains  unnameable:  a  certain  undecidability.  According to  Plato,  democracy is
distinct  from  every  other  political  regime  in  that  it  represents  not  a  single
constitution,  but a constitution of constitutions,  a “supermarket  of constitutions”
where one may consume political ideologies as if commodities on the free market.8
“For Plato, democracy is in its essence a system of variety, and this applies equally
6 Particularly Book VIII.
7 Gerasimos Santas, “Plato’s Criticism of the Democratic Man in the Republic,” The Journal of Ethics vol. 5,
iss. 1 (2001): 67. For a more general account of the essential relation between constitution and psychology
in Plato’s Republic see G. R. F. Ferrari, City and Soul in Plato’s Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005), chapter 3. 
8 Plato,  Republic,  VIII,  557d.  Also  see  Sheldon  Wolin,  “Norm  and  Form:  The  Constitutionalising  of
Democracy,”  Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of  American Democracy,  eds.  J.  Peter
Euben, John R. Wallach and Josiah Ober (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 50. 
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well to what is on offer politically: democracy, he says, is not a constitution, but a
bazaar filled with all possible constitutions, where anyone can choose to perceive
whichever variety they please.”9 In a society in which each may arrange his own life
as he sees fit, each according to his own personal constitution, it is here where Plato
claims  to  encounter  the  greatest  variety  of  dispositions  and  temperaments.  The
democratic city is one plagued by an exaggerated, hyperbolic individualism. And
yet,  even  more  problematic,  beyond  this  system  of  variety  particular  to  the
democratic constitution as a whole, Plato finds this confused orientation to remain
the  defining  psychological  characteristic  of  each  individual  democrat.  What
democratic  man lacks,  Plato charges,  is  a consistency of character:  he is  fickle,
erratic, mercurial, temperamental. Just as democracy supposedly ascribes a certain
equality  to  the  demos,  distributing  to  each  citizen  an  equal  share  of  rule,  the
psychology of the democrat is one inflicted by an isomorphic equality of desires.10
Experiencing his  many appetites,  motives  and inclinations  with equal  force and
immediacy,  pursuing the satisfaction of each desire as it  arises within him as if
selected by lot, unlike the oligarch, timocrat and tyrant, the democratic psyche is
distinguished  precisely  by  the  absence of  a  dominant  desire  or  consistent
teleological orientation; like the infant of psychoanalysis whose reality principle is
yet to develop, he lacks both the capacity to organise and coordinate his impulses as
well as a stable framework of judgement to evaluate beneficial ends from harmful
9 Jacques Rancière, “The Uses of Democracy,” On the Shores of Politics (London: Verso, 2007), 42. 
10 Santas, “Plato’s Criticism of the Democratic Man in the Republic,” 62.
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ones.11 Infantile,  politically  and  intellectually  immature,  democratic  man  is
therefore  destined  to  confuse courage  with  impudence,  excellence  with
extravagance, liberty with anarchy.12 
Indeed,  according to  Plato’s moral  psychological  diagnosis,  the democrat
suffers from a chronic anarchy of the soul,  a condition in  which the precept  of
equality proper to democratic politics infects, like a contagious disease, all spheres
of life and depths of the soul. Conceived as such, this undecidability, this anarchy of
the soul, may be interpreted as the direct psychological consequence of a society in
which equality is perceived to dictate over all relations and things, extending itself
indefinitely to domains where it  does not belong. The problem with democracy,
Plato contends, is that it  is arrogant enough to attribute its radical conception of
equality to both the “equal and unequal alike,” inverting all forms of social relations
in  a  single  movement. This  is  why Plato’s  critique  of  democracy includes  that
farcical  caricature  of  the  democratic  city  in  which  slaves  live  as  free  as  their
masters, sons discipline their fathers, students contradict their teachers, the young
openly disrespect their elders, resident aliens feel as entitled as citizens and even
domestic  animals  assert  their  own savage  equality  by roaming  proudly through
public streets.13 Quite simply, for Plato, democracy is the name of the society which,
more than any other, expresses the need to be governed.       
11 Plato will  certainly mock democracy for its infantile psychological tendencies.  See Alain Badiou, “The
Democratic Emblem,” Giorgio Agamben et al., Democracy in What State? (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2011), 11-12.
12 Plato,  Republic,  VIII,  560d-e.  For  Plato,  this  confusion  eventually  leads  to  democracy’s  inevitable
degradation and downfall. See Dick Howard, The Primacy of the Political: A History of Political Thought
from the Greeks to the French and American Revolutions (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 55.
13 Plato, Republic, VIII, 562d-563d.
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Self-interested,  ignorant  of  the  common good,  disrespectful  of  authority,
concerned only with his own inclinations and immediate desires, “ungovernable” by
nature, although this more extensive assessment of the democrat only appears much
later in the  Republic, is this not a fitting summation of the reprehensible state in
which we find the sailors of Socrates’ narrative? Are we not placed on board the
ship of democracy precisely to bear witness to the wild anarchy symptomatic of a
mass democratic hysteria in which the ungovernable govern the ungovernable? The
metaphor is quite appropriate in more ways than one. For while the most famous of
the Greek philosophers generally emerged from the aristocratic classes, as Moses
Finley reminds us, in the Athenian navy, ships were invariably manned by oarsmen
composed of the demos.14 Therefore, just as Rancière will appeal to the shoemaker
to symbolise the poor,15 it is equally befitting that the sailor personify the demos of
democratic  Athens.  Secondly,  while  the  allegory  of  the  ship  clearly  draws  our
attention to the deplorable behaviour of the democratic sailors, obviously intended
to  underscore  their  utter  incapability  of  self-governance,  if  we  consider  the
maritime backdrop of the narrative more thoroughly, perhaps it may suggest a more
nuanced reading. For beyond the rather superficial treatment of the psychology of
the democrat, whose disposition could no doubt be reformed (or simply repressed)
under the proper order of a new regime, is there not a more profound evil to which
Plato’s allegorical seascape alludes? Perhaps it is not so much the chaotic scene of
drunken sailors  which unfolds on deck,  but  what  lies  beneath the hull  that  will
14 Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern, 87. 
15 In The Philosopher and His Poor (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
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reveal so decisively what Plato cannot tolerate about democracy: not so much the
psychology of democratic  man,  but rather  the boundless sea of  politics through
which  they  sail,  that  vertigo-inducing  experience  indicative  of  a  radical
indeterminacy,  a  groundless  ontological  condition  particular  to  democracy  and
democracy alone.
Insofar as the  Republic prescribes the erection of an immense hierarchical
edifice ruled by an exceptional class of guardian philosophers, the infrastructure of
such a regime cannot be established in the murky Mediterranean waters far from
shore.  The open sea will  provide no foundation for the architectonics of Plato’s
ideal city.16 Much like Hobbes, who hulls in his massive leviathan from great depths
so to lay down the sovereign ground of his absolutist State, Plato must first secure
the  infrastructure  of  his  own  city  far  from  the  “great  beast  of  the  populace”
encountered on ships at sea. For Plato, the sea represents a place of unpredictability
and volatility. For Plato, the sea represents the place of politics. Perhaps it is for this
reason that in the introduction to his appropriately titled volume On the Shores of
Politics, Rancière will contend that: “The whole political project of Platonism can
be conceived as an anti-maritime polemic.”17 According to Rancière, Plato’s entire
political  philosophy may be appreciated as an imperative  against politics, as the
refoundation of politics which is at the same time its effective dislocation: “The sea
smells bad. This is not because of the mud, however. The sea smells of sailors, it
16 John McSweeney,  “Giving Politics an Edge: Rancière and the Anarchic Principle of Democracy,”  Sofia
Philosophical Review vol. 3, no. 1 (2009): 129-30.
17 Jacques Rancière, “Introduction,” On the Shores of Politics, 1. 
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smells  of  democracy.  The task  of  philosophy is  to  found a  different  politics,  a
politics of conversion which turns its back on the sea.”18 It thus becomes the first
objective of Plato’s political philosophy to displace politics, to extract politics from
its life at sea so to lay it down upon  terra firma, upon the solid ground or archê
principle of philosophy itself.19 This operation is  precisely the basis  of what,  in
Disagreement, Rancière will denounce as archipolitics: a philosophical programme
designed to eradicate the threat of politics from the start by instituting a community
that aspires towards the complete realisation of its archê, an underlying principle
which  distributes  the  proper  relations  of  rule  without  remainder  and  without
excess.20 What Plato’s political philosophy intends to neutralise is the polemics of
the polis, the exercise of making the city and the organisation of the city a matter of
controversy and dispute. For on the stormy seas of democracy, the problem is not
only that the demos, much like sailing a ship, completely lacks the proper tools and
insight required to navigate the monumental task of governing a city.21 “It is that at
the people’s assembly, any mere shoemaker or smithie can get up and have his say
on how to steer the ships and how to build the fortifications and, more to the point,
on  the  just  or  unjust  ways  to  use  these  for  the  common  good.”22 When  Plato
disavows democracy for its profound ignorance of justice and the common good,
18 Ibid., 2.
19 Ibid.,  1-2. Also see  Gilles Labelle, “Two Refoundation Projects of Democracy in Contemporary French
Philosophy: Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancière,”  Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 27, no. 4
(2001): 88.
20 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy  (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press,
1999), 65-70. Also see Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 43.
21 Labelle,  “Two  Refoundation  Projects  of  Democracy  in  Contemporary  French  Philosophy:  Cornelius
Castoriadis and Jacques Rancière,” 88.
22 Ranciere, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 16. 
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essential to his charge is the contention that as a social or cultural phenomenon,
democracy appears to lay out a plane of equivalence in which anyone can lay claim
to anything in a space dictated only by the rule of doxa and agon.23 And yet, while
the purely epistemological implications of this experience are vast, for Plato, the
problem surrounding democracy extends deeper still.  At its core, perhaps Plato’s
real  concern  with  democracy is  that  with  regards  to  the  order  of  the  city,  with
regards to the question of its very constitution, democracy undermines the authority
of the experts at the same time as it undermines the authority of oligarchs and kings.
What democracy unapologetically denies is that there is a proper order of society
and indeed, a privileged class of rulers who possess knowledge of such a society. In
this respect, when associated with ancient Greek democracy, this is precisely how
the politics of  doxa and  agon should be understood: beyond the still predominant
Platonic interpretation which reduces these terms to mere rhetoric, circulation of
opinion and the interminable contest of debate, the formal institution of  doxa and
agon remains  a  testament  to  democracy’s  uncompromising  position  against the
notion that there somewhere exists an accessible and decipherable underlying truth
of society, that gods sanction the divine right of kings, that mystical sages possess
an esoteric knowledge of the nature of society.24 Rather, what ancient democracy’s
very institutions unmistakeably imply is that the problem of the organisation of the
23 Gilles Deleuze, “Plato, the Greeks,”  Essays Critical and Clinical  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997), 137.
24 According to Castoriadis,  democracy is  founded upon  doxa,  upon the public circulation and legitimate
refutation of ideas.  See “Intellectuals and History,”  Philosophy,  Politics,  Autonomy (New York:  Oxford
University Press, 1991), 7. Likewise, Chantal Mouffe will emphasise the role of the agon in democracy, the
rivalry, contest and conflict essential to the institution of political deliberation. See “For an Agonistic Model
of Democracy,” The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000).
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social  is  a  problem  destined  to  remain  unresolved  in  any  absolute  sense.  As
Castoriadis  reminds  us,  democracy demands  that  the  polis  absolve  itself  of  the
claim that its limits may be determined in advance. There is no abstract model of
society to  be provided by nature  or  revealed  by the  gods.  There  is  no ultimate
closure  to  the  question  of  what  constitutes  justice  and  the  common  good.
Consequently,  democracy is  perceived to  open up a  vast  gulf,  an infinite  depth
which annihilates the claim of a final word or ultimate authority.25 The meaning of
politics is intrinsically bound to this condition. 
To supplant the sea of politics with the ground of wisdom: this is the dream
of  the  Platonist.  Government  must  be  sheltered  from politics,  from its  lack  of
foundation, from the perils immanent to its condition. Politics can have no place in
the just city. And yet, set on the decks of ships far from shore, does not Plato’s
portrayal of democracy inextricably bound to his absurd sociology of democratic
man inadvertently conceal  the depth of the real  scandal  at  hand, the scandal  of
politics itself? On the contrary. The fact that Plato remains entirely disinterested in
any substantial  political  analysis  of  democracy  only demonstrates  that  its  often
comical depiction merely intends to present a problem to be resolved, a sickness to
be cured,  a  social  inversion to  be righted.  As Rancière suggests,  is  there not  a
certain  reassurance,  a  certain  solace  to  be  taken  from  Plato’s  portrait  of  the
disordered, upside-down world of democracy in which all relations from governor
25 This is one reason why Castoriadis will  proclaim democracy a  tragic regime. Democracy possesses no
ground beyond itself. Accordingly, Castoriadis sees democracy as perpetually at risk, perhaps even of its
own undoing. See for example “What Democracy?,” 123. Also see Nathalie Karagiannis, “Democracy as a
Tragic Regime: Democracy and its Cancellation”  Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social
Theory vol. 11, no. 1 (2010). 
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and governed to father and son have capsized at once? For this appears to attest to
the fact that all these relations are of the same nature, that all these subversions are
indicative of the same inversion of the proper order of society and therefore could
all  be  corrected  by the  application  of  the  same  principle  or  set  of  principles.26
Although democracy is equated to the overstuffed marketplace, what Plato’s moral
diagnosis indisputably reveals is that the disease which afflicts the regime is not in
fact one of abundance, but rather one of lack. As demonstrated by the allegory of
the ship, for Plato, it is precisely democracy’s lack of an archê which provides all
the evidence for the archê’s necessity and effectiveness in the composition of the
well  ordered  society.  With  respect  to  democracy’s  anarchic  condition,  what  the
Republic posits so unequivocally is not so much an argument for the rule of the
philosophers,  but  for  the  necessity of  the  principle  which  dictates  that  it  is  the
philosophers and the philosophers alone who constitute the proper rulers of the city.
And  thus,  however  trivial  its  presentation,  the  Republic’s  very  solution  to  the
problem of democracy, namely, the institution of a government of philosophers, the
founding  of  a  rational  social  order  grounded  upon  a  new archê  principle,  will
certainly render the substance and magnitude of the problem entirely transparent.
As long as Plato formulates politics and philosophy in antithetical terms, the rule of
philosophy  will  necessarily  entail  the  negation  of  politics.  Plato  allows  for  no
reconciliation. Therefore, far from a philosophy of politics, what Plato’s political
philosophy  must  properly  describe  is  an  anti-politics,  a  contempt  for  the
26 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 38.
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irreducibility or infinite depth that is intrinsic to its experience. And in this regard,
the very structure of Plato’s solution to the problem of democracy corresponds to
what the subsequent history of political philosophy will inadvertently reveal: “The
term  ‘political  philosophy’  does  not  designate  any  genre,  any  territory  or
specification  of  philosophy.  Nor  does  it  designate  politics’  reflection  on  its
immanent rationality. It is the name of an encounter—and a polemical encounter at
that—in which the paradox or scandal of politics is exposed: its lack of any proper
foundation.”27 At least in Rancière’s estimation, political philosophy is predicated
upon the supposition that there is a rational means to order the roles, spaces and
functioning parts  of  a  community.  This  is  precisely what  animates  a  theoretical
project intent on discovering a set  of normative principles that both ground and
justify a given order of rule.28 The name of such a principle is what we shall call the
archê. When the logic of the archê is operative in the organisation of the social, the
condition of politics, its lack of any proper foundation, is effectively obscured. 
But  if  it  is  Rancière’s  conclusion  that  Plato’s  political  philosophy  is
emblematic of philosophy’s suppression or effacement of politics, he will not be
alone in his evaluation. In his own assessment, Castoriadis argues that Plato’s very
ontology  inaugurates  a  political  philosophy  which  ultimately  rests  upon  the
concealment and closure of the political question (the self-institution of society).29
In  stark  contrast  to  Presocratic  philosophy  bound  to  the  project  of  autonomy
27 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 61.
28 Jean-Philippe Deranty, “Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology,”  Theory and Event  vol. 6, no. 4
(2003).
29 Cornelius Castoriadis, Ce qui fait la Grèce. 1 D’Homère à Héraclite (Paris: Seuil, 2004), 288.
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extending  from the  early sophists  to  Socrates  himself,  Plato  is  the  figure  who,
according to Castoriadis, betrays philosophy’s inherent political character, turning
its  back  on  society’s  explicit  self-instituting  capacity,  in  order  to  facilitate  the
invention of an imagined city outside history governed not by its citizens, but by a
new class of philosopher-kings who dictate laws from above.30 Likewise, although
Arendt’s  entire  authorship  could  be  said  to  be  instigated  by  the  problem  of
totalitarianism, compelling her formulation of a new concept of politics that draws
heavily from the Greek democratic experience, she will repeatedly disavow what
she understands as the tradition of political philosophy which finds its inception
with Plato.31 According to Arendt, Plato identifies the public sphere of speech and
action—the  being-together  of  citizens  in  common—as  a  realm  of  darkness,
confusion  and  deceptive  appearances  which  the  philosopher  must  escape  and
overcome  in  order  to  discover  the  clarity  of  eternal  ideas,  ideas  which  would
otherwise remain corrupted by the unprejudiced circulation of a public doxa without
standard  or  measure.32 Arendt  discerns  Platonism as  the  introduction  of  a  new
model  of  sovereignty specific  to the philosophers,  one which first  dissolves  the
integral bond between thought and action, theory and  praxis, only to reassemble
them in a hierarchical relation that imposes a certain governance of philosophy over
politics,  bios  theorètikos over  bios  politikos.  Far  from  signalling  a  productive
alliance,  Arendt  maintains  that  as  long  as  political  philosophy  engenders  the
30 Castoriadis, “Intellectuals and History,” 7-8. 
31 Claude  Lefort,  “Hannah  Arendt  and  the  Question  of  the  Political,”  Democracy  and  Political  Theory
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 46, 50-1.
32 Hannah Arendt,  “Tradition and the Modern Age,”  Between Past  and Future (London:  Penguin  Books,
2006), 17. 
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subordination of politics by philosophy, the tradition can only be approached and
evaluated according to this deepseated tension between these two terms.33
Let us retain our proximity to Arendt for a moment longer. For the charges
she levels against Plato will not only anticipate those of Castoriadis and Rancière,
but at the same time, also serve to completely reorient the concept of politics for the
purpose of this study. This predominance of philosophy over politics, thought over
praxis begins, for Arendt, with another Platonic allegory: the well known allegory
of  the  cave.34 Here,  we will  follow Abensour’s  interpretation  in  our  reading of
Arendt.35 While  there  is  no  need to  retell  the  familiar  narrative  here,  Abensour
argues that if we follow Arendt, what the cave allegory indisputably describes in
mythological  terms  is  the  origins  of  philosophy’s  representation  of  itself  as
diametrically opposed to  the politics  of  the polis.36 For  Arendt,  this  exercise  of
situating philosophy against politics would have a profound effect on the destiny of
the  western  philosophical  tradition  and  its  capacity  to  adequately  grasp  the
problems specific to politics itself. According to Abensour, by not only isolating the
allegory  of  the  cave  as  the  centrepiece  of  Plato’s  political  thought,  but  by
emphasising  the  heroic  figure  of  the  philosopher  at  the  centre  of  the  narrative,
Arendt  reads  the  allegory  as  symbolic  for  the  necessity  of  the  philosopher’s
withdrawal  from  the  shadowy  world  of  social  affairs  in  order  to  discover  an
33 This remains a predominant theme in Arendt’s posthumous The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken
Books, 2005). 
34 Plato, Republic, VII, 514a–520a. Also see Arendt, “Tradition and the Modern Age,” 17.
35 I will largely follow Abensour’s analysis in his essay “Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics:
Arendt’s  Reading  of  Plato’s  Cave  Allegory,”  Social  Research vol.  74,  no.  4  (Winter  2007).  Also  see
Abensour’s Hannah Arendt contre la philosophie politique? (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2006).
36 Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into Politics,”  The Promise of Politics,  130-1. Also see Abensour, “Against
the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics: Arendt’s Reading of Plato’s Cave Allegory,” 957. 
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absolute  standard  of  measure,  a  transcendent  yardstick  according  to  which  the
organisation of the city may be apprised and evaluated from without.37 It  is this
discovery  that  will  ultimately  serve  to  qualify  the  philosopher  as  the  proper
governor of the city. For it is not that the Platonist desires the arbitrary rule of the
tyrant  who  occupies  a  place  beyond  the  law.  What  he  seeks  to  establish  is  a
government of wisdom, a new form of legitimacy constituted by a new authority:
the authority of the philosophers. However, this authority will be generated neither
by strategies of coercion or persuasion (according to Arendt, this is not at all what
authority means).  The philosopher’s  authority remains  entirely distinct  from the
violence and hegemony exercised by the oligarch, timocrat and tyrant respectively.38
Rather, the authority of the philosopher will ultimately be drawn from his claim to
wisdom, a  claim which is  itself  indicative of  his  own privileged relation to  the
Forms,  to  truth  itself  (aletheia),  that  which  remains  unquestionable,
unobjectionable, undeniable, that which remains structurally impervious to dispute,
debate and public challenge.39 And yet, the basis of such an authoritarian model of
society, Abensour continues, is one which would have been entirely unknown to the
Greeks  until  Plato.40 While  authoritarianism  need  not  always  be  Platonic  in
37 Hannah Arendt,  “What is Authority?,”  Between Past and Future,  109. Also see Abensour, “Against the
Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics:  Arendt’s Reading of Plato’s Cave Allegory,” 970 and Andrew
Schaap,  “Hannah  Arendt  and  the  Philosophical  Repression  of  Politics,” Jacques  Rancière  and  the
Contemporary Scene: The Philosophy of Radical Equality,  eds.  Jean-Philippe Deranty and Alison Ross
(London: Continuum International Publishers, 2012), 150.
38 Arendt employs the term “authority” with a great deal of precision. According to Arendt, authority refers to
a relationship of obedience organised through a hierarchical structure in which the source of its legitimacy is
located in a realm beyond politics itself.
39 See Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” Between Past and Future.
40 Abensour,  “Against  the  Sovereignty  of  Philosophy  over  Politics:  Arendt’s  Reading  of  Plato’s  Cave
Allegory,” 960. 
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character, it is Plato who introduces this unique authoritarian framework to the ideal
of the well ordered polis. This is what is entirely new. While the Greeks certainly
possessed  an  understanding of  unrestricted  rule  under  the  name of  tyranny,  the
Republic’s promotion of a privileged class of rulers located at the apex of a rigid
hierarchical structure that discovers the source of its unchallengeable authority in a
publicly inaccessible  transcendent  field would have  been entirely foreign  to  the
Greek political imaginary.41 This is largely why Arendt maintains that Plato must
acquire the blueprint for his model of government precisely in a series of extra-
political relationships: the shepherd and his sheep, the physician and his patient, the
master and his slave, the captain and his crew, each example specifically extracted
from what she identifies as the private sphere of life.42 
Insofar as the allegory of the cave recites the manner in which, through his
discovery of the Forms, the philosopher distinguishes himself from the rest of the
community and identifies the proper order of the city as the one that transcends
political  relations,  Arendt  understands  the  narrative  as  the  originary  model  of
philosophy’s  defiant  position  against  politics.  Moreover,  given  the  Republic’s
exemplary status in the larger tradition, Arendt appreciates the allegory to produce
vast  consequences  for  the  subsequent  history  of  political  thought.  It  is  here,
Abensour contends, where her reading remains unique from other interpretations of
the allegory. For as Arendt demonstrates, not only does it provide the model which
41 Arendt, “What is Authority?,” 104, 110.
42 Ibid., 104,108. Also see Abensour, “Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics: Arendt’s Reading
of Plato’s Cave Allegory,” 960-1. Plato will repeatedly reference such dyadic relations of authority, not only
in the Republic, but in the Statesman and Laws as well.
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sets up the essential opposition between politics and philosophy, doxa and aletheia,
it offers a detailed narrative description of philosophy’s discovery of the means to
overcome politics altogether, providing the basis for a theoretical reconstitution of
the city specifically designed to cancel out the emergence of politics from the start.
And while, following Plato’s description, Arendt clearly recognises the conditions
of  the  cave  (heads  fixed  towards  the  shadows,  all  conversation  forbidden)  as
indicative of a definitively apolitical space—lacking in speech and action—she will
nevertheless insist  that the political  implications of the cave allegory are all  too
often  overshadowed  by  its  far  more  apparent  epistemological  dimensions,  a
problem which may be immediately forestalled when placed side by side with the
allegory  of  the  ship  already  examined.  Rancière  will  already  draw  a  formal
comparison between the two: “The cave is the sea transposed beneath the earth,
bereft of its sparkling glamour: enclosure instead of open sea, men in chains instead
of rows of oarsmen, the dullness of shadows on the wall instead of light reflected on
waves.”43 Although the epistemological problem of the cave is well known, if we
extrapolate from Arendt’s strategically political reading, what the narrative structure
of the allegory unmistakably implies is that it is just as essential that the philosopher
escape  from  the  indeterminable  sea  of  politics  (the  ship)  as  it  is  from  the
epistemological prison of illusion and doxa (the cave). For if the allegory of the ship
represents  not  only  the  psychology  of  the  demos,  but  as  I  have  suggested,
something of the ontology of politics itself—its lack of foundation—the allegory of
43 Rancière, “Introduction,” On the Shores of Politics, 2. 
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the  cave  will  represent  with  far  greater  clarity  the  mythological  origins  of
philosophy’s quest to overcome the very condition of politics in order to acquire an
absolute standard in which the proper organisation of the city may be accurately
measured  and evaluated.  Just  as  the  cave  concerns  the  problem of  doxa which
discovers  its  solution  with  the  advent  of  the  Forms  (the  ultimate  basis  for  the
philosopher’s claim to wisdom), the ship concerns the problem of politics’ anarchic
condition which discovers its solution with the advent of the archê principle (the
ultimate basis for the proper relations of rule). Both in the cave and on the ship,
what is discernibly lacking is a social order governed by a Platonic notion of truth, a
truth located at the limit of politics just as it is at the limit of doxa. In order to affirm
the authority of the philosophers, which itself forms the basis of the institution of
the  proper  order  of  rule,  Plato  must  first  establish  the  philosopher’s  privileged
relationship  to  truth.  As  demonstrated  by  Arendt,  beyond  the  problem  of
epistemology, this is the primary objective of the allegory of the cave. 
And yet, although the philosopher must escape the bonds of the cave—as if
a chained oarsman in the bowels of a sea vessel—to bear witness to the radiant
Forms in the clear sky above, according to Abensour, what particularly interests
Arendt is that the philosopher must inevitably return to the cave in order to realise
the Forms in application.44 Until that time, the Forms will remain purely aesthetic,
purely  theoretical,  their  practical  social  function  only  manifest  when  the
philosopher  returns  to  the  city  and  transforms it  according  to  this  transcendent
44 Abensour,  “Against  the  Sovereignty  of  Philosophy  over  Politics:  Arendt’s  Reading  of  Plato’s  Cave
Allegory,” 964-5. 
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standard discovered beyond the realm of politics and public  doxa.45 For Arendt,
there is nothing inherently political about the Forms in themselves. As observed
often  enough,  Plato’s  recourse  to  the  Forms  can  simply  be  taken  to  resolve  a
problem that remains purely epistemological: in the democratic city where every
statement appears equally reducible to the order of  doxa, how are we to establish
the ultimate criteria in which we may evaluate the veracity of each statement, their
relative proximity to truth? But as soon as philosophy concerns itself with the larger
social function of the Forms, as soon as it subjects the organisation of the city to an
entirely alien set  of abstract  ideas which shall  serve as the absolute  standard to
evaluate  the  basis  of  its  structural  model,  political  philosophy,  as  Arendt
understands the term,  is  born.46 This  is  precisely what  we discover  with Plato’s
Republic. And in this respect, the Republic is unique among the Platonic dialogues
in that it is the text which will most explicitly address this distinctively practical
application of the Forms: it concerns their social function as much as it concerns
their epistemological merit.
Therefore, although the Republic is often considered the archetypal work of
political philosophy, Arendt must conclude, as will Castoriadis and Rancière, that
the dialogue’s principal concern is not at all a question of politics, but rather its
eclipse and obfuscation. Plato can only arrive at the correct form of government—
the rule of the philosophers—through the disintegration of politics, its substitution
45 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 226.
46 Arendt, “What is Authority?,” 112-13. Also see Abensour, “Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over
Politics: Arendt’s Reading of Plato’s Cave Allegory,” 972. 
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with a new model  of  authority made possible  by the dramatic  discovery of  the
abstract Forms. And while this  brief sketch of Arendt’s critique of Plato merely
intends  to  illuminate  the  allegorical  origins  of  philosophy’s  rather  consistent
disavowal of politics itself, perhaps more importantly, from her conclusions we may
extract a more general postulate that will not only throw the customary theoretical
approach to politics into question, but at the same time, provide the background for
its conceptual reconstruction against which we may consider the principal authors
examined in this study from Rancière to Lefort to Abensour. Insofar as her analysis
of Plato compels a distinction between the rule of the philosophers on the one hand
and politics on the other, Arendt’s critique will correspond with one of her most
important theses, one that will be consistently encountered throughout her extensive
authorship: politics remains irreducible to rule.47 
Perhaps this simple affirmation represents one of Arendt’s most profound
contributions  to  modern  political  thought,  its  significance  witnessed  from  her
monumental analysis of totalitarianism to her critical evaluation of the tradition of
political philosophy from Plato to Marx. According to Arendt, it is the fundamental
error of political philosophy to affix the concept of politics to a general framework
dictated  solely  by  the  problem  of  rulers,  governors,  sovereigns  and  kings.
Interestingly, in a somewhat obscure reference in The History of Sexuality, Foucault
seems to share a similar concern, lamenting political philosophy’s apparent inability
to think beyond the limits of this rather myopic theme: “In political thought and
47 Parchen Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê and Democracy,” The American Political Science
Review vol. 100, no. 1 (Feb., 2006): 3.
43
analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.”48 This preoccupation with
rule—which for Arendt, is more of a consistent strategy than a perpetual oversight
—creates considerable complications for thinking about politics in its own right,
functioning not only to obstruct and conceal its wider meaning, but by displacing
the problems of politics for  innumerable theoretical  models  of rulers  and ruled,
ultimately becomes the basis  for the outright  cancellation of politics itself  from
philosophical inquiry. Here recall a passage from The Human Condition so pertinent
that it must be repeated at length: 
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet
and order has in fact so much to recommend that the greater part
of political philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as
various  attempts  to  find  theoretical  foundations  and  practical
ways for an escape from politics altogether. The hallmark of all
such escapes is the concept of rule, that is, the notion that men
can  lawfully  and  politically  live  together  only when  some are
entitled to command and the others forced to obey.49 
Beyond Plato’s particular appeal to models of authority and transcendent Forms,
what Arendt argues more generally is that political philosophy’s underlying fixation
with  rule already constitutes the basis of its simultaneous rejection of and escape
from politics altogether.  Consequently,  the author of  The Human Condition will
clearly recognise that her own phenomenology of human praxis (which ultimately
seeks  to  conceive  politics  in  a  manner  which  binds  visibility,  equality  and
autonomous activity in the public sphere) must inevitably confront and contradict
this  entire  tradition  accordingly.  Rather  than  negotiate  a  conception  of  politics
48 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 88-
9.
49 Arendt, The Human Condition, 222. 
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predominantly drawn from theories of government, sovereignty and the affairs of
the State from Plato to Hobbes to Schmitt,  Arendt’s own theoretical project will
immediately circumvent this entire tradition for a more historical analysis of the
Greek polis,  particularly democratic  Athens.50 Therefore,  in  many respects,  it  is
Arendt’s endeavour to unbind politics from a restricted reference to rule that will
ultimately  incite  her  appeal  to  the  Greeks.  In  a  decisive  attempt  to  recover
something  of  the  Hellenistic  roots  of  politikos,  Arendt  insists  that  the  central
problems of  politics  cannot  be  confined to  various  models  of  rulers  and  ruled,
however  assembled or arranged. Moreover,  with specific reference to  the Greek
concept  of  isonomia,  when  compelled  to  articulate  her  own  understanding  of
freedom—which  for  Arendt  is  always  a  political freedom—she  will  only do  so
according to what she calls the “conditions of no-rule” expressed in terms of the
explicitly absent division between governor and governed, ruler and ruled.51 
This strategy is entirely justified. For in his landmark historical study The
Greek Discovery of Politics, Christian Meier will delineate the Greek understanding
of politics  in a manner which largely supports  the basic  framework of Arendt’s
essential claim. As concisely as possible, let us consider some of his core theses.
Often with explicit reference to Athenian democracy, Meier underscores that for the
Greeks, politics intended to designate what pertains to the polis, that is,  what is
50 Although  The  Human Condition offers  no  systematic  analysis  of  democracy,  outlining her  concept  of
politics without explicitly employing the term, Arendt’s later work, particularly On Revolution and Crises of
the Republic, will offer a more direct engagement with democracy, now associating it with her notion of
praxis in a more apparent manner. 
51 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 20. Also see her “Tradition and the Modern
Age,” 18-19 where she explicitly identifies the Athenian polis as functioning without the division between
ruler and ruled. 
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public (dimosios), what specifically addresses what is common in society (koinos,
xynos) or what concerns the community as a whole.52 It could be said that politics
was perceived as the invention of a field which functions to intersect or cut across
what  would  otherwise  be  restricted  as  the  private  or  exclusive  or  enclosed,
facilitating a notion of a political community that effectively delimits traditional
filiations and alliances (birth, caste and class). And yet, politics was not conceived
as something universal or ubiquitous, did not describe the relations between cities
(international relations), did not simply correspond to authority, domination or the
exercise of power and was carefully distinguished from examples of absolute rule
(tyranny was  not  deemed political,  just  as  Arendt  will  not  deem totalitarianism
political). Politics, rather, in the broadest sense, was a term reserved to express what
constitutes  a  political  community  (politeia):  it  was  understood  as  that  which
identifies  or  affiliates  a  political  or  citizen  body (politai)  with  the  polis  itself,
namely its participation in the sphere of society that is public and thus described the
citizen’s activity in the affairs of the polis accordingly.53 
And while politics and rule certainly collide and intersect in a number of
ways (Meier reminds us, for example, that oligarchic rule could be understood to be
politicised when it was challenged and increasingly broadened to include more and
more public involvement),54 his research certainly provides the historical basis to
conceptually reframe the idea of politics in a manner that is no longer dominated by
52 Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 13. In the
most general sense, Meier defines politikos in terms of what is “appropriate to the polis.”
53 Ibid., 20-1.
54 Ibid., 13.
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references  to  acts  of  government,  State  administration  and  the  authority
concentrated in a small and exclusive circle of rulers or professional politicians.
Indeed, while Meier considers the question of government (the very question of
“who is to govern?”) as essentially political in nature, rather than the exercise of
rule  or  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  ruler  and  ruled,  he  will  tend  to
associate the Greek conception of politics with the politicisation of rule itself, the
making of rule a political problem, the ever widening of the community’s inclusion
in the affairs of the polis, the emergence of a political body that encounters itself as
a political body through its unique relation to that which is political.55 Thus, for the
Greeks, politics was equally bound to both subject and city through this distinct
nexus  between  the  two:  politics  renders  those  who  were  once  simply  ruled  a
political body by exposing the problems of the polis (that which concerns the whole
community)  to  a  political  field  so  that  the  meaning  of  the  polis  becomes
synonymous with the political body itself via its participation in the matters which
concern the whole community.56 
The implications of such a concept for Greek society were considerable. It
meant that for the first time the polis could be represented in a manner that was not
possible before. As the polis became envisaged as something set out against any
natural  or  preordained  order  of  society,  as  the  destiny  of  the  polis  became
appreciated as something to be shaped by the praxis of citizens as political agents,
55 The notion of politicisation is a prominent theme throughout Meier’s book. See 4-5, 50, 84-5, 166-7, 170-6.
For Meier, the meaning of democracy remains inextricably bound to this process of politicisation.
56 Ibid., 20.
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the very constitution of the community could be interpreted as a problem specific to
politics itself. This is the double movement that we tend to encounter with politics:
as soon as the problems of the polis become political, the very constitution of the
polis itself becomes a political problem. In this regard, the political philosophy of
Plato and Aristotle, which initiates an analysis of the polis via a detailed comparison
of constitutional forms, already arrives on the scene too late.57 For politics is located
not  in  the  distinct  governments  discovered  in  various  constitutions,  but  in  that
which  renders  the  constitution  a  problem of  politics  in  the  first  place.  This  is
precisely what Meier discovers with ancient Greek democracy: 
For the first time in Greek history—and world history—the civil
order as a whole was placed at the disposal of the citizens: it had
become a matter of controversy, hence a political issue. For the
first time in history men were presented with a clear alternative,
the starkest alternative that is possible within civic communities
[…]:  Should  the  governed  (that  is,  those  who  were  not
professionally  engaged  in  political  life)  be  granted  a  decisive
voice in civic affairs [...]  or should they not? It was no longer
simply a question of whether or not there should be some kind of
public order or of who should have the right to govern (either a
monarch or an aristocracy) [...]. The question was now: Given the
alternative constitutions that differ fundamentally, which should
be chosen? Should government be in the hands of the nobles or of
the people?”58 
For Meier, not unlike Castoriadis, what is significant here is the ability to explicitly
pose the question, the ability to discern the polis and the government of the polis as
something  controversial,  as  something problematic,  a question no longer  simply
allocated to the jurisdiction of monarchs, nobles or the rich. Politics declares that
57 Sheldon Wolin argues that Plato and Aristotle do not so much offer a philosophy of politics as a philosophy
of the constitution or of the constitutionalisation of politics. See “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalising
of Democracy.” 
58 Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, 84.
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the question regarding the order of the city is not prescribed and not settled. Politics
is that which not only raises the question, but maintains that the question itself is
political in nature. Consequently, for the Greeks, when there was politics, there was
no longer simply rule. 
Therefore,  insofar  as we follow Arendt’s  example and maintain a certain
fidelity to the ancient Greek origins of the term, it becomes possible to conceive
politics in a manner that resists its appropriation by a dominant theoretical model
that confines its meaning to various arrangements of rulers and ruled. For politics
does not reference the problem of how a defined set of rulers are to exercise their
rule over a community. From what is common (koinos) to what is public (dimosios)
to what constitutes the political community itself (politeia), politics references an
entirely different set of problems first expressed institutionally as political problems
by a small number of cites scattered across the Greek peninsula. In ancient times,
such  cities  were  typically  known  as  democracies. Quite  distinct  from  the
apparatuses,  strategies and dynamics of rule,  politics is  that which collides with
rule; it is what makes rule problematic, what puts rule into question as a given or
unequivocal relation. Politics initiates a  polemics of the polis. It  undermines the
closure of political problems at the same time that it denies their enclosure—their
becoming private or exclusive—so that the problems of the polis, its constitution
and  subsequent  parts,  roles  and  spaces,  remain  political,  which  is  to  say,  they
remain problematic and ultimately irreducible. Politics is the exercise of making the
polis  political.  It  does  not  describe  the  governance  of  the  city  itself,  but  what
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engenders the city and the government of the city a political problem. Perhaps it is
for this reason that when Rancière outlines his own concept of politics, he will do
so according to acts of dissensus, the very process in which the organisation of the
community becomes an object of dispute: according to Rancière, the community is
only  constituted  a  political community  when  it  is  divided  by  a  fundamental
disagreement (la mésentente) regarding the nature of its partition of parts, roles and
spaces.59 For Rancière, such disagreement is the essence of politics. Likewise, when
Lefort conceives politics (la politique), he will do so not simply according to social
conflict  and division (which is  everywhere in  society and hardly worthy of  the
term), but with respect to what makes conflict legitimate, visible and intelligible:
politics is that which brings conflict in society to the fore, institutes this conflict and
gives it a political expression.60 Just as totalitarianism strives to conceal and deny
the  manifestations  of  social  division,  thereby  attempting  to  resolve  the
complications of the political society, by framing politics according to the inception
of an irreducible forum in which conflict and division may be politically expressed,
Lefort understands politics itself as the permanent contestation of the very question
of what governs the relations of self and other at every level of social life.61 For
Lefort, such contestation is the essence of politics.  
Therefore, in many respects, by revisiting the historical generation of the
59 Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,”  Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics  (London: Continuum,
2010), 38-9. Also see Rancière’s interview with Davide Panagia, “Dissenting Words: A Conversation with
Jacques Rancière.”  Diacritics  vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 2000), as well as Paulina Tambakaki, “When Does
Politics Happen?,” Parallax vol. 15, no. 3 (2009): 102-3.
60 See  for  example  Claude  Lefort,  “The  Question  of  Democracy,”  Democracy  and  Political  Theory,  18.
Chantal  Mouffe  also  makes  this  point.  See  “Democracy,  Power  and  ‘the  Political’,”  The  Democratic
Paradox (London: Verso, 2000) 33-4.
61 Lefort, “The Question of Democracy,” 18-19.
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term, Arendt’s writings demand that modern political thought entirely reevaluate its
prevailing approach to politics. And yet, while this is not the occasion to elaborate
her own, more nuanced phenomenological understanding of politics which cannot
simply  be  equated  to  the  ancient  understanding  of  the  term,  if  we  accept  the
essential  non-identity  between  politics and  rule as  Arendt  maintains,  we  may
proceed to draw two significant inferences that will prove imperative to this study,
even if it means effectively suspending our conceptualisation of politics for the time
being. Firstly, after Arendt, a theory of democracy can no longer be initiated by
virtue of the question: when is rule democratic? Against familiar accounts such as
those theorised by Joseph Schumpeter and others, democracy cannot be degraded to
the  condition  whereby a  community selects  its  rulers  through free  and periodic
competitions.62 Democracy is that which challenges the very division between ruler
and ruled. Secondly, after Arendt, political philosophy can no longer organise its
conceptual framework around a series of topics that ultimately concern the proper
foundations for one man to rule another,  the few to rule the many:  the abstract
criteria  or  first  principles  according  to  which  the  authority  of  a  government  is
rendered legitimate or the order of a society deemed just.  After Arendt, political
philosophy must become something else altogether. Perhaps it is for this reason that
in  the very same essay discussed above,  Abensour (who unlike Rancière,  never
abandons the emancipatory potential or utopian promise immanent to philosophy
itself) will argue that Arendt’s very critique of the tradition of political philosophy
62 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950).
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makes “another political philosophy” possible.63 But instead of pursuing an endless
investigation of the proper foundations, criteria and standards of rule, the first task
of this new political philosophy—one now constructed to resist its very tradition—
would be exactly the opposite: a decisive attempt to conceive and express politics as
the very absence of any foundation of rule.64 The profound implications of such an
exercise  should  not  be  overlooked.  For  as  Castoriadis  repeatedly  explains  with
broader, more anthropological connotations: “If the human world were fully ordered
[...], if human laws were given by God or by nature or by the ‘nature of society’ or
by the ‘laws of history,’ then there would be no room for political thinking and no
field for political  action and no sense in asking what the proper law is  or what
justice is [...].”65 Politics opens the polis and the representation of the polis to a
condition which lacks any such ontological closure. When the problems of the polis
become political, that is, when the problems that concern the whole community are
exposed to a political field and articulated against a horizon of  doxa  and agon—
without closure, without finality, without truth—so that the problem of the common
becomes common, the problem of the public becomes public and ultimately the very
constitution of the polis itself is rendered an irreducible object of controversy and
63 Abensour,  “Against  the  Sovereignty  of  Philosophy  over  Politics:  Arendt’s  Reading  of  Plato’s  Cave
Allegory,” 979-80. Also see Patrice Vermeren, “Equality and Democracy,” Diogenes vol. 55, no. 4 (2008):
58.  Like  Rancière,  Abensour  is  certainly  opposed  to  political  philosophy  in  the  Platonic  tradition  as
denounced by Arendt, but he does promote a  critico-utopian or critical political  philosophy that at once
binds a persistent critique of domination to a self-reflexive utopian theory of emancipatory struggle. See
chapter 5 below.
64 Miguel Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the  ‘Principle of Anarchy’,”  Democracy Against the State:
Marx and the Machiavellian Moment (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 117.
65 Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy,”  Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy
(New York:  Oxford  University Press,  1991),  104.  Also see  Jeff  Klooger,  Castoriadis:  Psyche,  Society,
Autonomy (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 31.
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dispute, politics will reveal what Lefort could describe as a radical indeterminacy: a
vast abyss, an infinite depth, a groundless ontological condition without foundation,
without  principle,  without  archê.  Beyond  the  psychology  of  democrats,  this  is
precisely  the  condition  that  Plato  discovers  with  the  democratic  city.  This  is
precisely what instigates his hatred of democracy.
53
 
2
Democracy against the archê
Democracy first of all means this: anarchic ‘government’, one based 
on nothing other than the absence of every title to govern.
-Jacques Rancière
The democratic kratein, the power of the people, is first of all the power 
to foil the archê and then to take responsibility, all together and each 
individually, for the infinite opening that is thereby brought to light. 
-Jean-Luc Nancy
To posit an absolute foundation of rule implies the unequivocal closure of
politics. Therefore, beyond the problematisation of rule, beyond the politicisation of
the polis, the putting into question of the order of the city and its subsequent parts,
places and roles, politics may also describe a condition, the very condition that is
indicative of politics itself: the lack of foundation. As the name of a city, a regime, a
particular constitution, this is the condition which has long been associated with
democracy,  especially by its  many detractors.  Even more  than  the  scandal  of  a
government  of  the  demos,  the  poor,  those  who have  no  entitlement  to  govern,
perhaps this is what so often accounts for its denunciation as disordered, precarious,
anarchic.  
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Democracy  has  always  meant  the  power  of  the  people,  but  this  power
(kratos)  does  not  intend  to  found  a  new  principle  of  rule  in  society.  As  often
observed, democracy contains no archê within it and never testifies to the archê of
the demos.1 On the contrary, according to Rancière, the power of the demos is the
power of those that no archê entitles them to exercise.2 The  kratos of the  demos
does not signify the power of a defined body, class or number,3 but all those who
have no archê to which they may appeal, all those who fall short of every standard,
every criterion which would entitle them to participate in the government of the
community: “The power of the people is not that of a people gathered together, of
the majority, or of the working class. It is simply the power peculiar to those who
have no more entitlements to govern than to submit.”4 Consequently, as the power
of  those  who lack  all  entitlements  to  govern,  the  power  of  the  people may be
interpreted as the power that undermines the archê itself, the very principle which
references a special entitlement or qualification in the rule of the city. Democracy is
exceptional  within  the  ancient  catalogue  of  constitutions  in  that  it  posits  itself
against the archê, against any underlying principle from which a proper set of rulers
may be determined and a proper order of society may be ascertained. Therefore, the
1 See for example Jean-Luc Nancy, “Finite and Infinite Democracy,” Democracy in What State? (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 65. Also see Jacques Rancière, “Democracy Corrected,” On the Shores
of Politics (London: Verso, 2007), 94-5.
2 Jacques Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,”  Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London:
Continuum, 2010), 52.
3 Josiah  Ober  argues  that  it  is  in  fact  the  arkhê that  references  a  notion  of  power  bound  to  number
(monarchia=power of one, oligarchia=power of the few), while kratos refers to more of a qualitative power
as the capacity to act. Therefore, for Ober, demokratia does not imply the power of the demos as a majority,
but as a substantive or collective body. See “The Original Meaning of ‘Democracy’: Capacity to Do Things,
not Majority Rule,” Constellations vol. 15, no. 1 (2008).
4 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London: Verso, 2007), 46-7. 
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precise meaning of the power of the people should not be understood as the rule of
the people as opposed to the rule of the oligarchs or the rule of a monarch. This
remains  a  common  misconception.  Rather,  before  anything  else,  democracy’s
power of the people means this: the power to subvert and destroy the archê of every
other  order.  It  means  the  destabilisation  of  the  very  foundations  upon  which
oligarchs and kings may isolate themselves from the community and claim a certain
privilege in the distribution of the relations of rule. Democracy rejects any principle
from which a special entitlement to rule may be established. Democracy not only
lacks any such principle itself, but it is from this lack that it draws its conviction and
strength. 
What is the basis for one man to rule another, for the few to rule the many?
Democracy’s  reply is  as  uncompromising  as  it  is  scandalous:  there  is  no basis.
Accordingly, democracy must consider every initiative to establish such a basis, to
discover and secure some principle which functions to ground the division between
ruler  and  ruled  and  supply  an  account  of  that  division,  to  be  a  priori false.
Democracy assumes a sceptical attitude towards any inherent criteria to govern in
the same way that it maintains a sceptical attitude towards the legitimacy of any
order of rule  founded upon a first  principle:  whether  it  be God, nature,  history,
nation, truth, the leader, the party or even the name of the people itself.5 Perhaps
this  is  why  in  the  preface  to  his  monumental  history  The  Life  and  Death  of
5 John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 852.
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Democracy,  John Keane will  introduce  the  topic  of  democracy in  terms  of  the
denaturing  of power.6 “Democracy required that people see through talk of gods
and nature and claims to privilege based on superiority of brain and blood. […] It
implied that the most important political problem is how to prevent rule by the few,
or  by  the  rich  or  powerful  who  claim  to  be  supermen.”7 Since  its  earliest
institutional experiments in the cities of ancient Greece, democracy has offered a
profound rejection of the rule of the nobles, the rich, the best (the aristocrats) and
those  who  know  (the  philosopher-kings).  What  it  unabashedly  disputes  is  the
bedrock upon which any such privilege or entitlement to rule may be ultimately
established and in doing so,  functions to expose the sheer contingency of every
social order. “The exceptional thing about the type of government called democracy
is that it demanded people see that nothing that is human is carved in stone, that
everything is built on shifting sands of time and place [...].”8 Whether it be the rule
of the prophets or the rule of kings, democracy is that which undermines the very
claim of an absolute foundation of rule. And while Keane may prefer the image of
shifting sands to  stormy seas,  the implications  of  his  chosen metaphor are  very
much the same: from the beginning, what democracy reveals so convincingly is that
every form of government, every system of rule, is intrinsically artificial, historical,
human and never given or absolute,  never carved in stone.9 Regardless of birth,
6 Ibid., xii.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Likewise, for Lefort, what emerges with democracy is a representation of society as a human society. See
“The  Image  of  the  Body and  Totalitarianism,” The  Political  Forms  of  Modern  Society:  Bureaucracy,
Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 304.
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wealth, seniority or expertise, democracy is that which disputes the grounds of a
privileged status in the rule of the community. Democracy makes the claim of a
special criterion, qualification or entitlement to rule inherently problematic. Of this
claim we may give the name archê. 
On the relatively undertheorised problem of the archê (arkhê), which we
may now delineate  with  greater  precision  and  detail,  it  is  arguably  Arendt  and
Rancière who, across many of their writings, will most directly and exhaustively
examine both its logic and social function in the rule of the community. Look for it
and you will find it. In every claim of a natural order, in every claim of birthright or
heredity, of divine sanction, of privilege or priority, of a proper order of society, a
proper  allocation  of  parts  and  roles,  it  is  there:  the  archê  principle. Those  in
possession of the archê are those who possess the power to elevate themselves over
the  rest  of  society.  The power  of  the  archê  is  precisely the  power  to  deny the
ordinary voice.10 As soon as the proper rulers of the community are identified with
birth, wealth, expertise or any other entitlement to govern, the archê is established.11
As  soon  as  the  exercise  of  rule  carries  with  it  a  principle  that  distributes  the
community according to a predetermined set of criteria, the logic of the archê is
active.
Although Rancière offers no single, integrated or systematic theory of the
archê, the problem reappears again and again in his most substantial writings on
10 Nick  Hewlett,  Badiou,  Balibar,  Rancière:  Rethinking  Emancipation (London:  Continuum International
Publishing Group, 2007), 99.
11 Jacques Rancière, “Against an Ebbing Tide: An Interview with Jacques Rancière,” Reading Rancière, eds.
Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 238.
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democracy. Government, Rancière suggests, simply by virtue of governing, always
seems to require an account of itself, which is to say, an account of what determines
the distribution of roles in its relation of rule, that which grounds and justifies why
some occupy the position of rulers and others the position of those who are ruled.12
Thus, although rarely articulated by government itself, it appears that alongside the
actual exercise of rule, government also requires a principle of itself, a rationale for
how one comes to rule another. In many respects, we will encounter a somewhat
analogous perspective with anarchism, the tradition which adopts a position against
the archê in its very name.13 According to Noam Chomsky, it is anarchism’s most
rudimentary position that unless substantially proven otherwise, any order of rule in
society,  any  structure  of  authority—including  government,  ownership  and
management, relations between men and women, parents and children, etc.—must
ultimately be deemed illegitimate and systematically dismantled.14 “That is what I
have always understood to be the essence of anarchism: the conviction that the
burden of proof has to be placed on authority, and that it should be dismantled if
that burden cannot be met.”15 Although the context of these remarks (Rancière’s and
12 Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,” 51.
13 The question of Rancière’s relationship with anarchism has been raised on numerous occasions, particularly
with regards to the topic of the archê. In an interview Rancière summarises his position as follows: “At a
fundamental philosophical level my position can be called anarchist stricto sensu since I hold that politics
exists insofar as the exercise of power does not rest upon any  arkhê.” See “Against an Ebbing Tide: An
Interview with Jacques Rancière,” 238. Also see Rancière’s interview with Todd May, Benjamin Noys and
Saul Newman, “Democracy, Anarchism and Radical Politics Today: An Interview with Jacques Rancière,”
Anarchist Studies vol. 16, no 2 (2008). Much of Todd May’s recent work attempts to establish with greater
precision this underlying connection between the anarchist tradition and Rancière’s political thought. See
“Rancière and Anarchism,”  Jacques Rancière and the Contemporary Scene: The Philosophy of Radical
Equality, eds. Jean-Philippe Deranty and Alison Ross (London: Continuum International Publishers, 2012),
as  well  as  his volume  The Political Thought  of  Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality  (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), especially chapter 3.
14 Noam Chomsky, “Anarchism, Marxism and Hope for the Future,”  Chomsky on Anarchism (Oakland: AK
Press, 2005), 178. 
15 Ibid.
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Chomsky’s) are entirely distinct, what we immediately discover in both views is the
assertion  that  rule  is  never  self-legitimating,  never  self-authorising  or  self-
validating, that in addition to rule something else is required, something other than
rule itself, which however valid or invalid, claims to justify that rule and the social
arrangement that configures its relations. The legitimacy of government is never
self-evident. The source of its justification is always supplemental to the apparatus
and empirical exercise of rule itself. The diagram of rule is never one dimensional. 
The issue at hand is not the cultivation of a practical strategy in which we
may  ascertain  which  authority  can  be  determined  legitimate  and  which  cannot
(although  Chomsky  certainly  maintains  that  there  are  examples  of  legitimate
authority however rare).16 Nor is it the quintessentially modern question concerning
the precise relation between right and power (scrutinised so meticulously by figures
like Spinoza).17 Rather, the issue at hand is that every system and strategy of rule
seems to require a supplement, an account or justification of itself which is never
reducible to rule in its most immediate or empirical manifestation. What must be
established is that rule, once it is distinguished from mere coercion and brute force,
organises a logic which intends to bind the empirical organisation of a community
to  an  imperceptible  principle  that  determines  the  basis  of  its  social  relations.
Therefore,  what  we  identify  as  the  archê  must  be  located  beyond  what  would
16 Ibid.
17 Even when Spinoza, for example, maintains that right and power are coextensive, his Latin clarifies that
power in this respect (potentia) qualifies something essential and non-abstractable: a potential, ability or
capacity, while the power typically associated with rule, authority, privilege and control (potestas) remains
something of another  matter.  See Political  Treatise (Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing Company,  2001),
chapter 2.
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normally  be  identified  as  the  immediate  exercise  of  rule  in  its  most  apparent
incarnation. It is the principle that at once identifies, selects and divides so that a
classification of rulers may be distinguished from that of the ruled at the same time
as it provides a frame of reference for which a justification of these classifications
and the distinction between them may be established. Determining the underlying
bases for the division between governor and governed and the authority of one to
rule the other  is  essential  to the meaning of the archê: it  is  for this  reason that
Rancière will identify the presence of the archê in every order of the police and
Abensour  in  every State-form.18 The  logic  of  the  archê  serves  to  transform the
multiplicity and contingency of the social into a means in which a special class of
rulers  (those  who  exercise  the  archê)  may  be  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the
community (those who submit to its authority). It operates by selecting a particular
element  from the  social  (such as  birth  or  wealth)  and renders  this  the  decisive
grounds for the justification of some to govern others.19 In short, the archê offers a
solution to the problem of qualification, of who is entitled to rule.     
 To demonstrate this in the most succinct manner possible, Rancière, on more
than  one  occasion,  will  draw  our  attention  to  Plato’s  Laws  where  the  ancient
philosopher  most  explicitly  offers  his  own  systematic  enumeration  of  possible
qualifications or titles (axiomata) required to rule another.20 Here, in the voice of an
18 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy  (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press,
1999), chapter 2. Miguel Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” Democracy Against the State: Marx and the
Machiavellian Moment (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), xl-xli. See chapters 4 and 5 below.
19 Joseph J. Tanke,  Jacques Rancière: An Introduction (London: Continuum International  Publishers, 2011),
53.
20 Plato, Laws, III, 690a-690c. We will find Rancière’s critique of Plato’s seven qualifications in “Ten Theses
on Politics,” Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, 30-1, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,” 50-1, and
Hatred of Democracy, 39-41.
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unnamed Athenian, Plato lists seven in number (although his catalogue should in no
way be considered exhaustive), but for the moment, let us address only the first six,
the seventh remaining something of an exception. Without the slightest hesitation,
Plato will draw no distinction whatsoever between the government of a city and the
authority devised within entirely different social relations (such as the family). That
cites, much like families, elevate those with authority over those who must submit
to that authority on the basis of some inherent quality or position is simply assumed
and entirely naturalised. Accordingly,  the first of the titles to be listed are those
purportedly closest to nature: those positions that are determined directly by birth
(those who are “born before” or “born otherwise”).  The census begins with the
control that parents exercise over their children. This is followed by the entitlement
of those who are are highborn (the aristocrats) to govern those of no account. Next
is the authority that elders possess over the young (seniority). The fourth concerns
the dominion of masters over their slaves. But then our criteria is modified slightly.
Although  Plato  insists  that  the  following  two  qualifications  should  likewise  be
considered in accordance with nature, they can arguably no longer be said to be
directly related to birth as the preceding four. These consist of the rule of the strong
over  the  weak  (which  the  Athenian  does  not  fail  to  identify  as  the  dominant
principle throughout the animal kingdom) and the only title that Plato himself holds
to be ultimately valid: “But it looks as if the most important claim will be the sixth,
that the ignorant man should follow the leadership of the wise and obey his orders.”
Hence, deep within the Laws, we finally appear to arrive at the explicit articulation
62
of the principle that the Republic so desperately requires: the principle that declares
that the wise shall rule the ignorant. And while the cogency of declaring wisdom a
“natural” property akin to birth or strength could very well raise objections, Plato’s
Athenian,  perhaps  anticipating  such  objections,  will  entertain  no  rebuttal:  “I’m
certainly not prepared to say that it is unnatural.” Regardless, while the essentially
unchecked  philosopher-kings  of  the  Republic  make  no appearance  in  the  Laws
(which  concerns  itself  with  an  extensive  range  of  more  practical  constitutional
matters), it is nevertheless with the sixth qualification that we discover the principle
which intends to justify their rule. As with any other title, this too is simply posited
as given and axiomatic. Even in the  Laws, the Platonic text which perhaps more
than any other seems to gesture towards rule of law, that the wise are entitled to rule
requires  no  more  explanation  than  that  of  a  parent’s  authority  over  their  own
children.
Again,  let  us  suspend  the  question  of  the  validity  of  each  of  these
qualifications. Whether seniority actually represents a legitimate criterion to govern
those who are younger and what exactly it means to be “the stronger” is certainly
subject to debate, but it brings us no closer to understanding the logic of the archê
itself. Rather than assess the specific content of each qualification, what interests us
here is the formal structure of the archê as it appears in Plato’s thought. Via kinship,
age or by virtue of some other quality,  with each of the cited qualifications we
encounter  a  familiar  formal  binary  relation  (parent/child,  noble/common  man,
elder/young,  master/slave,  wise/ignorant)  configured  into  a  clearly  defined
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hierarchy of roles. More importantly, Rancière demonstrates that Plato understands
each distribution of roles, who occupies the position of ruler and who occupies the
position of the ruled,  to be determined entirely according to  disposition,  that is,
according  to  some  inherent  or  natural  difference  among  men.  It  is  Plato’s
supposition that what each hierarchical relation unequivocally reveals is that just as
there is a natural disposition to rule, there is a natural disposition to be ruled, just as
there is a natural disposition to act, there is a natural disposition to be acted upon:
“The logic of  arkhê thus presupposes that a determinate superiority is exercised
over an equally determinate inferiority.”21 Such dispositions are simply presumed to
be self-evident and in many cases, are already established and available to observe
throughout  society:  “All  these  qualifications  relate  to  objective  differences  and
forms of power already operative in society and can all be put forward as an arkhê
for  ruling.”22 This  reference  to  objective  difference marks  the  archê’s  necessary
return to the empirical, when the archê engineers a strategy so that it may interact
with the sensible world once again. As a principle which divides the categories of
ruler  and ruled,  the archê  remains  abstract,  imperceptible.  But  this  alone  is  not
enough.  The archê must  simultaneously devise  a  scheme in which real  existing
bodies  may  be  identified,  distinguished  and  distributed  according  to  clearly
observable  traits  and  characteristics.  Within  each  power  relation  there  must  be
exhibited certain inherent properties which inform one’s proper place within the
hierarchy.  Therefore,  despite their  expression in a social  field,  insofar as Plato’s
21 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 30.
22 Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,” 51.
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initial six entitlements ultimately rely upon disposition, his positing of the archê
must indeed be understood as an appeal to nature (physis): each qualification to rule
and its complementary counterpart compose a particular hierarchical arrangement
which claims to maintain a certain continuity with some purported natural law: 
Each of these titles fulfils two prerequisites. First, each defines a
hierarchy of positions.  Secondly,  each defines this  hierarchy in
continuity with nature: continuity by the intermediary of familial
and social relations for the first four; direct continuity for the last
two. The former titles base the order of the city on the law of
kinship. The latter assert that this order has a superior principle:
those  who  govern  are  not  at  all  those  who  are  born  first  or
highborn, but those who are best.23 
Hence,  it  is  not  with  tradition or  convention,  nomos or  mythos,  but  rather  with
nature that Plato appears to discover a series of normative principles that function to
determine  various  sets  of  social  relations  in  a  manner  that  cannot  be  easily
challenged. Within each catalogued relation, Plato attributes a latent archê principle
which, expressed by the complementary dispositions of those who occupy either
side of  the hierarchy,  governs that  relation and accounts  for  the harmony of  its
natural  order.  So  just  as  the  criticism of  our  infamous  democratic  man  of  the
Republic dwells so persistently upon his psychological disposition—a disposition
which may now, in light of the Laws, be appreciated simply in terms of the natural
disposition  to  be  ruled—Plato  declares  that  the  philosophers  of  the  city  will
likewise exhibit the essential attributes indicative of their own natural qualification
to rule. This is a logic which remains very consistent with Plato’s perception of
23 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 40. Also see John McSweeney, “Giving Politics an Edge: Rancière and the
Anarchic Principle of Democracy,” Sofia Philosophical Review vol. 3, no. 1 (2009): 119.
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democracy  as  the  upside-down  world  described  in  the  Republic:  for  Plato,
democracy represents the society in which those with the natural disposition to be
ruled, rule collectively, a scenario played out symbolically on the allegorical ship of
democracy. Quite simply, democracy is the agent that effectively inverts the natural
order of the proper relations of the social. As I have argued, the allegory of the ship
not only intends to demonstrate the ignorance and savagery of the demos, but more
importantly, invites us to bear witness to the dynamics of a regime in which no
operative archê is  in  place.  For Plato,  democracy is  that  which overturns  every
archê at once. 
Incidentally, this appeal to nature, to the disposition of the philosopher, also
offers an explanation for why so much of the  Republic is devoted to the topic of
education.24 For  if  only  the  wise,  those  with  the  natural  disposition  of  the
philosopher (the rational soul), are entitled to govern, it is imperative that Plato’s
ideal  city  establish  an  institutional  strategy  to  ascertain  who exactly  in  society
possesses  such  a  disposition  naturally  fit  to  govern.  More  importantly  for  our
purposes here, the archê’s reference to nature will likewise account for why Plato
himself will privilege the qualification of wisdom over all other titles. For even if
many of his respective depositions to rule remain pervasive throughout society and
readily observable, it is nevertheless the philosopher and the philosopher alone, we
can  only  assume,  who  may  claim  knowledge  of  the  underlying  natural  laws
purported to govern their relations and thus, the philosopher who assumes the role
24 See Nickolas Pappas’ discussion of education in Plato and the Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), 47-52.
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of articulating the social significance of these natural laws to the larger community.
For example, the principle that the strong shall rule the weak may very well be, as
our Athenian of the  Laws maintains, a principle ubiquitous throughout nature, the
principle of principles, the archetype for all principles to follow, but as we discover
developed more substantially in the  Gorgias, without the philosopher to elucidate
what exactly constitutes the meaning of “strength” and “weakness,” this principle
may very well  remain  socially  indeterminable.25 Therefore,  necessary to  Plato’s
model  of the archê is  precisely the philosopher  who renders  the laws of nature
intelligible, who grasps their meaning and social function for the community. In this
regard, Plato may be understood to posit  the philosopher as the guardian of the
archê at the same time as he is the guardian of the city. 
And yet,  if we wish to ascribe a certain consistency across Plato’s larger
formulation  for  the  rule  of  the  philosophers,  the  problem  becomes  more
complicated still. While it is no doubt his intimacy with the Forms that ultimately
constitutes the philosopher’s wisdom and hence, his exceptional nature compared to
those who are ignorant, it is imperative to recognise that in terms of assuming his
proper  place  in  government,  the  wisdom  of  the  philosopher  alone  remains
insufficient. To establish his position as governor, to be entitled to govern, Plato
also requires a principle which dictates that it is the wise who shall rule the ignorant
and not the reverse or some other arrangement altogether. Such a principle cannot
be said to be provided by the Forms themselves. This is an important detail that
25 Plato, Gorgias, 488c+. Also see Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 39.
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Arendt’s  critique  of  Plato’s  cave  allegory appears  to  overlook.  The Forms  may
certainly  account  for  the  nature  of  the  philosopher’s  disposition  and  claim  to
wisdom, but such a disposition only becomes a basis to rule when it is stipulated by
the appropriate archê principle. Although integral to his political  philosophy, the
archê remains supplemental to the Forms and according to Plato, is discovered in
nature, not in the heavens above. Just as Plato thematically associates the Forms,
wisdom and  the  sky,  he  will  likewise  bind  the  archê,  qualification  and  nature.
Whereas  the  Forms  provide  an  absolute  standard  or  measure  to  evaluate  the
organisation of the proper order of the city under the name of justice, the archê
provides the basis for the proper relations of rule under the name of natural law.
Both in substance and in function, the logic of the archê remains entirely distinct
from that of the Forms in Plato’s thought. Although both the Forms and the archê
pose similar theoretical questions to the philosopher (how the imperceptible relates
to  the  perceptible  and  how the  perceptible  relates  to  the  imperceptible),  as  the
Forms represent transcendent ideas of eternal essences which intend to solve the
problem of doxa, the archê represents a principle attributed to nature which intends
to solve the problem of politics. The Forms may provide the theoretical grounds for
the philosopher’s claim to wisdom, but it is only the archê principle (autonomous
from the Forms) that renders wisdom a qualification, that grants the wise his proper
place  as  governor  of  the  city.  In  this  regard,  if  one  of  political  philosophy’s
traditional  objectives  is  indeed  to  justify  and  rationalise  a  particular  order  of
government  as  Rancière  maintains,  Plato’s  political  works  certainly  remain  a
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testament to the degree of sophistication that such a theoretical exercise may entail.
As we have seen, each specified archê outlines a particular criterion to rule
ultimately  drawn  from  nature,  a  strategy  clearly  organised  to  circumvent  the
problem of politics from the start. Accordingly, if we were inclined to attack the
validity of Plato’s qualifications, it  would no doubt be here, at the level of their
reliance upon nature. For what Plato attempts to coordinate is a nomos that perfectly
coincides  with  physis.26 When  this  identity  is  achieved,  the  possibility  for  a
distinctively political relation is foreclosed. And yet, the charge that Plato’s initial
six titles  enumerate  a series  of  hierarchies  that  ultimately represent  sociological
relations as opposed to natural ones is not the point. We can certainly doubt that
Plato’s qualifications may actually be drawn from nature as he claims, but that they
may function  as qualifications is something that cannot be so easily discredited.
Instead, following Rancière’s analysis, what should be extracted from Plato’s appeal
to nature, his reference to disposition, is the second dimension which constitutes the
anatomy of the archê: the archê not only represents the principle which grounds the
division between ruler and ruled (commandment), but at the same time, arranges its
distribution of  hierarchical  roles  according to  an anticipatory origin or  temporal
beginning (commencement). As Rancière encapsulates in Hatred of Democracy: 
Arkhê is the commandment of he who commences, of what comes
first. It is the anticipation of the right to command in the act of
commencing and the verifying of the power of commencing in the
exercise  of  commanding.  The  ideal  is  thus  defined  of  a
26 Rancière, Disagreement:  Politics  and Philosophy, 70.  Also see McSweeney,  “Giving Politics  an Edge:
Rancière and the Anarchic Principle of Democracy,” 115. For a more extensive analysis of the relation
between  nomos and  physis in  Plato’s  political  thought  see  Robert  W.  Hall,  Political  Thinkers: Plato
(London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1981), chapter 2.
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government which consists in realising the principle by which the
power of governing commences, of a government which consists
in exhibiting  en acte the legitimacy of its principle. Those who
are capable of governing are those who have the dispositions that
make  them appropriate  for  the  role,  those  who are  capable  of
being governed are those who have dispositions complementary
to the former.27 
Insofar as it binds ruling and disposition (or disposition and destination), the archê
contains within it a logic of  priority. Beyond establishing the necessary structural
divide between ruler and ruled, the archê serves to distribute a social body across
these categories according to  a  predetermined or  predefined set  of qualities  and
attributes. For what the archê ultimately seeks to demonstrate is that only those who
rule possess the inherent capacity to do so. By qualifying that rule is anticipated by
the  disposition  that  is  essential  to  what  it  means  to  be  a  ruler,  by placing  the
presence  of  rule  in  direct  relation  with  its  beginnings,  or  the  conditions  of  its
beginnings, the archê functions to justify that order of rule in advance. For example,
when oligarchy declares that it is the wealthy who represent the proper rulers of the
city, what it claims is that only the wealthy possess the capacity to govern and by
extension, that it  is precisely the conditions of wealth which give rise to such a
capacity.  Likewise,  in  modern  times,  when  capital  declares  that  it  is  only  the
capitalist class that is capable of managing our financial institutions and means of
production, what it claims is that only this particular class embodies the integrity,
ingenuity and insight necessary to manage a productive, stable economy and that it
is precisely the conditions that make this class what it is that imbue it with these
27 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 38-9.
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essential attributes. Hence, according to the logic of the archê, what the exercise of
rule actually expresses is the infinite process of discovering its own legitimacy in
the origins of what it is that constitutes the appropriate ruler of the community in
the first  place.  When rule references the archê,  what it  references is the past  of
itself. Rule always anticipates itself in a time that comes before. It is precisely this
anticipation of rule that government calls forth and rehearses in the present act of
ruling  another.  This  is  indicative  of  the  somewhat  circular  logic  that  the  archê
appears to set in motion: just as the exercise of rule enacts or recalls the source of
its origins, these origins claim to confirm and verify that rule in advance by virtue
of the exercise of  rule  itself.  This  circularity forms the basis  of Rancière’ most
succinct definition of the term:
An  arkhê is  two things: it  is  a theoretical  principle entailing a
clear  distribution  of  positions  and  capacities,  grounding  the
distribution  of  power  between  rulers  and  ruled;  and  it  is  a
temporal beginning entailing that the fact of ruling is anticipated
in the disposition to rule and, conversely, that the evidence of this
disposition is given by the fact of its empirical operation.28 
Plato’s  specific  reference  to  nature  clearly  corresponds  to  this  second
dimension of the archê, but that the concept composes a formal unity of these two
sides (commandment and commencement) would have remained quite consistent
with the ancient understanding of this rather perplexing term.29 This is something
that does not escape Arendt (and for his part, Rancière certainly does not fail to
reference Arendt in his own nuanced discussions of the archê developed here).30 In
28 Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,” 51.
29 For a brief but precise account of the Greek understanding of arkhê both as ruling and beginning also see
Ober, “The Original Meaning of ‘Democracy’: Capacity to Do Things, not Majority Rule,” 5-6.
30 See for example Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 38.
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The Human Condition and a number of other texts, Arendt is perhaps one of the
first political theorists to recognise that our conventional translations of arkhê and
archêin  as  “rule”  and  “to  rule”  in  English  and  “herrschaft”  and “herrschen”  in
German often serve to  eclipse the  significance  of  this  second dimension of  the
Greek  term (which  according  to  Arendt’s  research,  may actually  have  been  its
primary  meaning).31 Consequently,  throughout  her  writings  which  consider  this
theme, Arendt will repeatedly emphasise that in addition to its allusions to rule,
arkhê will  also  signify  “to  begin,”  “to  initiate,”  “to  lead,”  and  even  “to  set  in
motion” and it is for this reason that she tends to associate the term with her own
theory of political activity in the public sphere (praxis): for Arendt,  politics is the
order of equals who possess the power to initiate action in the polis, to set the polis
in motion; to participate in the polis is therefore to participate in the power of the
archê, to at once take initiative, partake in the affairs of the polis and govern it
collectively.32 Quite opposed to Rancière, it is in this context that she will describe
the polis in terms of the public distribution of the archê.33 Likewise,  when Arendt
defines revolution as a  new beginning or beginning again (as opposed to its more
customary associations of insurrection and social upheaval), it is likely that she is
31 Parchen Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê and Democracy,” The American Political Science
Review vol. 100, no. 1 (Feb., 2006): 2, 4. 
32 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 177, 189. Also see her
various discussions of the concept in The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 45-6, 91,
114, 126.
33 There is indeed a historical basis for Arendt’s position here. With reference to Cleisthenes’ reforms, J. P.
Vernant  writes:  “The  polis  was  a  homogeneous  whole,  without  hierarchy,  without  rank,  without
differentiation. Archê was no longer concentrated in a single figure at the apex of the social structure, but
was distributed equally throughout the entire realm of public life [...].” Quoted in Pierre Lévêque and Pierre
Vidal-Naquet,  Cleisthenes the Athenian:  An Essay on  the Representation of  Space and  Time in  Greek
Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities
Press, 1996), 52. 
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thinking along the lines of this  forgotten dimension of archê as commencement
once again.34 For essential to Arendt’s concept of revolution in the modern age is
the experience of a return to the origin, of a new beginning bound to the idea of
freedom.35 And while  her  own theoretical  engagement  with  the  concept  may at
times be found to accentuate this commencement of the archê—as the initiation of
action or the action that initiates—at the expense of its reference to rule, this will
only sharpen her grasp of Plato’s particular application of the term as it appears in
his own political philosophy: 
it is  decisive for  Plato,  as  he says  expressly at  the end of  the
Laws, that only the beginning (archê) is entitled to rule (archein).
In  the  tradition  of  Platonic  thought,  this  original,  linguistically
predetermined  identity  of  ruling  and  beginning  had  the
consequence that all beginning was understood as the legitimation
for rulership, until, finally, the element of beginning disappeared
altogether from the concept of rulership.36 
According to Arendt, in the Greek polis, what the archê originally represented, both
linguistically and conceptually, was the formal conjunction of these two ostensibly
unrelated terms (commandment and commencement,  ruling and beginning).  And
yet, she maintains that the precise relation between these terms should in no way be
thought  to  be  limited  to  Plato’s  particular  arrangement  of  the  concept.  For  in
contrast to her own theory of praxis, the basis of which she clearly attributes to the
politics  of  the  Greeks,  Arendt  insists  that  it  is  Plato  (appearing  once  again  to
establish something of a precedent for the tradition of political philosophy) who
34 Hannah Arendt,  On Revolution (London:  Penguin  Books,  2006),  10.  Also see Claude Lefort,  “Hannah
Arendt and the Question of the Political,”  Democracy and Political Theory (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1988) and Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê and Democracy,” 5-8. 
35 Arendt, On Revolution, 19.
36 Arendt, The Human Condition, 224-5. 
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discovers in the archê a first principle for rule.37 If Arendt’s argument is correct,
Plato’s theoretical manoeuvre here is not difficult to retrace. In his own research,
Rancière locates a very early illustration of the archê in Homer: Odysseus, publicly
reaffirming Agamemnon as the sole chief of the Greek army, declares Agamemnon
the one in possession of the archê, implying that Agamemnon takes the lead and
walks ahead while everyone else must inevitably walk behind.38 But at least since
Anaximander, ancient philosophy consistently employs the term arkhê to express a
metaphysical  first  principle, the  substance,  source  and  immutable  nature  of  an
existing  thing  which  preserves  the  essence  of  its  origin  in  all  subsequent
transformations and expressions.39 Therefore, when Plato indiscriminately applies
this  distinctively Presocratic conception of the archê to a theory of government,
what he is able to extract from the archê, as Arendt acutely observes, is precisely a
first principle in which the legitimation of rule is located at the beginning of rule
itself, at  its  origin,  at  the  conditions  of  its  origin.  As  we  have  seen,  as  the
commandment of what commences, of what comes first, the archê organises a logic
in which rule anticipates itself in the disposition that comes before, the disposition
that is demonstrated and confirmed by the very exercise of rule itself. Therefore,
insofar  as the concept  appears  in  the tradition of political  philosophy under  the
guidance of Plato, the archê locates the legitimacy of rule in an immemorial past. It
37 Andrew Schaap, “Hannah Arendt and the Philosophical Repression of Politics,” Jacques Rancière and the
Contemporary Scene: The Philosophy of Radical Equality,  eds.  Jean-Philippe Deranty and Alison Ross
(London: Continuum International Publishers,  2012), 150.  This certainly supports  Rancière’s claim that
archipolitics discovers its origins with Plato.
38 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 30.
39 See Constantine J. Vamvacas,  The Founders of Western Thought: The Presocratics  (Dordrecht: Springer,
2009),  36  and  William Keith  Chambers  Guthrie,  A History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  Vol.  1:  The  Earlier
Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 77.  
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organises  a  temporality  which  privileges  a  time  past,  a  time  which  perpetually
precedes politics, anticipates its disruptions and intends to hinder them from the
start. 
This explains why Rancière’s general approach to the problem of the archê
deviates  substantially  from  that  of  Arendt’s.40 As  Arendt’s  theory  of  praxis
presumably endeavours to reestablish what she purports to be the archê’s original
political  relation  to  the  collective  activity  of  the  polis,  Rancière’s  various
discussions  of  the  archê  suggest  that  the  predominance  of  the  relatively
unchallenged Platonic  interpretation  of  the  concept  has  so  eclipsed  its  meaning
throughout  the  history of  political  thought  that  it  must  simply be  critiqued and
evaluated on Plato’s own terms, any residual pre-Platonic connotations seemingly
futile to salvage. Likewise, this distinction will account for the apparent disparity
between Arendt and Rancière’s respective conclusions on the topic. While Arendt
contends  that  politics  represents  the  collective  possession  of  the  archê  equally
distributed across the polis, Rancière maintains that politics represents the archê’s
uncompromising dissolution. For irrespective of Arendt’s excavation of traces of its
original political formulation, the vast implications of what Plato conceives as the
archê  appear  to  extend  well  beyond  the  limits  of  philosophy itself:  as  long  as
governments isolate a body of rulers from those who are ruled, they will likewise
require a general framework in which the community may be distributed according
to these two categories. As we have seen, this is precisely what Plato attributes to
40 Andrew Schaap will offer a helpful juxtaposition of the concept of the archê as it appears in Rancière and
Arendt. See “Hannah Arendt and the Philosophical Repression of Politics,” 155-6.
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the archê. In many respects, this is also consistent with what anarchism appears to
associate with the concept as well. And while figures such as Foucault and Deleuze
could  very  well  object  that  power  relations  require  no  such  archê,  that  power
remains  self-actualising and self-validating in its  own right,  as soon as political
philosophy embarks upon a project that seeks to posit various theoretical principles
which intend to account for the legitimacy of those powers by appealing to the
extra-political conditions of its origin, the problem of the archê only reappears once
again.41 Consequently,  if  we  wish  to  locate  the  archê  with  a  greater  degree  of
precision,  perhaps it  could be said that while the objective elements, forces and
relations that constitute the archê are always already there in the very structure of
government  itself,  in  the  very  power  to  arbitrarily  determine  and  distribute  the
community from a privileged position, the logic of the archê as an a priori principle
of rule only appears fully formed when it is realised by a philosophical expression
that intends to articulate and verify the legitimacy of that government subsequently.
Wealth,  blood,  class  or  brain:  whenever  it  is  declared that  only the  exceptional
among us possess the inherent capacity to govern, the logic of the archê is set in
motion.  Whenever  the  justification  for  that  government  is  referred  to  the
anticipatory conditions of its origin, the objective of the archê is achieved.
Therefore, in the broadest strokes, what can be extracted from Plato’s model
of the archê? The archê fosters a representation of society in which its primary task
41 Although it is possible to interpret a dimension of Foucault’s early archaeology of knowledge to be, in part,
an attempt to unearth and dispel subtle references to the archê that haunt particular discourses of power.
Here, Foucault situates his own method against both the archê of the philosophers and the archive of the
historians.  See  Mathieu  Potte-Bonneville,  “Risked  Democracy:  Foucault,  Castoriadis  and  the  Greeks,”
Radical Philosophy no. 166 (March 2011-April 2011): 31. 
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is to become identical with itself, to engineer its institutions of government so that
they  may  coincide  with  its  most  essential  principle.  Once  the  archê  is  posited
theoretically, the organisation of the community is interpreted as a rational problem
as opposed to a political one. According to Rancière, this explains its long appeal to
philosophy.  The  archê  inaugurates  a  project  of  discovering  the  grounds,  the
underlying principles, which claim to justify various social hierarchies and relations
of  rule,  some  already  established  throughout  society,  some  remaining  purely
hypothetical (Plato’s philosopher-rulers). Predicated upon the postulate that there is
a nature of the social, the archê identifies the basis for the proper order of rule in the
proper relations of the social. This intends to obstruct politics, or the potential for
politics, by claiming that the regulation of society remains consistent with natural
rules. Under the guise of nature, of capacities and the conditions of those capacities,
the archê introduces a principle of the social in order to dictate its basic organisation
and relations  of  rule.  Accordingly,  as  Rancière will  underscore,  the archê  binds
particular bodies to particular roles, functions and spaces by virtue of their inherent
capacities purported to be self-evident.42 Some are destined to exercise the archê,
others destined to submit to its authority. Hence, as soon as the logic of the archê is
established,  the  complications  of  government  become substantially simplified to
one of how to institute the community according to the principle which dictates
these basic relations. 
One of the consequences of such a representation of society is that it denies
42 This is the basis of what Rancière often calls the “distribution of the sensible” (le partage du sensible).
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the ability of the polis to be expressed as something to be shaped by its citizens’
activity as political agents.43 As an appeal to the archê intends to lay out an absolute
foundation of rule, when the logic of the archê is operative, the field of politics is
effectively dissolved,  its  condition covered over.  The political  is  reduced to  the
social and in turn, the social is reduced to an imperceptible principle that claims to
perpetually anticipate it. The archê therefore offers to government the gift of rule
without politics and community without political subjects. To posit an archê of the
community is to posit the potential of the polis to achieve harmony with itself, to
realise its proper order so that its model of rule repeats its most essential principle.
The  ideal  realisation  of  the  archê  is  therefore  the  government  that  perfectly
coincides with its principle in institutional form. 
But  when  democracy  appears,  the  entire  logic  of  the  archê  becomes
compromised.  Democracy not  only  puts  into  question  the  grounds  upon  which
governors distinguish themselves from those they govern, it serves to problematise
the  very  division  between  ruler  and  ruled  altogether.  What  is  it  that  makes
democracy’s  challenge  to  the  archê  so  compelling?  Democracy  represents  the
exception to every other regime in that it does not reproduce the logic of the archê
by  founding  a  new  criterion  for  which  a  new  form  of  government  may  be
established. It does not strive to institute a principle of the demos to combat those
corresponding principles which facilitate the rule of oligarchs and kings. Rather, the
ingenuity of democracy is that it discovers a way to undermine the very logic of the
43 Jean-Philippe Deranty, “Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology,”  Theory and Event  vol. 6, no. 4
(2003).
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archê itself. By disrupting the foundations upon which the rulers of the community
elevate themselves, democracy reveals the intrinsic artificiality and arbitrariness of
every hierarchical relation. By exposing the essential groundlessness upon which
the organisation of the social is ultimately constructed, democracy reveals the sheer
contingency of every social order. When this occurs, the edifice of rule begins to
crack and crumble, its justification rendered untenable. This is something perhaps
first articulated by Tocqueville who observes, somewhat disconcertingly, that what
democracy  appears  to  dismantle  is  precisely  the  conventions  of  aristocracy
(democracy exposes aristocracy’s conventions for what they are: conventions and
nothing  more).44 As  Keane  develops  with  broader  connotations:  “Democracy
skewered talk of stern necessity through the heart. It highlighted the contingency of
things, events, institutions, people and their beliefs. The originality of democracy
lay in its challenge to habitual ways of seeing the world, to thoughtless regard for
power and ways of governing people, to living life as if everything was inevitable,
or  ‘natural’.”45 Perhaps this  is  why Lefort  will  claim that  as soon as notions  of
natural  inequality and fixed,  transhistorical  hierarchies are  eliminated,  society is
already in some manner democratic.46 What democracy introduces to the city is the
problem of politics. By rendering the polis a political problem, by complicating the
bases  which  dictate  its  social  relations,  the  content  of  the  archê  is  effectively
denaturalised, its power stripped of its effectiveness. Democracy means confronting
44 Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 71.
45 Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy, 51.
46 Claude  Lefort,  Complications:  Communism  and  the  Dilemmas  of  Democracy (New  York:  Columbia
University Press, 2007), 69.
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the archê with a notion of society in which the order of the community lacks any
such foundation. It means denouncing a representation of the polis in which the
legitimacy of government may be expressed in terms of its formal correspondence
with an underlying principle. If we follow Rancière: “politics is not the enactment
of the principle, the law, or the self of a community. Put in other words, politics has
no archê, it is anarchical. The very name democracy  supports this point. As Plato
noted, democracy has no archê, no measure.”47 It is for this reason that democracy
cannot simply be appreciated as a constitution like any other. Democracy contains
no archê within it and always appears in the form of a democracy against the archê.
Therefore, just as the  Republic may be read in its entirety as one long argument
against democracy and its  lack of foundation,  as a critical  strategy, the topic of
democracy may likewise be initiated with respect to its own being-against what the
Republic so unabashedly promotes: in the most general, what democracy is against
is the archê of society. By problematising the foundations of a given social order, by
rupturing the logic which distributes rule to a select few, democracy locates the
radical indeterminacy at the root of every regime of government. It demonstrates
that even our most established and most sacred institutions are not given by nature
or  sanctioned  by the  gods,  but  are  rather  founded  upon  nothing  but  their  own
contingency. Likewise, when democracy fashions its own institutions, it can only do
so  according  to  this  anarchic  condition  that  it  so  boldly  uncovers.  Thus,
“democratic” government, insofar as we may employ the term, can never claim to
47 Jacques Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization,” October vol. 61 (Summer 1992): 59.
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achieve identity with itself as the very foundations of democracy ultimately remain
irreducible,  a  condition  experienced institutionally  in  the  infinite  expressions  of
doxa and  agon. Democracy, it could therefore be said, is the regime that remains
perpetually opened to difference.48 In this regard, if democracy has a foundation at
all,  it  is  the  condition  of  anarchy  itself:  the  foundation  of  rule  that  lacks  a
foundation. This is the very condition that we have called politics.     
Let us return to our analysis of Rancière. Rancière’s fourth thesis on politics
establishes democracy not as a regime of rule, but as a rupture in the logic of the
archê.49 Here Rancière introduces a problem that will be developed in greater detail
in Hatred of Democracy: if the demos is the body that possesses no entitlement to
exercise the archê, if the demos is the body that does not count and has no right to
take  part,  how is  democracy,  as  the  purported  government  of  the  demos,  to  be
understood?50 How are we to resolve the paradox of the government composed of
those who by every definition have no right to govern by any account? Certainly,
this is the very problem that so profoundly troubles Plato about democracy. But as
Rancière  explains,  this  paradox  that  appears  to  constitute  the  very  essence  of
democracy is not indicative of a problem to be resolved, but rather represents the
solution to understanding democracy itself.  Throughout  history,  perhaps  the two
most predominant entitlements to govern have been birth and wealth, the former
48 For an analysis of democracy’s unstable ontology as radical difference see Oliver Marchart, “The Absence
at the Heart of Presence: Radical Democracy and the  ‘Ontology of Lack’,”  Radical Democracy: Politics
Between Abundance and Lack, eds. Lars Tonder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2005).
49 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 31.
50 Ibid., 32.
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bound  to  the  superiority  of  kinship,  the  latter  to  a  privileged  position  in  the
organisation  of  economic  production  and  distribution:  “Societies  are  usually
governed by a combination of these two powers to which, in varying degrees, force
and science  lend their  support.”51 To these  two longstanding entitlements,  Plato
desperately longs to throw wisdom into contention. But to govern the highborn, the
rich and the wise alike, democracy must devise a supplementary title, a title which
remains specific to all those with no qualification whatsoever, a title for those who
have no status or position, entitlement or claim: “Now, the only remaining title is
the anarchic title, the title specific to those who have no more title for governing
than they have for being governed.”52 For Rancière, this  anarchic title is key to
grasping the meaning of democracy in its most general sense. Democracy is neither
a predetermined distribution of roles, nor a particular claim to exercise the archê:
“Democracy first of all means this: anarchic  ‘government’, one based on nothing
other  than  the  absence  of  every  title  to  govern.”53 According  to  Rancière,  this
anarchic title, the title based upon nothing other than the absence of every title to
govern, is precisely Plato’s mysterious seventh title included in the Laws: “And we
persuade a man to cast lots, by explaining that this, the seventh title of authority,
enjoys  the favour of  the gods and is  blessed by fortune.”54 So after  the careful
delineation of our initial six qualifications to rule, each positing a particular archê
principle,  Plato  curiously  ventures  to  include  a  seventh  which  appears  rather
51 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 46.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 41. Todd May offers considerable analysis of this statement in “Rancière and Anarchism.”
54 Plato, Laws, III, 690c.
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incongruous from the rest: a claim to rule that is based on no principle at all. 55 For
what grounds this  title is not a proper archê,  but if we follow Plato,  something
which remains indeterminate: the casting of lots, the arbitrariness of chance itself. If
the archê functions both to divide the categories of ruler and ruled and to distribute
the right to rule to those with the inherent capacities of the ruler, this seventh title
certainly fails to perform either of these two functions.56 The casting of lots, the
institution  that  structurally  resists  the  very  logic  of  the  archê,  that  formally
recognises  all  those  without  title,  is  emblematic  of  the  right  to  participate  in
government in spite of the complete lack of any qualification based on disposition.
As pronounced by Rancière’s third thesis, this is essential to what it is that politics
means: “Politics is a specific break with the logic of the arkhê.  It  does not simply
presuppose a break with the  ‘normal’ distribution of  positions that  defines  who
exercises power and who is subject to it. It also requires a break with the idea that
there exist dispositions ‘specific’ to these positions.”57 This is precisely what Plato
appears  to  associate  with  the  casting  of  lots.  Lot  is  that  peculiar  institution
engineered with the greatest degree of precision and calculation for the sole purpose
of injecting the element of unpredictability into government.58 By blindly selecting
members of the community to fill temporary positions in various offices and the
administrative council (boule), it functions to select out the entitlement of those few
55 See  Samuel  A.  Chambers,  “Police  and Oligarchy,”  Jacques Rancière:  Key Concepts,  ed.  Jean-Philippe
Deranty (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010), 65.
56 Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,” 51.
57 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 30.
58 From the drawing of lots to ballot machines to water clocks, John Keane will make this point regarding
many  of  the  institutional  mechanisms  employed  by  ancient  democracy.  See  The  Life  and  Death  of
Democracy, 51.
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who enjoy wealth, status and privilege. As the archê attempts to isolate those with a
special  capacity  to  govern,  lot,  by  its  very  nature,  appears  to  propose  that
participation in government requires no special qualification whatsoever. It implies
that government is not the discipline of experts or professional politicians, but that
the task of governing the community rightly belongs to the community itself, that
the disposition to govern is no different from the disposition to be governed. Lot is
therefore  the  ancient  institution  devised  specifically  to  facilitate  this  elusive
anarchic title, the title for all those without title. It is for this reason that Rancière, in
Hatred of Democracy, considers lot the very symbol of what is so scandalous about
democracy itself: “The scandal of democracy, and of the drawing of lots which is its
essence, is to reveal that this title can be nothing but the absence of title, that the
government of societies cannot but rest in the last resort on its own contingency.”59 
To affirm that every government rests only upon its own contingency is, in
part, to affirm a radical negation. It is to maintain that there is no ultimate basis for
one man to rule another, for the few to rule the many. It is to maintain that there is
no  necessity  to  the  manner  in  which  social  arrangements  are  organised  and
coordinated. To affirm the contingency of the social is to reject that there is a nature
of society that transcends the bounds of history,  custom and convention. It is to
refuse  the  postulate  that  social  relations  are  intuitive  and  straightforward  and
unequivocal.  Therefore,  perhaps  one of  the  more  significant  implications  of  the
democratic project is that as a general category “the social” must necessarily be
59 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 47.
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understood  according  to  the  infinite  series  of  contingencies  that  constitute  the
substance of its relations.60 Against Plato, the social is in no way indicative of an
organic system of relationships from which various orders of government may be
isolated  and  advanced  theoretically.  There  is  no  formula  or  foundation  for
government to be discovered in the extra-political relations of the social already
composed and arranged in innumerable ways. To Arendt’s point, the proper order of
the  city  can  be  drawn neither  from examples  of  the  captain  and  his  crew,  the
shepherd and his sheep, nor from any of the six models of authority outlined in the
Laws.  There  is  no  nature  of  the  social  which  dictates  one’s  proper  place  in  a
complementary relation  of  rule.  However  established  and ingrained our  various
social  arrangements appear to be,  the social  offers no principle,  no constant,  no
blueprint for government to repeat and express in institutional form. The social is
already  instituted  from  the  start.  Although  rarely  considered  a  thinker  of
institutions, this is something that Rancière never allows us to forget. The  social,
the  historical, the  contingent are terms which can never be opposed. There is no
static social space to be uncovered beyond the artifice of institutions themselves.
Divided, episodic, segmentary, discordant, if the social can be articulated in general
terms at all, for Rancière, it is only as a domain dominated by the universality of its
perpetually conflicting forces.61
60 For  an  analysis  and  evaluation  of  Rancière’s  general  position  on  the  social  see  Michael  J.  Shapiro,
“Radicalizing Democratic Theory: Social Space in Connolly, Deleuze and Rancière,” The New Pluralism:
William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition, eds. David Campbell and Morton Schoolman
(Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  2008).  For  a  more  critical  appraisal  of  Rancière’s  conception  of
contingency see Jodi Dean, “Politics Without Politics,” Parallax (vol. 15, no. 3, 2009): 31-2.
61 Shapiro, “Radicalizing Democratic Theory: Social Space in Connolly, Deleuze and Rancière,” 198, 202.
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Therefore,  if  politics  may  be  conceived  in  terms  of  an  absence  of
foundation, it is only because the social itself lacks any stable or immutable basis
upon  which  the  organisation  of  the  community  may  ultimately  ground  itself.
Indeed, for Rancière, politics can only be said to take place when the organisation
of the community or the distribution of the social is thrown back on its own inherent
contingency.62 Politics involves a radical exorcism of the natural from the social, so
that  for the first  time the social  appears  as the social and irreducibly social,  as
something entirely onto itself. This is not to suggest that the social and the political
remain indistinguishable conceptually, but that part of what politics entails is the
demonstration that the social is always particular, instituted, historical. The social is
the object of politics and politics is something that happens to the social. Politics is
the name of that which prevents the few, the rich, the highborn from transforming
the  contingencies  of  the  social  into  various  titles  for  ruling.  It  reveals  the
immeasurable gulf which separates these contingencies from any inherent right to
rule.63 Politics may not be an exercise as modest as simply juxtaposing nature with
convention or as hubristic as claiming to represent “the truth” of the social, but what
it does, if  we follow Rancière,  is render problematic the assertion that from the
nature of the social an archê which determines the proper governors of the city may
be ascertained and put forward as a foundation for rule. The very lack of such a
nature of the social is precisely what makes politics possible: “Politics exists simply
62 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 101. Also see Shapiro, “Radicalizing Democratic Theory:
Social Space in Connolly, Deleuze and Rancière,” 216.
63 Tanke, Jacques Rancière: An Introduction, 54-5.
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because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human society.
[…] [A]nyone who wants to cure politics of its ills has only one available solution:
the lie that invents some kind of social nature in order to provide the community
with an  arkhê.”64 As we have seen, the reinstallation of the archê is Plato’s only
viable solution to the scandal of democracy, the regime perceived to be grounded
only by the indeterminacy epitomised by the casting of lots. In order to combat this
condition, Plato’s only recourse is to attempt to cover it over once again by claiming
to establish a new foundation of rule via the discovery of a new archê principle.
Anticipating  his  later  studies  on  democracy,  this  procedure  is  precisely  what
Rancière, in The Philosopher and His Poor, will encapsulate as “Plato’s lie.”65 The
principal theme of the Republic may very well be what constitutes the justice of the
city, but insofar as its conclusions ultimately rely upon little more than the whim of
the city’s architect, the basis for the proper order of the just city remains entirely
arbitrary. Plato’s lie is that his ideal city, complete with its guardians, hierarchies
and partitioned classes affixed to particular functions and roles, is founded upon
nothing more than that which remains contingent still.  Plato may claim that his
city’s design is thoroughly rational, but rational design in no way cancels out those
very  contingencies  bound  up  with  the  ancient  philosopher’s  own  intentions,
strategies and preferences. Plato may put forward a model of the city governed by
the wise, but he in no way escapes the underlying contingency of the social  so
64 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 16.
65 See Jacques Rancière,  The Philosopher and His Poor (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), chapter 1.
Also see Oliver Davis, Jacques Rancière (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 75.
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dramatically exposed by democracy itself. By devising a new entitlement to govern
from  a  fraudulent  premise  of  the  social,  he  merely  succeeds  in  theoretically
obscuring this condition once again. Therefore, just as Rancière claims to decipher
an essential equality concealed beneath every form of inequality (expressed in terms
of even the lowest slave’s acknowledged membership to the linguistic community),
he  likewise  identifies  an  underlying  anarchy beneath  every  model  of  hierarchy
(expressed in terms of the contingency of the social).66 Obviously, such a postulate
does not deny the existence of hierarchies of all kinds everywhere in society, but
what it  ultimately intends to demonstrate  is  that immanent to  every hierarchical
relation  is  the  always  possible  means  to  dismantle  it.  If  democracy has  proven
successful in this task, it is because democracy discovers a way to undermine every
hierarchy at its very foundation, namely, by demonstrating that its foundation is not
a foundation at all.
Accordingly, this curious “anarchic title” may be understood as the basis of
democracy’s  unique  strategy  to  topple  those  given  hierarchies  associated  with
various models of rule. In this regard, why exactly Plato chooses to consider the
anarchic title  among his list  of  legitimate titles  in  the  Laws admittedly remains
unclear.  For  Plato  will  elaborate  upon the  content  of  this  seventh  title  and  the
reasons for its inclusion no further. Perhaps we should assume that by including it,
his intentions are simply to expose that the dominant title of his day—the empty
title  which facilitates  a  government  of  the  demos—is the  only title  based upon
66 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 16-17. Also see Davis, Jacques Rancière, 79.
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nothing at all: merely chance, accident, “the fortune of the gods,” the throw of the
dice. Perhaps the incontestable artificiality of the seventh title is only exhibited to
substantiate, by way of contrast, the inherent validity of the initial six titles drawn
from nature, the institution of lot only referenced to reaffirm the natural order of
rule spanning from parent and child to wise and ignorant. If this is so, then just as
we have seen with the allegory of the ship, Plato’s only intention is once again to
sabotage the government of the demos by demonstrating that in relation to other
models of the archê, the archê of democracy is the only archê that is not a proper
archê at all. Nevertheless, by including the seventh qualification only to discredit it,
Plato actually does a great service to the theory of democracy: by identifying the
radical indeterminacy upon which democracy must so precariously position itself,
he reveals that democratic government is the only government to be founded upon
the absence of any proper entitlement to govern. Against every other qualification,
every other criterion, democracy fabricates a supplementary title for all those who
possess no title at all. It is for this reason that the anarchic title, the exception to
every other title, is the only title that ultimately remains political.67 It undermines a
given distribution  of  the  social  that  binds  governors  and governed to  particular
qualities, capabilities and conditions. It cuts across the rigid filiations and alliances
of  birth, caste and class and opens up a field in which traditional identities, roles
and relations are broken down—or at least suspended—with respect to the rule of
the community, its legislation and occupation of civic offices and juridical posts.
67 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 47.
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Perhaps it is specifically in this context that Cleisthenes’ historic reforms must be
understood. What is it that makes Cleisthenes’ reforms so indisputably monumental
for the systematic institution of Athenian democracy? By at once configuring a new
model of “tribal” association (phulai) and distributing this model across an entirely
reorganised regional division of Attica, Cleisthenes discovered a way to formally
disrupt the traditional bonds which dictate age-old familial, economic and spatial
relations in the rule of the community, fostering the unprecedented emergence of a
uniquely political identity intersected by an entirely novel representation of civic
space.68 Put  another  way,  borrowing  the  terminology  of  Deleuze,  by
deterritorialising the traditional modalities which govern the spaces and identities
of Athens, only to  reterritorialise those very spaces and identities according to a
purely civic conception of the city, Cleisthenes’ reforms functioned to obstruct the
distribution of rule to a particular title, lineage or class. What Cleisthenes’ reforms
can be said to have achieved, therefore, is the structural bases (both geographic and
identitarian) in which the government of Athens is  rendered political,  that is,  in
which the claim to govern is drawn only from the anarchic title and nowhere else.
The so-called government of the demos, the rule of those who have no more right to
govern than to submit, is only possible when the identities, spaces and relations of
government are rendered political accordingly. In 507 B.C.E., Cleisthenes’ reforms
of the Athenian political landscape represent an unprecedented movement in this
68 For  a  still  unequalled  analysis  of  Cleisthenes’ reforms  see  Pierre  Lévêque  and  Pierre  Vidal-Naquet,
Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought
from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996).
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direction.
Hence, the power of the people is not the power to exercise the archê. Quite
the opposite, the  power of the people is the power that has become political.  In
opposition  to  the  government  which  claims  to  rest  upon  a  principle  of  itself,
democracy invents the only notion of government which rests upon politics itself,
that is,  which rests upon the explicit institution of the contingency of the social
expressed  in  terms  of  the  very  contradiction  of  the  qualification  without
qualification, the title that belongs not to a particular class or tribe, that is not bound
to capacity or condition, but embodies the empty form of anyone at all: 
What  remains is  the extraordinary exception,  the power of  the
people,  which  is  not  the  power  of  the  population  or  of  the
majority,  but  the  power  of  anyone  at  all,  the  equality  of
capabilities  to  occupy  the  positions  of  governors  and  of  the
governed. Political government, then, has a foundation. But this
foundation is also in fact a contradiction: politics is the foundation
of a power to govern in the absence of foundation.69 
Far from redundant, what Rancière here calls “political” government is the only
form of government to be founded upon the anarchic title,  upon  the equality to
occupy both the positions of governor and governed. Government becomes political
when the foundations which prop up the rule of a particular class of governors fall
away, so that the right to participate in the deliberation of political affairs may be
redistributed  to  that  generic  subject  traditionally  known  as  the  demos:  not  the
demos  as  a  particular  class  or  disenfranchised  body,  but  the  demos  understood
according to the anarchic title,  that is,  the demos understood as  anyone at all.70
69 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 49.
70 For  a  discussion  of  Rancière’s  “anarchic  equality”  see  Peter  Hallward,  “Staging  Equality:  Rancière’s
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Therefore, although Rancière will reject Laclau’s position that “the demos” merely
represents an empty signifier to be filled with various content, he will nevertheless
insist, as will Lefort, that what ultimately constitutes meaning of “the people” is
destined  to  remain indeterminate and inherently controversial.71 The idea  of  the
demos  is  one  imbued  with  an  essential  tension  or  ambivalence.  So  it  is  no
contradiction when Rancière declares democracy, as the power of the demos, at
once the regime of the poor, the excluded, the marginalised (the part without part)
and  the  regime  of  the  people  (the  part,  we  could  say,  that  has  become
indistinguishable from a representation of the whole via the contentious relation
between parts).72 For when expressed in terms of the anarchic title, the demos is the
name that simultaneously represents the particular and the universal: the demos is
both a part of the community and the part that becomes analogous to the whole. The
channel through which it moves from one to the other is the field of politics itself.
And yet, if one of the implications of Rancière’s anarchic title is that it may
be positively expressed in terms of the “equality of capabilities” as we see here, his
position could very well  be said to echo an argument that would not have been
unfamiliar  to  the  ancient  Greeks  themselves.  For  insofar  as  Rancière  binds  his
conception of politics to the equality of capabilities, the framework of his argument
will remain rather consistent with one of the few ancient philosophical defences of
democracy which purportedly survives.  If  we accept  the general  account  of  the
Theatrocracy and the Limits of Anarchic Equality,”  Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics, eds.
Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts (Durham and London: Duke University Press Books, 2009).
71 Miguel Abensour, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Rancière, “Instances démocratiques,” Vacarme vol. 48 (été
2009). For Laclau’s argument see On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). 
72 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 10.
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position espoused by the sophist as portrayed in the Platonic dialogue which takes
his name, Protagoras appears to have argued that unlike architecture, geometry and
navigation, the capacity for “deliberating on the administration of the city,” that is,
the capacity for political judgement (politike techne), is not at all a specialised skill,
such as those possessed by artisans,  but a capacity that remains universal to all
people, noble and common, wealthy and poor.73 To explain this claim, Plato has
Protagoras  recount  a  myth  in  which,  during  the  creation  of  man,  Zeus bestows
something  unique  to  this  rather  defenceless  species  that  other  animals  do  not
possess: to each individual, Zeus imparts an equal share of  politike techne so that
simply by virtue of living in a city and without any training whatsoever, all people
are capable of political deliberation and debate and hence, must be deemed capable
of participating in the affairs of city.  Therefore, much like Rancière’s celebrated
ignorant schoolmaster whose pedagogical strategies are predicated upon the axiom
that  simply  assumes  the  equality  of  intelligence  (the  equal  capacity  to  learn),
according to Protagoras, as a professional sophist, the only reason that it is possible
to instruct in the art of politics at all is because politike techne is already a capacity
presumed to be equally possessed by all people from the start.74 For Protagoras, it is
this  inherent  capacity—and not  the  social  contract  of  the  moderns—that  makes
73 Plato,  Protagoras, 319a-323a. According to Castoriadis, ancient Greek democracy is predicated upon the
notion  that  there  are  no  experts  regarding  the  affairs  of  politics,  that  political  wisdom belongs  to  the
community as a whole. Perhaps it is for this reason that Castoriadis famously asserts that the lesson of
democracy is that  one cannot  be wise  alone.  See “The  Greek  Polis and the  Creation  of  Democracy,”
Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 108, 120. 
74 Jacques  Rancière,  The  Ignorant  Schoolmaster:  Five  Lessons  in  Intellectual  Emancipation (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1991). Eric Mechoulan offers a fascinating analysis of some of Rancière’s most
central themes in light of Protagoras’ claim. See “Sophisticated Continuities and Historical Discontinuities,
Or, Why Not Protagoras?” Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics.
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living  together  in  a  political  community  possible.  This  is  the  argument  that
historians will most often put forward as one of the more compelling contemporary
defences of ancient democracy.75 For if democracy indeed posits that the capacity to
occupy the  position  of  governor  is  nothing  beyond  the  capacity  to  occupy the
position of the governed, then it must be concluded that equality cannot simply be
considered an institutional consequence of democracy, but something that is already
presupposed from the start: just as we discover in the work of Rancière, equality is
not the goal, but the very axiom of democracy itself.  
 And yet,  as  Rancière wishes  to  remind us,  to  occupy both the roles  of
governor and governed is something quite different from reciprocity. For whereas
reciprocity may still imply to rule and be ruled in turn and could be construed as the
circulation  or  exchange of  the archê,  what  the  concept  of  anarchic government
appears to entail is precisely the government founded only upon this paradoxical
status  of  the  qualification  of  the  unqualified.76 This  may appear  a  rather  subtle
distinction, but for Rancière, it is paramount for grasping what isolates democracy
from every other regime: 
Democracy is the specific situation in which it is the absence of
entitlement  that  entitles  one  to  exercise  the  arkhê.  [...]  In  this
logic the specificity of the arkhê—its redoubling, that is, the fact
that it always precedes itself in the circle of its own disposition
and  exercise—is  destroyed.  But  this  situation  of  exception  is
identical  with  the  very  condition  that  more  generally  makes
politics in its specificity possible.77 
75 See for example M. I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1985), 28. 
76 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 31.
77 Ibid.
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Democracy is  not a regenerated process to circulate or distribute the archê in a
manner in which its logic remains intact. This is precisely where Rancière disagrees
with Arendt. Rather, it is the specific situation in which the logic of the archê is
made to undermine itself through its very form. If the archê may be described as the
logic which binds an imperceptible principle to the empirical organisation of the
community by grounding the right to rule in a condition or capacity that anticipates
that rule in a time that comes before, then democracy describes the operation in
which the archê, put through the indeterminacy that constitutes the anarchic title,
loses its specific point of reference and returns to itself as an empty form, without
referent, without specification, so that the circle which binds rule to disposition and
disposition  to  rule  becomes  ruptured.  In  other  words,  democracy  represents  a
radical  break  with  the  logic  of  the  archê,  not  simply  by  virtue  of  its  outright
rejection of its content, but by inundating its form with an indecipherable reference
to anyone at all. What distinguishes Plato’s seventh title from his preceding six is
that formally incapable of isolating the appropriate set of rulers of the community,
the indeterminacy that permeates the archê of the demos is forcibly externalised
functioning to disrupt the various criteria of every other archê. When this occurs,
the  justification  for  the  rule  of  the  highborn,  the  rich  and the  wise  is  rendered
illegitimate leaving only one title remaining: the only title based upon politics itself.
As Rancière concludes: “Politics means the supplementation of all qualifications by
the power of the unqualified. The ultimate ground on which rulers govern is that
there is no good reason as to why some men should rule others. Ultimately the
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practice of ruling rests on its own absence of reason.”78 
Accordingly, the outstanding question of democracy’s own legitimacy is one
impossible to evaluate within the given framework as stipulated by the logic of the
archê. This is because beyond the order of politics, democracy is able to provide no
point of reference to justify its institutional models or claims of equality. Thus, if we
wish  to  remain  consistent  with  Rancière’s  general  formulation  of  democracy as
“political” or “anarchic” government, government that rests only upon the condition
of its own contingency, democracy must consequently be said to be the government
that at once legitimises and delegitimises itself in a single gesture.79 For as Abensour
will attest, anarchy is that which cannot be sovereign, cannot reign and cannot be
expressed as a principle without contradiction.80 Democracy can therefore provide
no absolution, no proof and no guarantee. It has recourse to no principle or external
frame of reference from which its justification may be verified in any unequivocal
or  absolute  manner.  Its  foundation  is  inextricably  bound  with  its  absence  of
foundation, its ground with its absence of ground. It is precisely for this reason that
from the beginning, we likened its condition to the sea.      
 
In a recent interview, Rancière explains that democracy is that which makes
politics thinkable.81 As long as rule is simply allocated to the rich, the strong, the
exceptional among us, there is no need for politics. Rule, in itself, does not require
78 Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?,” 53.
79 Ibid.
80 Miguel Abensour, “An-archy Between Metapolitics and Politics,” Parallax vol. 8, iss. 3 (2002): 16. 
81 Jacques Rancière and Eric Hazan, “Democracies Against Democracy,” Democracy in What State?, 78-9.
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politics and politics is in no way essential to its meaning. Politics, rather, manifests
as the exception to rule;  it  is what puts rule into question, what makes rule the
object  of  controversy and dispute.  As we witnessed  with  the  Greeks,  when the
problems  of  the  polis  are  expressed  as  problems  of  politics,  when  the  very
constitution of the community itself becomes political, rule and the relations of rule
can no longer be understood as a straightforward and intuitive arrangement,  the
order  of  the  city  no  longer  perceived  as  a  given,  natural  or  unchallengeable
formation. As Rancière attempts to illustrate, when politics takes place, the very
sensible of the community is transformed.82 
Politics  occurs  when  the  order  of  the  city,  its  spaces,  institutions  and
relations, is exposed to the order of politics accordingly; it is the process whereby
the problem of the organisation of the community is declared to rightly concern the
whole  community and hence  is  rendered  a  political  problem.  The agent  of  this
process is democracy. For Rancière, before the name of a regime, before a set of
institutions, democracy must be understood as a dynamic, transformative force, one
that opens a space for polemics and dissensus in the polis.83 When approached and
considered according to its most universal form, its  being-against the archê, it is
precisely this radical transformative agency that will appear with the greatest clarity
and salience. Expressed in terms of the anarchic title, the equality of anyone at all,
democracy can be appreciated to offer an unprecedented challenge to an order of
82 See Jacques Rancière,  The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Continuum,
2004).
83 Hewlett, Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Rethinking Emancipation, 108.
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society that categorically divides governors from governed according to an abstract
principle of rule. What democracy introduces to government is the complications of
politics. As observed by Plato, democracy’s subjection of the polis to politics serves
to undermine the logic of the archê and subsequently expose the organisation of the
social to an underlying anarchic condition. As the power of the people, democracy
is not only committed to the annihilation of the archê as such, but also to the task of
keeping this condition open. As Jean-Luc Nancy eloquently conveys in The Truth of
Democracy:
In this  sense,  democracy equals anarchy.  But anarchy commits
one to certain actions, operations, and struggles, to certain forms
that allow one rigorously to maintain the absence of any posited,
deposited, or imposed  archê. The democratic  kratein, the power
of the people, is first of all the power to foil the archê and then to
take  responsibility,  all  together  and  each  individually,  for  the
infinite opening that is thereby brought to light.84 
84 Jean-Luc Nancy,  “The Truth of Democracy,”  The Truth of Democracy  (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2010), 31. Jean-Philippe Deranty explores a number of thematic similarities between Rancière and
Nancy including their understanding of the archê and the implications of its refutation. See “Rancière and
Contemporary Political Ontology.”
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Part Two | The use of philosophy
3
To think democracy otherwise:
Claude Lefort and “savage”
democracy
Democracy has consequently been abandoned to its wild instincts, and 
it has grown up like those children who have no parental guidance, who 
receive their education in the public streets...
-Alexis de Tocqueville
It is true that, in a certain sense, no one holds the formula for democracy 
and that it is most profoundly itself by being savage democracy. Perhaps 
this is what constitutes its essence...
-Claude Lefort
If  an  examination  of  democracy  against  the  archê  reveals  something
essential about what democracy means, it  is not only because, as we have seen,
democracy  and  the  archê  remain  inherently  irreconcilable,  but  more  generally,
because when the question of democracy is initiated according to what it is against,
we  are  obliged  to  consider  something  often  left  concealed  by  the  customary
institutional  analysis:  its  emancipatory,  transformative  potential. Perhaps  one
feature that the work of Rancière, Lefort and Abensour all share in common is a
commitment to a conception of democracy that denies that it may be confined to a
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system  of  government  or  collection  of  institutions.  Although  the  scope  and
objectives of their projects differ considerably and can be integrated into no single
framework, in each respective case what these authors help us to think is a notion of
democracy as something defiant, adversarial, resurgent. In a Brechtian spirit, their
work functions to estrange the concept of democracy from those discourses that
perpetuate  a  mitigated,  domesticated  representation  of  democracy  officially
sanctioned by the interests of capital and the rules of the State so that something
that  perhaps  once  appeared  so  familiar  and  unequivocal  and  prosaic  may  be
encountered and engaged in entirely new ways. This is a strategy that unabashedly
rejects the kind of sentiment espoused by Slavoj Žizek who ultimately finds the
term democracy: “so discredited by its predominant use that, perhaps, one should
take the risk of abandoning it to the enemy.”1 Refusing such a risk, refusing the
capitulatory gesture of surrendering democracy “to the enemy,” Rancière,  Lefort
and Abensour can each be read to propose something far more challenging: the
rediscovery of the radical imperative at the root of democracy itself, so that we may
reappropriate the term, give it new life and place it against a prevailing order that
limits  and  confines  its  potentials  and  capacities.  Consequently,  what  such  a
theoretical  venture  will  immediately  recognise  and  render  explicit  is  that
particularly in  the modern age,  part  of  what  democracy means is  the inevitable
conflict over its very meaning. As Rancière will attest most unequivocally, while
democracy certainly entails a resistance to the strategies of consensus engineered by
1 Slavoj Žizek, On Belief (New York: Routledge, 2001), 123.
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our so-called “democratic” States, at the same time, it also inaugurates a struggle
over language itself, a struggle over the very word “democracy.”2 
Despite Rancière’s persistent scepticism, this is a struggle that philosophy—
broadly understood, following Deleuze, as the labour specific to the construction of
concepts—can be said to be well disposed to aid and support.3 Although Rancière
longs to distance his own work from the discipline, convinced that the history of
philosophy  has  repeatedly  confirmed  that  its  only  approach  to  the  question  of
politics is limited to deciphering a rational means to account for the structure and
functioning of  a  given social  order,  if  we follow the  example  of  Abensour,  the
critical and emancipatory potential of political philosophy can in no way be limited
to  Rancière’s  rather  narrow  typology  of  archipolitics,  parapolitics and
metapolitics.4 While Abensour will likewise provide a rather disparaging appraisal
of political philosophy in its conventional form, drawing from Arendt and Lefort,
what his own critical political philosophy boldly demonstrates is that the practice of
philosophy can  be organised not  only to  resist  the anti-democratic  currents  that
remain so prominent across political thought since Plato, but more importantly, to
rethink  and  reimagine  democracy  in  the  context  of  the  challenges  and  trials
particular to the  here and now.5 As we have seen, Abensour praises the political
2 Jacques Rancière and Eric Hazan, “Democracies Against Democracy,” Giorgio Agamben et al., Democracy
in What State? (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001),  78. Rancière will  typically discuss such
models of consensus under the name postdemocracy.
3 Here I follow Deleuze’s general formulation of philosophy as the creative practice of concept construction.
See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
4 Archipolitics,  parapolitics  and  metapolitics are  outlined  in  Rancière’s  Disagreement:  Politics  and
Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), chapter 4. For a general analysis of these
terms see Bruno Bosteels, “Archipolitics, Parapolitics, Metapolitics,” Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts, ed.
Jean-Philippe Deranty (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010.)
5 We will find this approach across Abensour’s oeuvre. In particular, see the essays contained in his volume
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writings  of  Arendt  for  their  decisive  opposition  to  the  longstanding tradition  of
political philosophy which has so often functioned to obscure the very problems
and  polemics  specific  to  politics  itself.6 But  devised  as  a  critical and  utopian
political philosophy, according to Abensour, philosophy can return to the matters of
politics  themselves,  that  “burst  into  the  present,”  demanding  interrogation  and
renewed critical evaluation. Philosophy is a critique of the present, of the here and
now.  This is its political  use. And while philosophy can never itself  assume the
place  of  direct  political  activity,  what  Abensour’s  work  appears  to  advocate  is
twofold: firstly, that the struggle for emancipation can never be divorced from a
permanent critique of modes of domination; and secondly, that such a critique both
compels and is enhanced by a constructive theoretical reformulation of the concept
of  democracy  itself,  one  in  which  democracy  can  once  again  be  thought  as
something challenging, dynamic, an enduring transformative agent in society.7 In
this regard, beyond a mere war of words, perhaps Abensour could declare one of the
objectives of such a political philosophy to be the cultivation of the ability to think
democracy anew or think democracy otherwise. Such an experimental exercise in
thought is precisely what Lefort’s savage democracy invites us to peruse. It is for
Pour une philosophie politique critique (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2009). For additional analysis of Abensour’s
critical political philosophy see Martin Breaugh, “Critique de la domination, pensée de l’émancipation. Sur
la philosophie politique de Miguel Abensour,” Politique et Sociétés vol. 22, no. 3 (2003) and Gilles Labelle,
“La philosophie politique et le ‘choix du petit’ dans le travail de Miguel Abensour,”  Monde Commun vol. 1,
no. 1 (automne 2007). Also see chapter 5 below.
6 Patrice Vermeren, “Equality and Democracy,” Diogenes vol. 55, no. 4 (2008): 57-8. In chapter 1 we relied
heavily upon Abensour’s essay “Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics: Arendt’s Reading of
Plato’s Cave Allegory,” Social Research vol. 74, no. 4 (Winter 2007). Also see his Hannah Arendt contre la
philosophie politique? (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2006).
7 Abensour’s  preferred  term for  such a  concept  is  insurgent  democracy.  See “Of Insurgent  Democracy,”
Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). This concept
will be developed in chapter 5 below.
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this reason that it will likewise form the basis of our approach to what I have called
democracy’s “being-against.”  
To initiate a theory of democracy according to what it is against is to allow
the concept of democracy to diverge dramatically from the conventions which tend
to restrict it to a  variety  of government or set of institutions. For what its being-
against will immediately affirm and render transparent is that the elemental forces
which constitute democracy and propel it forward—the power of the people—not
only  remain  irreducible  to  a  particular  system  of  government  or  institutional
framework, they find their most immediate and powerful expression in the form of
that specific polemic or controversy that we found to be essential to the meaning of
politics itself. Although we cannot speak of a principle or foundation of democracy,
if we were to attempt to isolate and identify its germinal or originary impulse, it
would unmistakably take the form of an against, an against which is not simply a
derivative of democracy, but the basis and substance of its transformative politics.
This against does not describe the antithetical consequence of an antecedent form,
but instead defines a democracy that appears in the form of an against from its very
inception.  Therefore,  in  the  most  precise  terms,  to  consider  what  democracy is
against  is  something  quite  distinct  from  the  more  limited  question  of  what
democracy simply contradicts or negates. For the object of its being-against does
not  merely  compose  an  external  relation  with  democracy  itself,  but  remains
immanent to its very form. Perhaps this is explained by the fact that historically
democracy is never constituted in a void, but invariably appears in the guise of a
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counter  or  objection  to  an  established  order  of  society in  which  a  spectrum of
familiar modes of social domination are already in place: unrestricted or arbitrary
rule, concentrations of authority, monopolies of decision, strategies of exclusion and
marginalisation,  archic governance.  From  the  beginning,  as  the  initiation  of  a
unique  political  controversy  and  dispute,  whether  a  response to  oligarchy  or
theocracy, to the rule of despots or kings, democracy is always generated in the
form of an against which at all times remains integral to its constitution, orientation
and institutional expression. Consequently, it could be said that democracy reveals
exactly what it is against by virtue of its very form. For example, democracy is
often declared to be organised around a defiant claim of equality (what Rancière has
articulated  correctly  as  an  anarchic equality).8 But  what  this  anarchic  equality
indisputably reveals is that democracy necessarily contains within it  an intrinsic
being-against the  archê that must be considered just as essential to its concept as
this positive claim of equality itself. As we have seen, democracy does not simply
encounter the archê from without, but composes itself in the immanent form of a
democracy against the archê from the start. This means that democracy does not
simply  lack an  archê,  but  more  accurately  describes  a  distinct  political
manifestation  against it,  against  both  the  various  orders  of  the  archê  that  it
confronts and disputes in society as well as the archê that perhaps always threatens
to emerge within the walls of its own institutions. Hence, what democracy is against
8 Rancière states: “This equality is simply the equality of anyone at all with anyone else: in other words, in
the final analysis, the absence of  arkhê, the sheer contingency of any social order.” See  Disagreement:
Politics and Philosophy, 15. This position has already been discussed at length in chapter 2.
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—and  incorporates  and  internalises  in  the  form  of  a  being-against—is  never
extraneous to democracy itself, but must be thought to represent a fundamentally
inalienable dimension  of its very form. As the immanent expression of what it is
against, what democracy’s being-against therefore intends to signify is the inability
of  democracy to  be  formally isolated  from that  which  it  counters,  contests  and
renders  politically  problematic.  Accordingly,  any  conceptual  construction  of
democracy that  fails  to identify,  delineate  and punctuate  the significance of this
indispensable dimension can only be said to offer an impression of democracy that
remains limited in scope.    
Perhaps, as a formal theoretical model, we can draw our approach to the
general structure of democracy’s against from the political anthropology of Pierre
Clastres.  In  his  seminal  study  Society  Against  the  State,  Clastres  ventures  to
discredit  an  established  anthropological  position  which,  until  that  time,  had
prevailed over the discipline: just as primitive societies were often understood to
lack architecture, scientific inquiry and a written history, the politics of such tribal
cultures tended to be examined in terms of an absence of politics.9 But as Clastres
explains,  when anthropologists traditionally went looking for signs of politics in
primitive societies, their very parameters of what constitutes the political field was
entirely subject to a modern western ethnocentric bias inclined to ground politics
according to what is perceived to be its proper place in civilised societies and hence
9 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology (New York: Zone Books, 1987),
189-90. Both Lefort and Abensour have written on various facets of Clastres’ work. Some of their writings
appear  in Abensour’s  edited  volume,  L’esprit  des  lois  sauvages:  Pierre  Clastres  ou  une  nouvelle
anthropologie politique (Paris: Seuil, 1987).
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according to precisely what is lacking in tribal communities, namely the State: that
coercive,  hierarchical  “command-obedience  relationship”  in  which  a  distinct
apparatus isolates the organs of power from the whole community and consolidates
them in the  hands of  a  select  few.10 It  is  against  these parameters  that  Clastres
develops his core theses. Through extensive fieldwork with the Guayaki tribes of
Paraguay, Clastres demonstrates that while primitive societies do indeed lack a State
as anthropologists have often observed, this is not indicative of the absence of a
very meticulous organisation of power in such communities, but rather of our own
flawed comprehension of how power may be arranged in Stateless societies. Thus,
in the context  of tribal cultures,  Clastres recognises that  if  we wish to consider
politics at all, the concept can no longer be centred around the relations of the State,
but according to the extensive social strategies and institutional mechanisms that
specifically intend to prevent the State’s emergence.11 What distinguishes primitive
societies from our own is an elaborate institutional model designed to retain the
organs of power under the control of the whole community. In this respect, we must
take the title of Clastres’ volume quite literally. Primitive societies are not simply
societies  without a State, but societies  against the State, against the very capacity
inherent to every community to institutionally abstract the means of authority from
the whole community and concentrate them in the hands of the few. Therefore,
contrary to the dominant anthropological perspective of his day, Clastres insists that
10 Clastres,  Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology,  9-11,  16,  189-90,  203-4.  Also see
Lefort “Dialogue with Pierre Clastres,” 214.
11 Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology, 154, 218.
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primitive societies do not represent embryonic cultures momentarily suspended in
an  inevitable  development  towards  an  advanced  political  society  coordinated
around the State-form. It is precisely his intention to dispense with such a vapid
evolutionist postulate.12 Rather, what these tribal communities represent to Clastres
are societies in which an immanent being-against the State determines the basis of
their very mode of being: not only does their social organisation lack any semblance
of a centralised State apparatus, it embodies a distinctive institutional orientation
against  the  perpetual  threat  of  its  appearance. Primitive  communities  reveal  an
intrinsic and unextractable against that remains essential to the very foundation of
their tribal organisation.  For Clastres, it is precisely according to the structure of
this  immanent  being-against  that  primitive  societies  must  be  approached  and
understood politically.     
Hence,  although  Clastres  suggests  no  intention  to  exhibit  such  tribal
societies as examples of primitive democracies, his research certainly uncovers a
social model that definitively encapsulates the formal structure of the being-against
that is so essential to the concept of democracy we are advancing here. Much like
Clastres’ description of the politics of primitive societies, what democracy is against
cannot  be  regarded  extrinsic  or  secondary  to  more  rudimentary  properties  that
customarily define it. Although often neglected, forgotten or overlooked by many of
even the most exhaustive studies of democracy, a comprehensive grasp of its being-
against is imperative for a more nuanced and multifaceted understanding of what
12 Gilles  Deleuze  and  Felix Guattari,  A Thousand Plateaus:  Capitalism and Schizophrenia  (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 357.
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democracy means. When a concept of democracy is constructed with the capacity to
identify, distinguish and chart out this against—its logic, objects and orientation—
what is uniquely facilitated is a theoretical inquiry far more disposed to establish
democracy as an emancipatory agency of the demos. For it is precisely the against
that  propels  democracy  forward,  that  informs  its  targets  and  objectives,  that
galvanises  its  unyielding  resolve  towards  a  more  participatory,  more  egalitarian
society. Democracy is not a static entity; it is an active agent. It is not so much a
type  of  society as  something that  happens  to  it.  Democracy is  the  name of  an
unprecedented  challenge  to  modes  of  domination,  strategies  of  inequality  and
hierarchies of all kinds. It may be identified with the forces that seek to expose,
contest and transform oppressive and exclusionary arrangements and practices from
below,  from  the  outside,  from  a  minoritarian positionality.  In  the  simplest
formulation,  democracy is  the  democratisation of  society,  of  its  institutions  and
relations. It carves out new spaces for democracy, locates social fields where there
is potential for greater democracy and confronts obstructions where democracy is
blocked,  channelled  away or  refused  altogether.  This  is  an  attempt  to  conceive
democracy at its most libertarian, its most revolutionary or to employ that rather
enigmatic  term  of  Lefort,  its  most  savage.  Indeed,  philosophy  need  not  be
conservative with its concepts.
It  is  in  this  respect  that  what  Lefort  incites  as  a  “wild”  or  “savage”
democracy (démocratie sauvage) represents an indispensable moment of thinking
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the against.13 For the savage elicits everything about democracy that challenges the
limits and constraints of its  accepted concept, urging us to push our thinking of
democracy ever further, towards its most uncompromised and resilient incarnation:
its political acts of emancipation, its endless capacity for conflict and contestation,
its  enduring  momentum  towards  a  more  democratic  society.  If  a  theory  of
democracy’s against necessitates a concept of democracy able to incorporate those
moments  of  defiance,  objection  and  confrontation,  Lefort’s  savage  democracy,
however  unconventional,  will  prove  invaluable  in  the  philosophical  exercise  of
organising  such  a  concept.  Therefore,  while  Lefort’s  larger  theory  of  modern
democracy could very well be presented in the context of a democracy posited at
once against monarchy and against totalitarianism, our appeal to Lefort here does
not intend to extract a particular model of democracy’s being-against, but instead
pursues, within this context, a way of thinking democracy that illuminates the basis
of its transformative politics.14 Navigated by Abensour’s considerable elaboration of
this particularly difficult term, Lefort’s recurring reference to a savage democracy,
although never defined, will tend to evoke those revolutionary moments punctuated
throughout modern history in which democracy appears as a formidable challenge
to  that  which  it  contests  and disputes  in  society.  Less  a  descriptive  analysis  of
democracy than an experimental strategy for thinking about it, savage democracy
not only functions to open up the concept of democracy so it may be considered in
13 The term démocratie sauvage will also be translated as “wild” democracy and “untamed” democracy.
14 Part 3 will consider two theoretical models of democracy’s being-against: Rancière’s democracy against the
police and Abensour’s democracy against the State.
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entirely new ways, it also invites us to construct our basic conception of democracy
according to  its  most  creative  and transformative  dimensions  and capacities.  To
think  a  democracy  against  is  to  think  a  democracy  that  binds  the  persistent
democratisation of  society to  that  distinct  challenge of  the  demos that  we have
hitherto associated with politics  itself.  To think a  democracy against  is  to  think
democracy savage.
The  heuristic  power of  savage democracy will  be  discovered  in  Lefort’s
oeuvre  in  its  capacity  to  revive  and  reactivate  that  indissoluble  philosophical
question: how should democracy be thought? Lefort’s writings are devoted to many
facets of modern democracy that often remain only obscure or marginal themes in
comparable theoretical studies: its formal abolition of the generative principles of
the  ancien régime, its political institution of conflict and division, its categorical
rejection  of  the  totalitarian  solution  to  the  problem  of  politics.  Distancing  the
question  of  democracy from the  customary topics  of  government,  much  of  his
mature work can be approached as a descriptive phenomenological appraisal of how
what democracy renders political is both represented symbolically and experienced
socially.15 His  project  considers  the  manner  in  which  democracy  radically
transforms not only the institutions of society, but the very horizon against which
questions of authority,  legitimacy,  law, justice and knowledge are perceived and
15 Bernard  Flynn,  The  Philosophy  of  Claude  Lefort:  Interpreting  the  Political (Evanston:  Northwestern
University  Press,  2005),  xix-xx.  Also  see  Flynn’s  essay  “Lefort  as  Phenomenologist  of  the  Political,”
Claude Lefort: Thinker of the Political, ed. Martín Plot (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan
Publishers Limited, 2013).
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evaluated.  Lefort  is  often considered a thinker of indeterminacy.  Obviously,  this
view is hardly unjustified. And yet, what is often forgotten, or hastily overlooked, is
that beyond democracy’s revelation of the contingency of the social, the lack of a
stable  ontological  ground—that  which  we  found  to  be  constitutive  of  the  very
condition of politics  itself—part  of what  indeterminacy implies  for Lefort  is  an
unequivocal refusal of  mastery. This represents an indispensable dimension of his
broader  approach to  democracy itself:  “It  is  to  dream to  think  that  we possess
democracy [...]. Democracy is but a play of possibilities, one inaugurated in a still
recent past  and about which we still  have everything to explore.”16 As much as
Lefort  represents  a  thinker  of  indeterminacy,  he  must  also  represent  a  thinker
against  mastery.17 Perhaps  this  forms  the  basis  of  both  his  ethical  and
epistemological  critique.  From  his  earliest  surveys  of  bureaucracy  and
totalitarianism, to his ultimate disavowal of Marxism and the seductive image of the
“good society,” to his later acclamations of democracy’s subversion of everything
that  is  absolute,  certain,  fixed,  this  position  against  mastery  is  a  theme  which
extends across almost every facet of his work. It is likewise a theme that may serve
to  illuminate  one  of  the  more  perplexing  terms  to  appear  throughout  his  later
writings.  For when Lefort  longs to incite  a concept  of democracy as something
unmasterable and unrestrained, as something that refuses to be pacified, inhibited or
16 Claude  Lefort,  Élements  d’une  critique  de  la  bureaucratie (Paris:  Gallimard,  1979),  28  as  quoted  in
Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” Democracy Against the State: Marx and
the Machiavellian Moment, 109.
17 Alain Caillé, “Claude Lefort, the Social Sciences and Political Philosophy,”  Thesis Eleven vol. 43, no. 1
(1995): 54.  Rancière has likewise been interpreted as adopting an essential position against mastery. See
Peter Hallward, “Jacques Rancière and the Subversion of Mastery,” Paragraph vol. 28, iss. 1 (March 2005).
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regulated,  he  will  tend  to  reference  a  “savage”  democracy,  a  curious  phrase
ostensibly reserved to distinguish and chart out democracy’s more unbridled and
subversive  dimensions  and  capacities.18 And  while  some  may  find  the  term to
remain rather evasive, it  is nevertheless according to this savage democracy that
Lefort will identify what is most essential to democracy itself: 
It is true that, in a certain sense, no one holds the formula for
democracy and that it is most profoundly itself by being savage
democracy. Perhaps this is what constitutes its essence; as soon as
there is  no ultimate reference on the basis  of which the social
order might be conceived and determined, this order is constantly
on a quest for foundations, in search of its own legitimacy, and it
is  precisely the  opposition  and  the  demands  of  those  who  are
excluded from the benefits of democracy that constitute its most
effective wellspring.19
Deriving its  forces from the opposition of those who are most  excluded,
lacking  any  formula  or  ultimate  foundation,  constantly  in  search  of  its  own
legitimacy,  how  are  we  to  engage  and  evaluate  this  savage  democracy  that
according  to  Lefort  constitutes  democracy’s  very  essence?  And  moreover,  is
Abensour, who not only provides the most exhaustive analysis of the term, but who
also adopts something of a savage conception of democracy to animate his own
theory  of  a  democracy  against  the  State,20 justified  in  his  rendering  of  savage
18 Martin Legros, “Qu’est-ce que la démocratie sauvage? De Claude Lefort à Miguel Abensour,” Critique de
la politique. Autour de Miguel Abensour, eds. Anne Kupiec and Étienne Tassin (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2006),
96-7.
19 Claude Lefort and Paul Thibaud, “La communication democratique,”  Esprit  no. 9-10 (septembre-octobre
1979): 34 as quoted in Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 106-7. Reprinted
with minor variations in Claude Lefort, Le temps present: Écrits 1945-2005 (Paris: Belin, 2007), 389-90.
Also see Newton Bignotto, “Lefort and Machiavelli,” Claude Lefort: Thinker of the Political, 46.
20 Abensour writes: “In a way, ‘savage democracy,’ in Claude Lefort’s terms [...] could be a plausible figure, a
name, for democracy against the State. Indeed, if savage democracy defines itself by the dissolution of the
ultimate  markers  of  certainty,  by  the  repeated  test  of  indeterminacy—which  implies  a  way  out  of
metaphysical derivation, an emancipation from a foundational principle—it appears hardly compatible with
the State whose existence requires foundation,  certainty,  and reliance on a primary principle.” See “Of
Insurgent Democracy,” xxxi-xxxii. This position will be further qualified in chapter 5.
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democracy as the centrepiece of Lefort’s thought and the key to interpreting his
larger oeuvre? In a short essay on Deleuze’s aesthetics, Rancière will preface his
remarks declaring  that:  “Understanding a thinker does not amount to coinciding
with his centre. On the contrary, to understand a thinker is to displace him, to lead
him on a trajectory where his articulations come undone and leave room for play.”21
With  respect  to  Lefort,  perhaps  this  holds  especially  true.  For  while  one  could
hardly  locate  savage  democracy at  the  “centre”  of  Lefort’s  work,  if  we  follow
Abensour’s compelling exposition, when interpretations of Lefort venture to take
his thought to its most challenging and distinctive point, perhaps it is indeed savage
democracy that represents its “necessary outcome.”22 For as Abensour explains  in
his indispensable essay “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” what
the  adjective  savage first  intends  to signify—as  a  qualifier  opposed  to  a
demarcation—is the indetermination bound up with the very question of democracy
itself;  it  is  what  raises  the  question  over  and  over  again,  keeping  the  idea  of
democracy  unsettled  and  perpetually  open.23 If  Lefort  ultimately  understands
philosophy itself as interminable questioning, indefinite and open-ended in scope,
savage  democracy certainly  sets  such  an  exercise  into  motion.24 Unbinding  the
concept of democracy from the constraints that so often circumscribe its limits and
determine its reference, what savage democracy will immediately refuse is precisely
the authority to definitively master its formula and monopolise its meaning once
21 Jacques Rancière, “Is There a Deleuzian Aesthetics?,” Qui Parle vol. 14, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2004): 1.
22 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 102.
23 Ibid.
24 Claude Lefort, “Philosopher?,” Writing: The Political Test (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 248-9. 
113
and for all. Thus, in the broadest sense, savage democracy may be introduced as the
idea of democracy at its most unshackled, its most  deterritorialised and therefore
may serve as a vehicle to propel our thinking of democracy in unprecedented new
directions,  exposing  it  to  entirely  new  possibilities.  In  this  regard,  if  savage
democracy remains one of the more difficult terms to decipher in Lefort’s work, it is
because rather than proposing a proper concept of democracy, it functions to throw
the  concept  into  question,  challenging  our  basic  attitudes  and  underlying
suppositions. Perhaps less a description of democracy than an experimental strategy
for thinking about it, at the same time as qualifying democracy itself, the savage
also qualifies something of our own thought:  what savage democracy demands is
that we think democracy in a savage way. It is for this reason that Lefort can be said
to provide an extremely effective strategy to emancipate democracy in thought. By
evoking everything that is revolutionary about democracy, Lefort discovers a way to
release the concept from all the snares that so often entrap, limit and confine what
democracy can be and what it can mean, allowing us to reimagine it anew according
to  its  most  creative  and  transformative  dimensions  and  capacities,  however
unconventional  or  provocative.  This  is  imperative  for  thinking  the  against.
Therefore,  although this  rather  peculiar  phrase  may only be  encountered  at  the
margins of Lefort’s writings, perhaps Abensour is profoundly correct to suggest that
central  to  understanding  Lefort  is  an  understanding  of  savage  democracy  and
likewise,  central  to  understanding  savage  democracy  is  an  understanding  of
something that is essential to democracy itself.   
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In this respect, at the same time as Lefort’s savage democracy raises a whole
series of questions about our interpretation of democracy, it also gives us cause to
reflect  upon our  interpretation  of  Lefort  himself.  For  this  savage  conception  of
democracy will often remain omitted or diminished in various surveys of his work.
It  is  largely  only  Abensour’s  rather  unorthodox  reading  that  grants  it  such
prominence across his larger oeuvre.25 But as Lefort illustrates in his own highly
original discussions of hermeneutics outlined in his colossal work on Machiavelli,
the  art  of  interpretation  is  not  ultimately  a  question  of  mastering  a  text  or
uncovering some indisputable truth regarding its author, but an attempt to open up a
world  of  thought  through  a  horizon  of  the  work  that  perhaps  the  author  holds
together, but given the particularity of the interpretation, remains irreducible to the
reconstruction of his  doctrines and lends itself  to ever renewed possibilities and
powers.26 Thus, with Lefort, interpretation could very well be elevated to a political
act  in  itself.  According  to  Lefort,  the  mode  of  interpretation  that  escapes  the
limitations of ideology and raises itself up to the demands of politics is precisely the
one that binds the particularities of our own interpretation to the conditions of the
“here and now” (hic et nunc), not only so that our present experience may inform
the critique of the work, but also so that the work itself may inform the critique of
25 In contrast to Abensour, Isabelle Garo reads Lefort, for example, as seeking a third option that carefully
negotiates  between  the requirements  of  market  capitalism on the one  hand and  the radical  democratic
currents of savage democracy on the other. See “Entre démocratie sauvage et barbarie marchande: A propos
de Claude Lefort, Le temps présent – Écrits 1945-2005,” La Revue internationale des livres et des idées no.
3 (janvier-février 2008).
26 See Claude Lefort, Machiavelli in the Making (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012), Parts 1 and
5.  For a general  introduction to  Lefort’s  theory of interpretation see Flynn,  The Philosophy of Claude
Lefort: Interpreting the Political, chapter 3.
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our  present  experience.27 This  is  what  is  essential  for  a  political  philosophy.
Accordingly, perhaps there is something of our own conditions, our own present
experience,  our  own  here  and  now,  that  for  Abensour  calls  for  a  concept  of
democracy  that  strives  to  rejuvenate  everything  that  is  radical  about  what
democracy can mean. For when Abensour reads Lefort, his own strategic approach
appears to be twofold: he not only locates the most radical democratic moments in
Lefort’s thought, he simultaneously interprets Lefort’s thought as a whole according
to  those  very moments.28 The  result  is  a  picture  of  Lefort  that  is,  although not
unfamiliar or obscure, one in which the possibilities and powers of his thought are
taken to their highest point. For Abensour, the outcome is savage democracy.
Although the phrase rarely appears in his major works, a series of references
to  savage  democracy will  be  found scattered  across  a  number  of  Lefort’s  later
essays  and  interviews,  suggesting  a  conception  of  democracy  that,  given  its
qualification,  must  be  somewhat  distinguished  from  his  more  characteristic
phenomenological rendering of democracy as a symbolic order or form of society.
But why savage? What is at the source of this curious qualification? We can only
speculate. Abensour certainly warns against the initial temptation to associate the
term with  either  Clastres’ ethnological  studies  of  the  “savage”  society  or  with
Hobbes’ chaotic state of nature that remains perpetually in a state of  war of all
27 Lefort,  Machiavelli  in  the  Making,  504.  Also  see  Dick  Howard,  “Claude  Lefort’s  Passage  from
Revolutionary Theory to Political Theory,”  The Spectre of Democracy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002), 76.
28 For an analysis of Abensour’s “radical democratic” interpretation of Lefort  see James D. Ingram, “The
Politics of Claude Lefort’s Political: Between Liberalism and Radical Democracy,”  Thesis Eleven vol. 87,
iss. 1 (2006).
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against all.29 Rather, given the manner in which Lefort appears to want to incite
democracy’s  more  unrestricted  and  uninhibited  powers,  it  is  possible  that  the
adjective is  borrowed from (or  simply  inspired  by)  an  equally  difficult  term
encountered in the late writings of his teacher and mentor Merleau-Ponty. In his
unfinished manuscript The Visible and the Invisible, a text that Lefort would himself
edit  and prepare for  publication,  Merleau-Ponty appears to  reevaluate  the entire
basis in which phenomenology approaches the question of ontology. Through his
exploratory  research,  in  a  rather  unorthodox  move  for  an  author  who  long
endeavoured  to  break  down  the  sharp  distinctions  between  subject  and  object,
appearance and essence, Merleau-Ponty nevertheless appears to want to distinguish
between  a  being  that  is  organised  according  to  the  conditions  of  subjective
experience and a being that, it can only be postulated, resists or remains external to
those processes of subjective mediation. In an attempt to articulate this unintegrated
dimension of being in a manner that does not reinstate a notion of an absolute Being
or an essential thing-in-itself, Merleau-Ponty will invoke a “brute” or “wild” being
(l’etre  sauvage).30 Although  the  precise  status  of  this  wild  being  is  difficult  to
determine  given  that  the  concept  specifically  intends  to  indicate  that  excess  or
residue  which  transcends  all  categories  and  predication,  much  like  Adorno’s
negative dialectics, this rather unusual qualification  does allow  Merleau-Ponty to
29 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 105.
30 References to “wild being” will be found throughout the text. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and
the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Also see Angela Ales Bello, “‘Brute Being’
and Hyletic Phenomenology: The Philosophical Legacy of Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible,”
Analecta  Husserliana vol.  104  (2009)  and  Gilles  Labelle,  “Maurice  Merleau-Ponty et  la  genèse  de  la
philosophie politique de Claude Lefort,” Politique et Sociétés, vol. 22, no. 3 (2003).
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express  something  that  was  not  possible  before,  even  if  only  as  a  series  of
negations:  wild  being  is  that  being  which  exceeds  organisation  and  resists
ontological closure, it is that being which escapes the rules of an established order
and refuses to be arranged into an overarching scheme, it is that being which cannot
be  incorporated  into  a  system and  falls  outside  the  realm of  facts,  figures  and
predicable patterns. Instead, wild being recalls the “wildness” of wildflowers that
remains irreducible to the cultivated garden.31 It is that excess of being always in the
process of inundating its boundaries and speaks to an ontology without closure,
without principle and without essence. Is this not precisely the manner in which
Abensour  will  convey  Lefort’s  savage  democracy,  a  democracy  that:  “like  an
impetuous  river  that  incessantly  overflows  its  bed,  cannot  ‘go  back  home’ and
submit to the established order”?32 
It is in this respect that Lefort’s savage democracy could arguably be taken
to bear a trace or vestige, however subtle, of Merleau-Ponty’s wild being. And yet,
perhaps this only raises more questions. In his own analysis, Abensour argues that
insofar  as  it  resists  domestication  and  is  incapable  of  being  domesticated,
democracy may be understood to remain faithful to its “savage essence.”33 But as
Abensour clearly recognises, if the savage qualifier intends to release the concept of
31 Eleanor  M.  Godway,  “Wild  Being,  the  Prepredicative  and  Expression:  How  Merleau-Ponty  Uses
Phenomenology to Develop an Ontology.” Man and World vol. 26, no. 4 (1993): 389. It is precisely in this
sense  of  “wildflowers”  that  Lévi-Strauss will  employ  the  term  “savage”  in  order  to  distinguish  an
“untamed” human thought from a more methodical or scientific mode of reasoning in La pensée sauvage:
“In this book it is neither the mind of savages nor that of primitive or archaic humanity, but rather mind in
its untamed state as distinct from mind cultivated or domesticated for the purpose of yielding a return.” See
The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 219.
32 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 107.
33 Ibid.
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democracy  from  the  narrow  confines  of  a  fixed  or  preconceived  framework,
prompting us to think democracy beyond all reference to foundation, principle or
archê,  can  we  then  even  speak  of  a  “savage  essence?”  Particularly  in  light  of
Merleau-Ponty’s wild being, does not the savage attempt to undermine the very
notion of an essence of democracy? And if so, how do we reconcile this apparent
contradiction? This is a problem, however semantic, that appears to be resolved by
Lefort scholar Bernard Flynn. According to Flynn, Lefort once explained that if he
at times relies on a language of essences, he is not thinking of essence in the sense
of Plato, but in the sense of “gasoline, fuel, which one puts in a car.”34 Therefore, if
we can extrapolate from this rather intriguing remark, when Lefort refers to savage
democracy as the  essence of democracy,  he does not intend to lay down a new
formula or foundation to which democracy must adhere conceptually. Instead, what
he is attempting to express, supporting Abensour’s fundamental claim, is the power
of democracy itself,  the living source of its  transformative agency. When Lefort
asks us to think democracy according to its savage essence, he is asking us to draw
our  basic  conception  of  democracy  not  via  a  compromised  or  domesticated
representation of democracy, but according to its most revolutionary potentials and
capacities.35 Lefort is interested in what democracy can do and what it can achieve.
He  is  interested  in  what  propels  democracy  forward,  how  it  transforms  our
34 Flynn, “Lefort as Phenomenologist of the Political,” 31-2.
35 Sheldon Wolin, whose own concept of “fugitive democracy” repeats many of the distinctive features of
Lefort’s savage democracy, will likewise maintain that democracy must be conceived according to its most
revolutionary  tendencies.  See  “Fugitive  Democracy,”  Democracy  and  Difference:  Contesting  the
Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), as well as
“Postmodern Democracy: Virtual or Fugitive?,” Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western
Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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institutions  and relations  as  well  as  the  manner  in  which  those  institutions  and
relations are represented and experienced symbolically.  Hence,  contrary to those
rather  monotonous declarations  lamenting  democracy’s  “fragility,”  what  Lefort’s
savage democracy ultimately invites  us  to  consider  is  its  enduring  strength  and
vitality in the modern world. This is something that much of Lefort’s work will
attempt to demonstrate.
Although  never  properly  defined  by  the  author  himself,  even  the  most
cursory  survey  of  Lefort’s  employment  of  the  term  will  discern  that  savage
democracy is  often associated with spontaneous revolutionary currents that have
tended to unfold throughout  some of  the  most  monumental  events  to  punctuate
modern  European  history:  from  the  earliest  days  of  the  French  Revolution  to
February 1917 to May ’68. Even if all of these events could be declared to have
ultimately failed to fully realise their democratic potential, it nevertheless appears
that  Lefort  is  able  to  identify  something  inside  each  of  them that  captures  his
imagination:  a  power,  an  impulse,  a  radical  democratic  upsurge  that,  however
ephemeral its  manifestation,  refuses to be tempered or restrained: “This ferment
may only be an element of revolutions, but it is extraordinary enough to warrant our
interest. For a period of time that can be longer or shorter, it gives form to savage
democracy, the trace of which can be lost, or is always lost, yet it reveals certain
specific aspirations of the modern world.”36 Through all the chaos and confusion
and contradictions inherent to each of these examples of popular social upheaval,
36 Claude Lefort,  “Relecture sur Mai 68,”  Le temps present: Écrits 1945-2005,  592 (translation by Martin
Breaugh).
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Lefort believes he can discern something distinctive, something which he considers
to be essential to the meaning of democracy itself. And yet, at the same time, these
observations do not imply that for Lefort, savage democracy and revolution may in
any way be considered synonymous. At least since his early disillusionment with
Trotskyism,37 Lefort cannot be said to be guilty of falling prey to what he calls the
“myth of revolution,” the naive promotion of a certain revolutionary voluntarism
most often associated with Lenin and firmly ingrained in the popular imagination of
the French Revolution itself.38 Rather, following the example of Tocqueville, Lefort
is intent on distinguishing between the model of the French Revolution on the one
hand  and  the  forces  of  democratic  revolution on  the  other.39 It  is  against  this
backdrop of Tocqueville’s democratic revolution that  Lefort’s  savage democracy
must  be  situated  and  explored.  Contrary  to  that  familiar  representation  of  the
momentary  insurrection  that  overturns  the  very  conditions  of  society,  Lefort
understands democratic revolution as a more protracted democratising process, one
in which, however uneven and sporadic, democracy is perpetually in the state of
confronting its limits and striving to overcome those limits: “Beyond a historically
determined system of political institutions, I wish to call attention to a long-term
process,  what  de  Tocqueville  called  the  democratic  revolution,  which  he  saw
coming to birth in France under the ancien régime and which, since his time, has
37 As documented  by his  essay  “The Contradiction of  Trotsky,”  The Political  Forms of  Modern Society:
Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: MIT Press,1986).
38 See for example Claude Lefort, Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007), 50. Also see Flynn,  The Philosophy of Claude Lefort: Interpreting the
Political, 241-2.
39 Lefort, Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy, 50.
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continued to develop.”40 Therefore, while respecting Tocqueville’s carefully drawn
distinction between the two, perhaps Lefort could be said to identify democratic
revolution as something which passes through the French Revolution: a tendency or
capacity  that  may  survive  and  reappear  once  again  long  after  the  historical
culmination of the revolution had itself receded and diminished.41 
Perhaps it is for this reason that Lefort will declare the foremost objective of
political  philosophy  today  to  be  a  comprehensive  grasp  of  what  Tocqueville
describes as democratic revolution.42 Even if the aristocratic surveyor of American
democracy  regularly  expresses  certain  reservations  about  democracy’s  unruly
disposition,  Lefort  praises  Tocqueville  for  grasping  its  profound  capacity  for
innovation and reinvention,  for grounding his essential  notion of democracy not
with respect to a particular form of government or collection of institutions, but
according to its unparalleled powers to create and transform. In a passage which
Lefort  particularly  admires,  Tocqueville  writes:  “Democracy  does  not  give  the
people the most skilful government, but it produces what the ablest governments are
frequently  unable  to  create:  namely,  an  all-pervading  and  restless  activity,  a
superabundant force, and an energy which is inseparable from it and which may,
40 Claude Lefort,  “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism,”  The Political  Forms of  Modern Society:
Bureaucracy,  Democracy,  Totalitarianism,  302.  To  develop  this  concept  Lefort  will  draw  from  both
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and The Old Regime and the Revolution.
41 Before Tocqueville and Lefort, Immanuel Kant will articulate this very point, distinguishing between the
actual historical events of the French Revolution on the one hand and a revolutionary spirit or “enthusiasm”
which runs through it and extends beyond it on the other. See “The Contest of Faculties,” Political Writings
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  1991),  182.  Citing Kant,  Deleuze and Guattari  will  likewise
appeal to this distinction in order to distance the more generic understanding of revolution from their own
more idiosyncratic concept of becoming-revolutionary (devenir-révolutionnaire). See What is Philosophy?,
100, 112-13.  
42 Samuel  Goldman,  “Beyond  the  Markers  of  Certainty:  Thoughts  on  Claude  Lefort  and  Leo  Strauss,”
Perspectives on Political Science vol. 40, iss. 1 (2011): 31.
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however  unfavourable  circumstances  may  be,  produce  wonders.”43 Therefore,
against those innumerable interpretations of Tocqueville which conclude with the
maxim  that  we  should  love  democracy,  but  love  it  moderately,44 what  Lefort
extracts  from  Tocqueville  is  a  vision  of  democracy  as  an  “uncontrollable
adventure,”  an  intractable  impulse  that  unleashes  an  extraordinary  battle for
equality  and  destroys  the  very  positions  occupied  by  those  who  traditionally
dominate society by virtue of their wealth, status and privilege.45 What democracy
makes possible is a society where hierarchies can no longer rely upon nature, right
can no longer rely upon the divine and social rank will no longer go unchallenged.46
These are the forces  that  Lefort  understands  to  have ultimately undermined the
foundations of monarchy during the French Revolution. These are the forces that
savage democracy invites us to consider.
 It  is  here  where  we  may establish  the  link  between  the  savage and  the
against.  Following  Tocqueville’s  general  account  which  locates  democracy’s
revolutionary  origins  in  the  waning  conditions  of  premodern  Europe,  Lefort’s
writings  on  democracy  can  be  appreciated  to  elaborate  a  detailed  theoretical
perspective  that  meticulously  positions  democracy  against the  ontology  of  the
43 Alexis de Tocqueville,  Democracy in America,  vol.  I  (New York: Vintage Books,  1990), 252.  Also see
Claude Lefort, “Irreversibility,”  Democracy and Political Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988), 169, as well as Steven Bilakovics, “The Regime of Revolution:  Claude Lefort on History,
Nature,  and  Convention  after  the  Democratic  Revolution,”  Democracy  Without  Politics,  (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 150.
44 Perhaps most recently with Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1996), 132.
45 Claude Lefort, “From Equality to Freedom: Fragments of an Interpretation of  ‘Democracy in America’,”
Democracy and Political Theory, 196.
46 Wim Weymans, “Defending Democracy’s Symbolic Dimension: A Lefortian Critique of Arendt’s Marxist
Assumptions,” Constellations vol. 19, iss. 1 (March 2012): 74.
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ancien régime.47 Drawing heavily from the research of Ernst Kantorowicz, Lefort
understands modern democracy as an unprecedented challenge to the entire order of
the monarchical  system, not only by displacing the body of  the king,  but  more
importantly,  by violently breaking down the very basis  of monarchy’s  symbolic
representation of right, power and legitimacy.48 What exactly is it that democracy is
against for Lefort? 
At  the  source  of  democracy  can  be  found  the  rejection  of  a
number of things: power detached from the social ensemble, law
that  governs  an  immutable  order,  and  a  spiritual  authority
possessing knowledge of the ultimate ends of human conduct and
of the community. However, it is not enough to say at the source
of  democracy:  this  rejection  has  been  democracy’s  permanent
driving energy.49 
Consequently,  what  democracy rejects  is  precisely  that  which  makes  monarchy
tenable, a rejection which, as Lefort maintains, does not dissipate or attenuate over
time, but remains democracy’s permanent driving energy. Like gasoline in a car, it
is  this  profound  rejection,  this  against,  that  fuels  democracy  and  charges  its
revolutionary momentum. For Lefort, much like Tocqueville before him, democracy
cannot be reduced to a regime of law, to the limits traditionally ascribed to the état
de droit.50 What  appears  against  monarchy is  indicative of  a  savage democracy.
Setting  up  a  field  in  which  a  unique  political  conflict  may unfold,  democracy
47 Bernard Flynn, “Democracy and Ontology,” Research in Phenomenology vol. 38, iss. 2 (2008): 224.
48 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology  (Princeton: Princeton
University  Press,  1957).  Also  see  Daniel  Steinmetz-Jenkins,  “Claude  Lefort  and  the  Illegitimacy  of
Modernity,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 2009). For Lefort, democracy
institutes a “society without a body” or one that “undermines the representation of an organic totality.” See
Fred Dallmayr, “Postmetaphysics and Democracy,” Political Theory vol. 21, no. 1 (February 1993): 114-15.
49 Lefort, Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy, 124.
50 Claude  Lefort,  “Politics  and  Human  Rights,”  The  Political  Forms  of  Modern  Society:  Bureaucracy,
Democracy, Totalitarianism, 258.
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inaugurates an experience in which the very questions of authority, legitimacy and
right are subjected to an incessant controversy and dispute: “In other words, modern
democracy invites  us to  replace the notion of  a regime governed by laws,  of a
legitimate power, by a notion of a regime founded upon the legitimacy of a debate
of  what  is  legitimate  and  illegitimate—a  debate  which  is  necessarily  without
guarantor and without any end.”51 Democracy exposes the order of society to a new
ontology, to a radical indeterminacy, so that, in Lefort’s view, institutions can never
become fixed, knowledge can never become absolute and the quest for unity can
never eclipse an underlying conflict and division.52 Contrary to totalitarianism in the
20th century,  democracy is  therefore the regime,  following Abensour,  that  never
shutters, never shies away from this inescapable experience of conflict and division:
“Inversely,  democracy  is  seen  as  constituting  itself  through  the  acceptance,  or
better, the elaboration of the originary division of the social; democracy is the form
of  society  that,  unsatisfied  with  merely  recognising  the  legitimacy  of  internal
conflict, comprehends conflict instead as the originary source of an ever renewed
invention  of  liberty.”53 Dissolving  the  representation  of  a  unified  body-politic,
opening  up  a  conflictual  space  in  which  social  division  may  be  politically
expressed, violently displacing the powers embodied in the absolute authority of the
crown, what  Lefort’s  writings  effectively reveal  is  that  located at  the origins  of
51 Claude Lefort,  “Human Rights  and the Welfare  State,” Democracy and Political  Theory,  39.  Also see
Ingram, “The Politics of Claude Lefort’s Political: Between Liberalism and Radical Democracy,” 42-3 and
Steven Hendley, “Reconsidering the Limits of Democracy with Castoriadis and Lefort,” Reinterpreting the
Political: Continental Philosophy and Political Theory,  eds. Lenore Langsdorf,  Stephen H. Watson and
Karen A. Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 174-5. 
52 Lefort, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism,” 305.
53 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 105.
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modern  democracy  is  a  revolutionary  being-against monarchy,  an  against  that
would not disperse with the demise of the king, but would endure, transform and go
on to confront and contest new forms of inequality and new modes of domination
that emerge with a new society. Hence, expounding his larger theory of modern
democracy with respect to this inherent rejection of the ancien régime, it is in this
context  that  Lefort  will  detail  what  is  often  considered  his  most  memorable
description of the form of society that unfolds according to this very rejection that
propels  democratic  revolution,  like  a  motive  force,  ever  further:  the
disincorporation  of  power,  the  spatialisation  of  power,  law  and  knowledge,  the
dissolution of the markers of certainty, the indeterminacy of the constitution of the
people.54 
It  is  therefore  according  to  what  Tocqueville  chronicles  as  democratic
revolution that savage democracy appears to orient our concept. And yet, even these
terms  should  not  be  identified  too  hastily.  For  whereas  democratic  revolution,
consistent  with  Tocqueville’s  general  description,  considers  democracy’s  more
protracted democratising trajectory, seemingly touching every facet of social and
cultural  life,  what  Lefort’s  illustrations  of  savage  democracy  appear  to  isolate,
within this very democratising process, are those more transient, punctuated and
intensive moments of heightened social turmoil and explosive confrontation. When
Lefort speaks of savage democracy, he longs to incite democracy’s transformative
capacities at their most pronounced, decisive and unwavering and those spectacular
54 See particularly Claude Lefort, “The Question of Democracy,” and “The Permanence of the Theologico-
Political?,” Democracy and Political Theory. 
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moments in history, however brief, when democracy demonstrates its utter refusal
to be mastered, domesticated or restrained. It is in this respect, for example, that
Lefort will repeatedly employ the phrase to describe the waves of civil unrest he
witnessed sweep through France during the summer of 1968, an event that would
have a profound affect on Lefort, as it would many other French political thinkers
of his generation:55 
To suddenly see such a liberation of words, powerful words, that
was  in  itself  an  extraordinary  event.  It  was  a  new  mode  of
socialisation, a wild socialisation, which could not last.  I never
had the hope of a revolution in 68; only some idiots ascribed that
idea to me. On the other hand, [...] [i]n the midst of that savage
democracy there  was  a  sort  of  freedom which,  I  confess,  was
extremely precious to me.56 
Perhaps what Lefort finds so inspiring about the events of May ’68 is not only its
unpredictable and spontaneous character that effectively deposed of every model of
what  proper  (Marxist)  revolutionary  action  should  look  like,  but  also  its
proliferation  of  an  entirely  new  language  against  authority,  hierarchy  and
bureaucracy and its  expression  of  a  genuine  desire  for  liberty and equality that
unleashed  something  powerful,  something  that,  according  to  Lefort,  is  almost
always restricted,  if  not repressed outright.57 Without a leader,  without a unified
programme or overarching design, May ’68 discharged an uncompromising upsurge
of  creative,  improvised  political  action  that  was  able  to  at  once  break  down
55 For a discussion of the wider impact of May ’68 on contemporary French political thought see Julian Bourg,
From Revolution  to  Ethics:  May  1968 and Contemporary  French  Thought  (Montreal:  McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2007).
56 Claude Lefort  and Pierre Rosanvallon,  “The Test of the Political:  A Conversation with Claude Lefort,”
Constellations vol. 19, iss. 1 (March 2012): 14. Lefort, in collaboration with Edgar Morin and Jean-Marc
Coudray (Cornelius Castoriadis), would write the first full-length volume to consider the events of May ’68.
See Mai 1968: la Brèche (Paris: Fayard, 1968).
57 Lefort, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism,” 309. 
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partitions that normally isolate diverse groups, occupy spaces that are ordinarily
forbidden,  challenge existing hierarchies in ways never before seen  and articulate
social demands in a manner that could no longer go unheard.58 Perhaps it is for this
reason that Lefort will identify something within May ’68 that is for him consistent
with everything that is savage about democracy. 
And yet, Lefort is certainly not the first to observe democracy’s more savage
character. The history of political thought reveals a long line of critics, adversaries
and detractors  of  democracy who are  able  perceive  these  tendencies  with great
clarity, often  with  far  greater  clarity,  in  fact,  than  those  insipid  proponents  of
democracy who claim to advocate it. We have already seen, for example, how Plato
portrays  democracy  as  the  anarchic  disruption  of  the  wild  mob,  allegorically
equating democracy to the aimless ship whose unruly sailors have undermined the
authority  of  the  captain  and  recklessly  usurped  the  doomed  vessel.59 Likewise,
Polybius,  the  ancient Greek  historian,  unapologetically  catalogues  democracy’s
principal  vice  as  its  “savage  rule  of  violence,”  which  perpetually  endangers
democracy  and  remains  inseparable  from  it.60 When  considering  democracy’s
appeal for popular self-government, Jean Bodin questions disparagingly: “How can
a multitude, that is to say, a Beast with many heads, without judgement, or reason,
58 Claude Lefort and Anti-mythes, “An interview with Claude Lefort,” Telos no. 30 (1976): 187.
59 Plato, Republic, III, 488a-489d. This notion of democracy as the rule of the “wild mob” is also prevalent in
Pseudo-Xenophon’s “The Constitution of the Athenians.” See  J.  M. Moore,  Aristotle and Xenophon on
Democracy and Oligarchy: Translations with Introductions and Commentary (London: Chatto & Windus,
1975). 
60 Polybius,  The Histories: Books 5-8  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 291. Also see Sheldon
Wolin,  “Norm and Form:  The  Constitutionalising  of  Democracy,”  Athenian  Political  Thought  and  the
Reconstruction of American Democracy,  eds. J.  Peter Euben,  John R. Wallach and Josiah Ober (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994), 31. 
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give good council? To ask council of a multitude is to ask for wisdom in a mad
house.”61 On the opposite side of the English channel, penning his Leviathan at the
height of the civil war, Hobbes observes that many find no reason whatsoever to
distinguish  between  democracy  on  the  one  hand  and  anarchy  on  the  other,
signifying  not  a  kind  of  government,  but  its  lack.62 Moreover,  when  Adam
Ferguson,  of the Scottish enlightenment,  compares  democracy and despotism as
archetypal examples of corrupted, lawless societies, he concludes that: “Democracy
seems to revive in a scene of wild disorder and tumult: but both the extremes are
but the transient fits of paroxysm or languor in a distempered state.”63 In a similar
vein,  warning his new found nation of the unbridled evils  of democracy,  James
Madison famously writes: “Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence
and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been
violent  in their  deaths.”64 In  The Philosophy of  Right,  his  major  contribution to
political  thought,  Hegel  recoils  at  democracy’s  very  proposition  of  “popular
sovereignty,” insisting that not only does such a confused notion distort the very
meaning of sovereignty itself (properly expressed in the embodiment of a monarch),
61 Jean Bodin,  Six Books of the Commonwealth,  original English translation as quoted in  Jennifer  Tolbert
Roberts,  Athens  on  Trial:  The  Antidemocratic  Tradition  in  Western  Thought (Princeton:  Princeton
University Press, 1994),  8, footnote 5. Also see John Keane,  The Life and Death of Democracy (London:
Simon & Schuster, 2009), 82.  
62 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts One and Two (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), 153. Also
see Alan Apperley, “Hobbes on Democracy,” Politics vol. 19, iss. 3 (September 1999): 166-7. 
63 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
73.
64 James  Madison,  “Federalist  10,”  Alexander  Hamilton,  James  Madison  and  John  Jay,  The  Federalist
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44. Also see Dupuis-Deri, “The Political Power of Words:
The Birth of Pro-Democratic Discourse in the Nineteenth Century in the United States and France,” 20-1.
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but is likewise entirely predicated upon a “wild idea of the people.”65 Finally, in a
remarkable  passage  in  the  preface  which  opens  his  prodigious  Democracy  in
America,  Tocqueville  himself  proclaims  that  democracy,  painfully  lacking  in
education,  religion  and morality:  “has  consequently been abandoned to  its  wild
instincts, and it has grown up like those children who have no parental guidance,
who receive their education in the public streets, and who are acquainted only with
the vices and wretchedness of society.”66 Violent, unstable, tumultuous by nature
and impelled by the likes of drunken sailors, wild mobs and orphaned children, very
consistent throughout the history of political thought the scandal that is known as
“democracy” is hardly considered by its many critics to offer a viable foundation
for government and indeed testifies to an experience that could only be expressed as
savage.       
Let us return to Abensour. Whether Lefort references the events of May ’68
or the French Revolution itself, perhaps what immediately strikes Abensour about
savage democracy is the manner in which it tends to emerge self-posited and self-
actualised,  seemingly  bound  to  no  particular  rules  and  subject  to  no  particular
conditions. Savage democracy appears to attest to democracy’s capacity to spring
up at will, at the most unexpected times, assuming the most unpredictable forms.
And  while  there  is  no  reason  to  presume  its  outward  hostility  to  institutional
65 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 182-3. The
young Marx will offer his own analysis of this very passage in his “Critique of Hegel’s  ‘Philosophy of
Right’.” See Karl Marx, Early Writings (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 86. This is the passage that would
ultimately lead Marx to conclude that with “true democracy” the State itself disappears. This position will
be discussed in chapter 5.
66 Tocqueville,  Democracy in America, vol. I, 7-8. Also see  Abensour,  Democracy Against the State: Marx
and the Machiavellian Moment, 1.
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mechanisms or modes of organisation, what particularly seems to intrigue Abensour
about  savage  democracy  is  its  propensity  to  manifest  in  such  a  way  that  it
nevertheless reveals no identifiable formula, no underlying schema and thus evades
all ideological categories and classifications:
“Savage democracy” evokes, rather, the idea of the wildcat strike
(grève sauvage),  that is,  a strike that  arises spontaneously,  that
begins  with  itself  and  unfolds  in  an  “anarchic”  fashion,
independent of any principle (archê), of any authority—as well as
of any established rules and institutions—and that strikes in such
a way that it cannot be mastered. It is as if “savage” connotes the
inexhaustible reserve of turmoil that soars above democracy. In a
word: to forge a “libertarian idea” of democracy is to think it as
savage.67
 
Perhaps  this  is  as  close  to  a  definition  as  we are  likely to  come.  Spontaneous,
governed  by no  overarching  order,  guided  by no regulating  principle  or  archê,
Abensour  not  only  draws  Lefort’s  savage  democracy  into  a  broader  discussion
concerning democracy’s anarchic condition—a topic we have already covered at
length  with  Rancière—he will  also  situate  the  term according  to  Lefort’s  more
underlying position against mastery. This is a recurring theme in Lefort’s work that
I  have  tried  to  underscore  here.  As  we  have  seen,  Lefort  qualifies  a  savage
democracy  to  inspire  a  notion  of  democracy that  resists  subordination  and
pacification,  a  democracy  which  cannot  be  easily  possessed,  neutralised  or
restrained. Savage democracy not only manifests in opposition to various logics of
mastery and domination, it manifests in such a way that it refuses to be mastered
and dominated itself. In part, this is what makes democracy anarchic. It is precisely
67 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the  ‘Principle of Anarchy’,”  106.  Also see Breaugh, “Critique de la
domination, pensée de l’émancipation. Sur la philosophie politique de Miguel Abensour,” 65-66.
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the meaning of anarchy to open to indeterminacy and defy masterability. And yet,
perhaps what Abensour finds most compelling about savage democracy’s anarchic
character in this regard, is its unique capacity to liberate the way in which we think
about political activity itself. When Abensour considers what exactly Lefort intends
to elicit with the term “savage” democracy, when he considers what this string of
references that populate Lefort’s writings all share in common, what he ultimately
appears  to  decipher  is  something perhaps  just  as  imperative to  his own critical
political  philosophy  as  it  is  to  our  own  theory  of  democracy’s  being-against
advanced here: the  emancipatory act of politics. According to Abensour, to think
democracy savage is to uncover the “libertarian idea” of democracy. As specified in
Lefort’s  Un homme en trop, Abensour illustrates this libertarian idea accordingly:
“Libertarian is he who dares to talk when everyone is silent, she who does not shy
from contradicting the public, unafraid to break the wall of silence so as to make the
unexpected  voice  of  liberty  be  heard.”68 It  is  in  the  spirit  of  this direct  and
uninhibited libertarian expression that savage democracy may be taken to represent
the  liberation  of  political  action  itself.  If  we  extrapolate  from  Abensour’s
compelling exegetical study, savage democracy may be interpreted both in terms of
action and form: as a distinct  political action in which a desire for liberation is
expressed and as a distinct political form in which that action is liberated in its own
right. Perhaps it is for this reason that Abensour finds it beneficial to develop the
68 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 106. Christina Hurtado-Beca will likewise
situate her discussion of savage democracy according to a desire for liberation. See “Démocratie sauvage ou
démocratie intermittente,” Critique de la politique. Autour de Miguel Abensour, 105.
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notion of savage democracy alongside the “principle of anarchy,” a term extracted
from  Reiner  Schürmann’s  efforts  to  cultivate  a  politics  of  praxis or theory  of
liberated  action  from  Heidegger’s  various  ontological  studies.69 And  while
Abensour admits that his recourse to Schürmann may be found rather peculiar, he
maintains that the intersection of savage democracy and the principle of anarchy
will  nevertheless  serve  to  illuminate  this  indispensable  libertarian  dimension  of
Lefort’s term.  
Briefly,  Schürmann’s  basic  thesis  contends that  20th century philosophy’s
prolonged  critique  of  metaphysical  closure  (perhaps  culminating  with
deconstruction)  in  many  respects  begins  with  Heidegger,  who  may  initiate  his
phenomenology with the classical ontological question “what is being?” but who
will ultimately dislodge this question from the inherited philosophical tradition by
way of what Schürmann calls the anarchy principle. Consequently, isomorphic to
democracy’s “savage essence,” Abensour will introduce Schürmann’s “principle of
anarchy”  via  the  initial  problem of  its  apparent  contradiction:  for  have  we not
already discerned  anarchy to  be  that  which  lacks  all  reference  to  principle  and
indeed,  embodies  an uncompromising position against  it?  And yet,  as Abensour
explains,  far  from  a  concept  which  restores  a  foundation  to  anarchy,  what
Schürmann’s principle of anarchy intends to uncover is precisely the point where a
Heideggerian theory of praxis supposedly arrives: at a principle of action, true, but a
principle that functions to negate its very principle, a principle that commands itself
69 Reiner Schürmann,  Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy  (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987).
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not  to  have  one;  at  the  very  moment  a  principle of  anarchy  is  posited,  it  is
immediately  undermined  by  its  own  anarchic  content  exposing  an  inescapable
paradox that, according to Schürmann, serves to open to a representation of political
action  liberated  from  origin,  reference  and  commandment.70 This  is  what
particularly interests Abensour about Schürmann and explains his insistence that
savage  democracy  and  the  principle  of  anarchy  share  a  common  ontological
organisation: “In its very movement, in its dynamic, does not savage democracy
have something in common with anarchy, understood in the sense of a liberation of
action  from  the  hold  of  foundations—from  an  archê—in  the  sense  of  a
manifestation of an ‘action without why’?”71 If we follow Abensour’s reading, what
Schürmann’s  principle  of anarchy makes possible  is  a  theory of  praxis released
from a metaphysics of closure in which the meaning of political activity remains
forever subordinated to a first principle. No longer bound to its beginnings, to its
commencement,  an anarchic or libertarian theory of  praxis affirms that  political
action cannot simply be appropriated and understood according to its origins, to the
conditions it can be referred back to. At the same time, nor must political action be
subjected to a telos, to an ultimate goal, end or final cause (a category really more
appropriate for production).72 Rather, what Schürmann attributes to Heidegger is the
first  substantial  philosophical  demonstration that  praxis  need not  be  bound to a
legitimating principle and likewise, that a practical philosophy need not be derived
70 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 112-13.
71 Ibid., 113. Also see John W. M. Krummel, “Reiner Schürmann and Cornelius Castoriadis Between Ontology
and Praxis.” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies no. 2 (2013): 48-9. 
72 Miguel Abensour, “An-archy Between Metapolitics and Politics,” Parallax vol. 8, iss. 3 (2002): 8-9.
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from a first philosophy.73 In this regard, Schürmann envisions Heidegger’s work as
an important  reminder  that  at  times even the very concept  of  praxis may itself
require emancipation. 
Therefore,  with  the  principle  of  anarchy,  we may think  the  political  act
liberated from its principle: action becomes an  event, self-legitimating, an end in
itself.74 For Abensour, this is essential to savage democracy. Refusing the limitations
of the principle-derivation model, marking a decisive break from a strict rationalism
of causality and finality, Abensour understands savage democracy to realise a form
of political action free to unfold in multiple and even contradictory ways, remaining
open to the accident, to fortune, to error, to the unforeseen and to the unforeseeable.
Is this not a fitting description of the logic of spontaneity itself? Hence, placing
aside  the  intricacies  of  those  longstanding  questions  regarding  the  precise
relationship between theory and praxis, thinking and acting, Schürmann’s principle
of anarchy, although not a reference for savage democracy, very much provides an
ontological model appropriate to the form of political action that Abensour ascribes
to  it.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  savage  democracy may be  understood  to  forge  a
libertarian idea of democracy. In the most concrete terms, savage democracy traces
a  particular  political  action  or  form of  political  action  that  allows  democracy’s
persistent  democratising  struggles  against  various  modes  of  domination  and
strategies of inequality to unfold in a uniquely spontaneous and anarchic fashion. It
may be understood both in terms of the political action that expresses a desire for
73 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 112.
74 Ibid., 115.
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liberation as well as the opening up of a space in which that political action may
transform and evolve in any number of ways. In this respect, when conceived as a
political act, what savage democracy first seeks to liberate is the political act itself.
This is something that Abensour’s analysis of savage democracy will not allow us
to  forget.  Perhaps  this  represents  his  most  important  contribution  to  Lefort’s
concept. 
Accordingly, in both content and in form, what Abensour appears to draw
from  savage  democracy  is  the  emancipatory  act  of  politics.  It designates  that
unprecedented political challenge which, given its spontaneous, anarchic character,
breaks with a theory of praxis that finds the only legitimate political activity to be
the one that remains sanctioned, preordained,  instituted. Democracy refuses to be
restricted to a particular sphere of society, frame of time, subject or object. Lefort
certainly allows for a broader conception of democracy than this. As illustrated by
Abensour, the quintessential libertarian act is he who dares to speak when everyone
else is silent. It is precisely the political act that must at times break through the
established order of accepted norms, institutions and conventions. As Lefort appears
to affirm in a particularly intriguing remark: “In democracy itself, the institution of
individual  and political  freedoms  couldn’t  make one  forget  that  freedom is  not
given; speech always requires an interruption of the ordered relations among men, a
right that exceeds all  definition,  a sort  of violence.”75 With this  passage—which
75 Claude Lefort, “Humanism and Anti-Humanism: Homage to Salman Rushdie,” Writing: The Political Test,
31.  Also  see  Ingram,  “The  Politics  of  Claude  Lefort’s  Political:  Between  Liberalism  and  Radical
Democracy,” 43.
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may uncover a potentially fruitful point of intersection with the work of Rancière—
Lefort wishes to remind us that freedom is never something to be given; it must be
taken. It must be seized, created, affirmed. This can be a violent act. Even in the
context of the broader topic of rights, on which he certainly writes a great deal,
Lefort  rejects  the  notion  that  rights  and  freedoms  are  simply  harboured  by
institutions,  handed  down  from  above,  distributed  by  the  State.76 Rather,  what
Lefort’s  writings  clearly  demonstrate  is  that  freedom,  however  defined,  is
something  intrinsically  bound  to  a  long  process  of  political  action,  persistent
questioning  and  permanent  contestation.  To  express  this  process,  Lefort  will  at
times reference Tocqueville’s notion of democratic revolution, at others he will put
forward his own more idiosyncratic savage democracy.   
Lefort’s contribution to a theory of rights (rights of man/human rights) may
offer  additional  insights  into  his  intentions  with  savage democracy.  As early as
Élements  d’une  critique  de  la  bureaucratie (1971),  Lefort  will  describe  the
protracted struggle for rights in terms of an undomesticated,  savage democracy:
“Let it once again be said, it is not only the protection of individual liberties that is
at issue, but also the nature of our social ties; where there is spreading feeling for
rights,  democracy is  necessarily  savage  and  not  domesticated.”77 In  addition  to
providing a  compelling  point  of  departure for  an  intriguing analysis  of  Lefort’s
highly  original  theory  of  rights  that  will  contradict  everything  that  we  will
76 See for example Lefort, “Politics and Human Rights,” 264, as well as “Human Rights and the Welfare,” 43.
77 Lefort, Élements d’une critique de la bureaucratie, 23 as quoted in Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the
‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 107. This is one of the earliest examples of Lefort’s use of the term.
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encounter on the subject from Marx to Arendt, these remarks may also be advanced
to chart out the relative distinction between what he elicits as savage democracy on
the one hand and what he will delineate more generally as the democratic form of
society on the other. This is an important nuance in Lefort’s work that warrants far
more attention than it receives. Although the language of rights remains a defining
feature of what is broadly framed as modern democracy in his later work, if Lefort
rejects both Marx and Arendt’s familiar assertion that any substantive evaluation of
rights must necessarily situate them within the bounds of an established institutional
framework, it is because Lefort himself will locate the source of those rights, as is
well known, in a symbolic domain which extends beyond the realm of any such
concrete institution.78 Therefore, insofar as Lefort binds the very discourse of rights
so prevalent in the modern age to a symbolic field, his larger concept of democracy
will  correspond  not  to  a  set  of  institutions,  but  to  a  particular  form of  society
distinguished by a particular symbolic mutation, one that distributes an abstract or
indeterminate figure of rights across a horizonal  social  imaginary that organises
both meaning (mise en sens)  and representation (mise en scène) in society.79 As
Lefort  readily observes,  the  demand for  rights  can  never  be  dissociated  from a
wider  social  awareness  of  rights  themselves.80 And  yet,  although  Lefort  clearly
understands the larger discourse of rights particular to the modern era in reference
78 See Weymans, “Defending Democracy’s Symbolic Dimension: A Lefortian Critique of Arendt’s Marxist
Assumptions,” 75.
79 For a broader discussion of this point see Raf Geenens, “Democracy, Human Rights and History: Reading
Lefort,” European Journal of Political Theory vol. 7, no. 3 (July 2008).
80 Lefort,  “Politics  and  Human  Rights,”  260,  264.  Also  see  Flynn,  The  Philosophy  of  Claude  Lefort:
Interpreting the Political, 227-8.
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to  this  symbolic  dimension constitutive of  the  democratic  society,  this  does  not
intend to conceal the fact that the struggle for rights—the emancipatory act itself—
can never be located there. Rather, when Lefort considers that “spreading feeling
for  rights,”  that  incessant  demand for  rights,  the  actual  battle  for  rights  on  the
ground, he can no longer be said to be alluding to the symbolic dimension which so
defines the democratic form of society, but more specifically to that direct form of
political activity that Abensour associates with savage democracy, a struggle played
out,  if  we  follow Lefort,  against  the  backdrop  of  this  symbolic  horizon  which
infuses this struggle with its salience and social significance. It is in this respect that
Lefort’s  reflections  on  rights may  serve  to  exemplify  the  two  intrinsically
interwoven  dimensions  of  his  larger  concept  of  democracy  ceaselessly  being
worked out throughout his later writings. In the context of a society which not only
establishes a representation of rights in its social imaginary, but one in which the
precise content  of those rights is  destined to remain indeterminate,  what  savage
democracy seeks to distinguish is the  demand for rights itself,  the endeavour to
institute new rights, the continuous effort to extend those rights to more and more
disenfranchised  people  which  has  so  indisputably transformed the  fabric  of  our
social ties since the modern revolutions. So it is not really a matter of isolating a
“liberal” Lefort  and a “radical” Lefort,  but a matter of identifying the particular
context  in  which  Lefort  deploys  his  concept  of  democracy:  either  as  a  form of
society  or as a  savage  democracy.  The savage evokes democracy’s  creative and
transformative dimensions and capacities, its inventions as well as its interventions.
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What  savage  democracy invites  us  to  consider  is  that  human  beings  are  never
simply the subject of rights, but at the same time their authors.81 Much like equality
for  Rancière,  rights  are  something  to  be  created,  contested,  confirmed.82 They
remain inextricably intertwined with their enunciation.83 As Lefort avows: “rights
are  not  simply the  object  of  a  declaration,  it  is  their  essence  to  be declared.”84
Therefore,  cutting  across  the  many illusions  and misattributions  which  so  often
obscure the topic of rights, perhaps Lefort may be read to offer an assessment of
democracy  which  succeeds  far  better  than  most  in  identifying  the  substantive
political  function  of  the  discourse  of  rights  in  the  modern  age:  they  provide  a
language, a logic, an instrument according to which the ongoing democratisation of
society may be advanced. For as Abensour testifies, the demand for new rights is
ultimately a demand for new social relations, a new form of society, a new way for
society to be.85 
Understood in this context, drawing on Lefort’s admiration for the work of
historian  E.  P.  Thompson,  whose  research  traces  the  struggles  of  an  emerging
proletarian  class  under  the  conditions  of  early  capitalism, what  Abensour  will
particularly  wish  to  extract  from  this  persistent  declaration  of  rights  that  so
epitomises savage democracy for Lefort is its more formal character of permanent
81 Stefan  Rummens,  “Deliberation  Interrupted:  Confronting  Jürgen  Habermas  with  Claude  Lefort,”
Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 34, no. 4 (2008): 394.
82 For a detailed discussion of Rancière’s position on human rights see Andrew Schaap, “Enacting the Right to
Have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s Critique of Hannah Arendt,” European Journal of Political Theory vol. 10,
no. 1 (January 2011).
83 Flynn, The Philosophy of Claude Lefort: Interpreting the Political, 273.
84 Lefort, “Politics and Human Rights,” 257. Also see Bilakovics, “The Regime of Revolution: Claude Lefort
on History, Nature, and Convention after the Democratic Revolution,” 153.
85 Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 107.
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contestation.86 It  is  permanent contestation that Abensour will  locate at  the very
heart of democratic revolution. It is likewise the Lefortian concept that perhaps best
gives shape to those political forces that we have hitherto expressed in terms of
democracy’s  being-against.  Insofar  as  rights  can  never  be  fixed,  fastened  or
established absolutely,  once and for all,  even more than the institution of rights
themselves,  Lefort  will  tend  to  define  democracy  in  terms  of  a  theatre  of
contestation.87 Essential to Lefort’s understanding of democracy is the installation
of  a  field  in  which  rights  and other  grievances  may be  declared,  contested  and
disputed. From the beginning, this is very much how we qualified the experience of
politics itself. As we have seen, following Lefort, rights are neither found in nature
nor granted by God. They must be articulated, realised, most often by those who
find themselves excluded from the benefits and protections that rights can provide.
But  just  as  their  realisation  cannot  be  divorced  from  their  articulation,  their
articulation cannot be divorced from their contestation. The very demand for rights
itself  implies  a  certain  provocation  or  defiance,  a  certain  “interruption of  the
ordered relations among men.” Accordingly, as the perpetual initiation of a unique
political controversy and dispute, the activity that Lefort chronicles as permanent
contestation may first be recognised to contain a distinct phenomenal dimension.
Democracy  is  always  something  demonstrative,  something  visible,  the  making
86 Abensour will largely attribute Lefort’s well known concept of permanent contestation to E. P. Thompson,
perhaps  drawing  in  particular  from Thompson’s  widely influential  essay “The  Moral  Economy of  the
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,”  Past & Present  vol.  50,  iss.  1 (Feb.  1971).  See Abensour,
“‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 107.
87 See for example Lefort,  “Politics and Human Rights,”  258. Also see  Flynn,  The Philosophy of Claude
Lefort: Interpreting the Political, 168.
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visible what was not visible before. Perhaps this is one reason why its characteristic
act of contestation may be considered theatrical, an account that will feature just as
prominently  in  the  writings  of  Rancière.  To  the  extent  that  his  own theory  of
democracy is formulated according to an inherent disagreement regarding the very
distribution of the social, Rancière will often present democracy as a “staging” of
equality: democracy opens up a space of litigation by that part of the community
that has no part (les sans-part), a demonstration of equality that, for Rancière, must
effectively reconstitute the very sensible of the community itself: those who could
not be seen now appear, those who could not be heard now speak.88 Similarly, what
Lefort calls permanent contestation may likewise be appreciated to open up a space
in which a unique political conflict may unfold: “Democracy must be seen as this
milieu  for  conflicts,  as  a  milieu  in  which  we  have  to  know how to  engage  in
contestation.”89 Lefort’s understanding of contestation should not be confined, as we
occasionally  find  in  more  narrow  readings  of  his  work,  to  the  institution  of
legitimate conflict so that competitions, rivalries and antagonisms may be played
out  according  to  procedural  rules  (thereby excluding  all  those  conflicts  already
deemed “illegitimate”).90 Rather, the act of contestation that remains consistent with
88 Peter Hallward will consider this staging of equality in two closely related essays. See “Staging Equality,”
New Left Review vol. 37 (January-February 2006) and “Staging Equality: Rancière’s Theatrocracy and the
Limits of Anarchic Equality,” Jacques Ranciere: History,  Politics,  Aesthetics,  eds.  Gabriel Rockhill  and
Philip Watts (Durham and London: Duke University Press Books, 2009). In many respects, the significance
of  this  phenomenal  dimension  of  democracy  may be  traced  back  to  Arendt,  who,  drawing  from the
experience of the Athenian assembly, will often characterise politics in terms of the institution of seeing and
being  seen,  hearing and  being  heard.  See  particularly The  Human Condition (Chicago:  University  of
Chicago Press, 1998).
89 Lefort and Rosanvallon. “The Test of the Political: A Conversation with Claude Lefort,” 13.
90 As  we  find,  for  example,  in  James  Bohman’s  introductory  “Continental  Political  Philosophy,”  The
Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy, eds. Gerald Gaus and Fred D’Agostino (New
York: Routledge, 2013), 164.
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a savage conception of democracy is precisely the conflict that functions to raise the
very question of what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate conflict and refuses the
closure of this question in any absolute sense. This is precisely what it means to
render  conflict  irreducibly  political. Thus,  akin  to  disagreement  in  the  work  of
Rancière,  contestation is Lefort’s preferred term for the act that we found to be
essential to the meaning of politics itself: the making controversial what was not
controversial  before.  Contestation  does  not  simply  imply  adopting  a resolute
position on a particular social problem, or set of problems; it is the act which itself
makes the social problematic. It is what divides the social or recasts an antecedent
social division in a renewed political form. Perhaps this is how we should interpret
Abensour  when he  states  above that  democracy is  not  only the acceptance,  but
elaboration of that originary division of the social.91 For what contestation could be
said  to  introduce  to  the  generality  of  social  conflict  is  the  particularity  of
democracy’s being-against, an against that is not so much a type of conflict among
others, but as the specific challenge of the demos, the minority, the excluded, what
reconstitutes or reconfigures the arena of social conflict according to the power of
the people, according to the power that not only appears in the form of an against
from  its  inception,  but  operates  specifically  to  render  what  it  is  against  an
irreducible problem of politics. Hence, if  Lefort’s  contestation carries with it  an
implicit  against,  it  is  not  simply  because  contestation  necessarily  expresses  an
opposition to that which it confronts and disputes in society,  but because what it
91 We will return to the originary division of the social in chapter 5.
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confronts  and  disputes  is  persistently  subjected  to  the  condition  of  politics,  a
condition that exposes what it is against to a radical indeterminacy undermining its
absolution, certainty and fixity.      
Democracy’s  distinguishing  practice  of  contestation  and  the  permanent
nature of this contestation is itself indicative of a democracy in perpetual motion, a
democracy unsettled and profoundly discontent. Lefort will resist the notion that
modern democracy, even long after the revolutionary age from which it springs,
may be presumed a settled form, a stabilising agent, a completed project. As we
have  seen,  democracy  does  not  represent  the  resolution  to  the  problem of  the
political society. It is rather what complicates society in the first place, what renders
it  politically  problematic,  not  in  a  single  gesture,  however  monumental,  but
repeatedly, over and over again. As a succession of political contests engendered by
an increasingly diverse body of  actors  located  at  the  most  divergent  corners  of
society, since the dawn of its modern manifestation against the order of the ancien
régime,  democracy has  offered an enduring political  challenge to  the prevailing
relations  of  society.92 However  sporadic  and  discontinuous,  it  is  the  very
permanence of this  challenge,  perpetually reborn,  regenerated and resumed,  that
must  orient  Lefort’s  concept  of democracy according to  a  protracted process of
democratisation, according to what Tocqueville, in his own analysis, describes as
92 In a similar fashion, what Laclau and Mouffe develop as a “plural” or “radical” democracy describes the
process of deepening and extending the democratic revolution by intersecting diverse democratic struggles
and subject positions as a means to proliferate sites of conflict and forge new strategies to confront and
challenge oppressive power relations in society. On a number of occasions Laclau and Mouffe will draw
directly from Lefort’s work. See  Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:
Towards a  Radical  Democratic  Politics (London:  Verso,  2001),  chapter  4,  as  well  as Chantal  Mouffe,
“Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern?,” The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 2005).
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democratic revolution. For democracy is not merely the name of the emancipatory
act itself. It is also the name of the society that this act invariably seeks to create: a
more democratic society permeated by more inclusive, participatory and egalitarian
institutions and relations. This cannot be achieved in a single moment. It is a project
that necessitates a prolonged, sustained effort. Accordingly, contrary to the regimes
of monarchy and totalitarianism to which Lefort clearly posits its concept against,
democracy  may  be  understood  to  open  a  representation  of  time  in  which  its
movements  and  transformations,  successes  and  failures,  must  be  charted  and
evaluated according to an extended trajectory, a becoming.93 Democracy strives for
a future more democratic than the past. To again appeal to that powerful concept in
Nietzsche, democracy’s relation to the present could be thought untimely: it resists
the conditions of the present in the hopes of a better future to come. In addition to
its constitutive openness to the indeterminate and to the indefinite, perhaps this is
why Lefort will declare democracy the historical society par excellence.94
More  than  a  description  or  explanation,  perhaps  what  Lefort’s  savage
democracy offers his readers is a new way to think about democracy. Rather than
proposing a proper concept of democracy, the savage is what opens up its concept,
challenging us to consider its powers and potentials anew. Savage democracy not
only demands we reflect upon what is savage about democracy, it demands we think
93 Here  Lefort  could  be  seen  to  approximate  what  Deleuze calls “becoming-democratic” (devenir-
démocratique). See Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 112-13.
94 Lefort, “The Question of Democracy,” 16. 
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democracy  in  a  savage  way.  Thinking  democracy  savage entails  distancing  its
concept from those mitigated, domesticated representations of democracy, allowing
us to rediscover its most creative and transformative dimensions and capacities. It
therefore  functions  to  animate  and  reanimate  those  interminable  philosophical
questions that constantly return us to the very construction of the concept itself:
how should democracy be thought? How do we go about organising its concept?
On what basis? And to what end? Despite Rancière’s many objections, perhaps this
is  what  will  restore  democracy as  a  legitimate  topic of  philosophy. In his  final
volume  What  is  Philosophy?,  Deleuze  reflects  that  central  to  the  practice  of
philosophy  is  the  creative  exercise  of  concept  construction.  With  reference  to
particular problems posed to philosophy from without, these concepts help us think
in new ways that  were not possible before.  Deleuze insists  that  philosophy is  a
practical  discipline,  even  suggesting  the  value  of  what  it  creates  can  only  be
evaluated according to its practical, often nonphilosophical uses. What is the use of
philosophy? Deleuze will not waver in his response: the critique of the present, “the
criticism of its own time,” so that we may counter  what is,  think against it  and
create  new possibilities  to  act.  In this  regard,  perhaps  what  it  is  that  ultimately
makes  philosophy  political is  not  so  much  the  topics  it  examines  or  themes  it
considers, but the manner in which the concepts it generates can be thrown back
into society and used in a political way.95 As we have seen, it is certainly true for
Abensour,  who  studied  under  Deleuze,  that  philosophy  does  indeed  contain  a
95 For an evaluation of Deleuze’s notion of concept construction in a political context see Paul Patton, Deleuze
and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000), 1-12.
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political and critical potential. And when Abensour ventures to construct his own
concept of democracy, he will not fail, unlike so many, to recognise and incorporate
its  more  “savage”  dimensions.  A political  philosophy necessitates  a  concept  of
democracy organised to  critique the  here and now. Savage democracy may prove
invaluable in this task. Accordingly, following the example of Abensour, if we have
pursued Lefort’s savage democracy to organise our basic conception of democracy
here,  it  is  because  beyond  releasing  the  concept  from  a  more  compromised,
domesticated  representation  of  democracy,  inviting  us  to  reconsider  everything
about  what  the power  of  the  people  can  mean,  it  is  precisely  what  Lefort
understands as savage about democracy that orients the construction of its concept
according to something that cannot be reduced to a form of government or set of
institutions, that cannot be confined to rule of law or the état de droit, but represents
a  distinct  political  challenge  to  an  order  of  society  dominated  by  hierarchies,
inequalities  and  modes  of  exclusion.  This  is  what  is  essential  for  a  theory  of
democracy’s being-against. To generate a concept of democracy according to what
it is against is an attempt to think democracy an enduring transformative agent in
society. This is precisely what Lefort’s savage democracy compels us to consider. 
Understood as the emancipatory act of politics, integral to Lefort’s savage
democracy, as Abensour demonstrates, is the permanent contestation of that which
it rejects and disputes in society. In Lefort’s terms, if democracy invariably appears
in the form of  an against,  it  is  because this  rejection  that  fuels  democracy and
propels it forward, is not only located at the revolutionary “source” of democracy,
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but as Lefort maintains, constitutes its “permanent driving energy.” It is precisely
the permanence of this rejection, this against, that should not escape our attention.
For neither arbitrary nor an end in itself, democracy’s being-against will attest to a
very  particular  political  project:  the  perpetual  democratisation  of  society,  of  its
institutions  and  relations.  Situated  in  the  context  of  Tocqueville’s  democratic
revolution, once again, this is precisely what Lefort’s savage democracy compels us
to consider. 
Hence, although often eclipsed by more prominent facets of his work and
rarely  explored,  what  may  be  extracted  from  Lefort’s  theoretical  studies  of
democracy are the three indispensable components that must be represented in any
philosophical  construction  of  its  concept:  the  savage,  the  against and
democratisation. More than any particular conclusion about democracy, this forms
the basis of the concept that we have pursued throughout this study.
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Part Three | Rationalities of democracy’s being-against
4
Model I:
democracy against the police
(Rancière)
So what the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors understand by 
‘the police’ is very different from what we put under the term. [...] What 
they understand by ‘police’ is not an institution or mechanism functioning 
within the State, but a governmental technology peculiar to the State— 
domains, techniques, targets where the State intervenes.
-Michel Foucault
Democracy is more precisely the name of a singular disruption of this 
order of distribution of bodies as a community that we proposed to 
conceptualise in the broadest concept of the police. It is the name of 
what comes and interrupts the smooth working of this order through a 
singular mechanism of subjectivation. 
-Jacques Rancière
If  we  have  appealed  to  Lefort’s  admittedly  obscure  reference  to  savage
democracy to organise a basic concept of democracy for the purposes of this study,
it  is  because  rather  than  supply  a  definitive  model  or  prescriptive  formula  for
democracy,  we  found  the  savage to  open  up  its  concept,  exposing  it  to  new
possibilities and experimentation. Savage democracy is not simply an interpretation
of democracy among others (such as “liberal” democracy or “social” democracy). It
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is a vehicle through which we may revolutionise the way we think about democracy
altogether.  It  compels us to revisit  even our most  underlying assumptions about
democracy, to constantly test the accepted boundaries and limitation of its concept.
In this respect, perhaps we could ascribe a certain savage democracy to Rancière,
Abensour and no doubt to others as well. Whenever a theory of politics challenges
the prevailing representation of democracy, daring us to reimagine its concept anew
and continually explore the potential of what the  power of the people can mean,
such a theory can very well be said to incite a savage conception of democracy. This
is why Lefort’s  savage democracy implies an exercise of thought as much as it
identifies  something  essential  about  democracy  itself.  This  is  also  why  savage
democracy provides a fitting conceptual basis through which we may pursue what I
have  called  democracy’s  being-against.  For  just  as  its  revolutionary  proclivity
against  will  tend  to  evoke  everything  that  Lefort  finds  to  be  savage  about
democracy, as a mode of thought, as a way of liberating the way we think about
democracy, the savage may also facilitate the rediscovery of this often dismissed,
forgotten or overlooked being-against. It is for this reason that Lefort is essential to
our study.
In part,  the link between the  savage and the  against could be established
with  Lefort  because  his  own recurring  allusions  to  savage  democracy,  however
ambiguous,  must  always  be situated in  the context  of  his  broader  philosophical
project which ultimately incorporates a distinct model of democracy’s being-against
into  its  core  theoretical  framework:  a  democracy conceived at  once  against  the
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monarchic and totalitarian forms of society. As we encountered, these are the two
objects that Lefort will tend to posit his concept of democracy against. And yet,
however central to his own characteristic rendering of democracy and the symbolic
order of society he associates with it, this formal opposition to monarchy on the one
hand and totalitarianism on the other is in no way exhaustive of what democracy is
against in the modern age. The topic of democracy’s against may be considered
through any number of avenues and channels. This is because its being-against may
theoretically  assume as  many forms as  the  objects  it  manifests  to  confront  and
dispute in society,  at  different times,  under different conditions.  For this  reason,
what democracy is against  in the modern world will often be found to be quite
distinct  from what  it  was  originally  against  in  antiquity,  the  form of  its  being-
against always determined by the particular context in which democracy appears an
emancipatory act of politics. In recent decades, in the guise of a diverse body of
research,  an  increasing  number  of  authors  appear  to  have  uncovered  various
incarnations of this against, integrating this striking facet of democracy into their
larger theoretical projects.  It thus becomes possible to identify,  for example, the
groundwork  for  a  more  anthropological  analysis  of  a  democracy  against
heteronomy (Castoriadis),1 or drawing from the roots of historical materialism, a
democracy against  capitalism (Ellen  Wood),2 or  rediscovering  the  origins  of  its
“fugitive” capacities in ancient Greece, even a democracy against the constraints of
1 This theme extends across Castoriadis’ later work. See for example the essays contained in the English
compilations Philosophy,  Politics,  Autonomy (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1991)  and  The
Castoriadis Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).  
2 See Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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its own constitutionalisation (Wolin).3 Conversely, if we chose to initiate the topic
via  a  detailed  analysis  of  democracy’s  being-against  the  archê,  this  is  not  only
because this particular against offers a unique opportunity to consider democracy’s
underlying anarchic condition which we found to be indispensable to the meaning
of  politics  itself,  but  also  because  as  the  uncompromising  rejection  of  the  very
division between governor and governed, ruler and ruled, it would appear that it is
this against that must be deemed universal to democracy, wherever and whenever it
appears. 
Therefore,  as  a  means  to  investigate  this  often  neglected  dimension  of
democracy  in  greater  detail,  for  the  remainder  of  this  study  let  us  select  two
exemplary  theoretical  models  in  contemporary  political  thought  in  which  the
against appears particularly pronounced and carefully evaluate how its logic plays
out in each case. Keeping with the principal authors whose work has guided our
inquiry throughout, we shall advance Rancière’s model of a democracy against the
police  and  Abensour’s  model  of  a  democracy against  the  State.  Although  their
writings on democracy remain quite distinct in many respects, by charting out the
objects and relations of its being-against, what both Rancière and Abensour are able
to identify in democracy is precisely that which we have attempted to isolate in our
own  analysis  of  democracy  here:  a  unique  political  challenge,  objection  or
confrontation  in  which  the  foundations  of  a  given  social  order  or  particular
3 See Sheldon Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalising of Democracy,” Athenian Political Thought
and the Reconstruction of American Democracy,  eds. J.  Peter Euben, John R. Wallach and Josiah Ober
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) and “Fugitive Democracy,” Democracy and Difference: Contesting
the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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institutional arrangement is called into question by that generic body or political
subject  traditionally  known  as  the  demos.  If  we  have  argued  that  democracy
remains irreducible to a type of government, form of society or set of institutions,
however  assembled and arranged,  it  is  because  it  is  the  forces  that  initiate  this
challenge and set it in motion that must ultimately form the basis of its concept.
Both Rancière and Abensour help us to understand this.
Let us begin with Rancière. In  Disagreement, the work that will dominate
our attention here, Rancière will formulate a rather particular notion of democracy
not in isolation, but located at the juncture or intersection of two very opposing
logics: the logic of equality and the logic of the police. What Rancière understands
as politics will be described in terms of this encounter, nexus or “meeting of the
heterogeneous.”4 Two related implications may be immediately drawn from this.
Firstly, nothing can be regarded political in and of itself. Politics occurs only when
there is a meeting of these two distinct logics. Anything may have the potential to
become political,  but only on the occasion of this encounter or confrontation of
democracy  with  the  police.5 Secondly,  any  notion  of  a  “pure  politics”  must
consequentially be denounced a fiction. It is the nature of politics to always remain
mixed, impure. Politics is a composition, an alloy; not a simple substance.6 
Perhaps more importantly, Rancière understands the manner in which these
4 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy  (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press,
1999), 32. 
5 Ibid., 32-3.
6 See Samuel  A.  Chambers,  “Jacques  Rancière  and the Problem of  Pure Politics,”  European Journal  of
Political Theory vol. 10, no. 3 (July 2011).
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two  logics  collide  in  a  very  particular  way.  For  there  is  no  neutral  context  or
territory in which democracy’s logic of equality may encounter that of the police.
And we are told from the outset to be wary of any concepts that function to conceal
or cover over their inherent antagonism, implying the smooth connection between
the two (Rancière identifies  power or  power relations as  an example of  such a
concept).7 Instead,  the  police  will  be  introduced  in  terms  of  a  certain  state  of
generality  in  which  politics—as  the  meeting  of  logics,  the  orchestration  of
antagonism—appears as something of an exception to the  givenness of this social
order.8 Although its arrangement and design will vary dramatically, it is this order of
the police that for Rancière, classifies the general state of society.  Politics is that
which  acts  on  the  police.9 It  is  this  notion  of  politics  as  an  active  agent,  as
something which  acts or  acts upon, that should not escape our attention. For it is
indicative of Rancière’s larger strategy in the text which first seeks to establish the
police,  however  defined,  as  a  kind  of  primary category so  that  a  more  precise
interpretation of politics may be at once disentangled from it and reoriented in terms
of something specific that happens to it: a disruption, suspension, modification.10
Accordingly,  insofar  as  politics  represents  the  setting  up  of  this  encounter,  this
7 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 32.
8 It is for this reason that Badiou will identify Rancière’s “police” as an overtly political expression of his
own more ontologically generic concept of the “state of the situation,” a general, overarching state of being
that  governs  over  the  particularities  of  a  given  situation.  Accordingly,  he  will  likewise  correspond
Rancière’s “politics” with his own concept of “the event” which breaks open the limits of the state of the
situation allowing for new possibilities. See Alain Badiou, “Rancière and Apolitics,” Metapolitics (London:
Verso, 2005), 116. Also see Jeff Love and Todd May, “From Universality to Inequality: Badiou’s Critique of
Rancière,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy vol. 2, iss. 2 (Fall 2008): 53-4. 
9 Rancière, Disagreement:  Politics  and  Philosophy,  33.  Also  see  Jodi  Dean,  “Politics  without  Politics,”
Parallax vol. 15, no. 3 (2009): 27-8. 
10 See  Jacques  Rancière, “The  Use  of  Distinctions,”  Dissensus:  On  Politics  and  Aesthetics  (London:
Continuum, 2010), 206-7. Also see Paulina Tambakaki, “When Does Politics Happen?,” Parallax vol. 15,
no. 3 (2009): 104.
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confrontation or antagonistic relation between democracy and the police, whatever
it is that ultimately falls under the general category of “the police” may therefore be
postulated and put forward as the principal object in which democracy can be said
to manifest against. In Rancière’s model, the police is posited as the condition for
democracy,  as  both  its  point  of  departure  and its  object  of  dispute.  Democracy
appears as a dynamic polemical agent that interjects moments of dissensus into the
police  order,  calling  into  question  the  intuition  of  its  given  arrangements,
classifications and regulations, opening up a space for new ways of seeing and new
ways of thinking about the community, its composition and configuration. This is
why as long as Rancière outlines his concept of politics with specific reference to
democracy’s inextricable relation to the police, his first task remains to isolate these
two terms accordingly: “Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby
the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organisation of powers,
the  distribution  of  places  and  roles,  and  the  systems  for  legitimising  this
distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and legitimisation another
name. I propose to call it the police.”11 
Therefore, in rather broad strokes, the police will be introduced as a vast set
of  institutions  and  procedures  that  govern  over  both  the  organisation  and
representation of a community: the exercise of authority, the distribution of roles,
spaces  and  functioning  parts  as  well  as  the  manner  in  which  these  systems  of
authority and distribution are legitimised and maintained.12 And yet, in the very next
11 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 28.
12 Oliver Davis, Jacques Rancière (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 76.
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sentence, Rancière admits that this rather anachronistic use of the term “police” is
not without problems. For what it intends to encapsulate obviously remains quite
distinct from the usual associations we are typically accustomed to today. Here, the
police will no longer merely signify law enforcement, the disciplinary instrument of
the State,  the forces of law and order, men in little blue suits (la basse police).
Alternatively, Rancière employs the term in its broadest connotations, much closer
to the manner in which it would have been understood across Europe in the 17 th and
18th century.13 It is precisely this more historical sense of the police that informs
Rancière’s  terminology and  thus,  must  likewise  orient  our  own analysis  of  the
concept  accordingly.  Rancière  certainly  points  us  in  this  direction  in  his  initial
proposal of the term. Nevertheless, given its significance in his larger theoretical
project, a number of commentators have observed that the concept of the police
remains rather undertheorised across Rancière’s writings.14 This criticism is entirely
justified. For even in  Disagreement, the work that arguably more than any other
situates the police—and democracy’s opposition to it—at its theoretical centre, the
concept still only receives but a few pages of the most abbreviated description. This
lack of analysis could very well be seen as one of the text’s greatest deficits.15 
13 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 28.
14 See for example Samuel A. Chambers, “The Politics of the Police: From Neoliberalism to Anarchism, and
Back to  Democracy,”  Reading  Rancière,  eds. Paul  Bowman  and  Richard  Stamp  (London:  Continuum
International Publishing Group, 2011), 19 and Davis, Jacques Rancière, 96.
15 Todd May will defend Rancière against this criticism, arguing that Rancière does not organise his political
theory in a typically descriptive or analytical manner, but that his writings are in fact “addressed to” those
disadvantaged,  marginalised and overlooked groups in a given distribution of the social.  May therefore
suggests that Rancière presents the police precisely from the perspective of those most impaired by its
arrangements,  systems  and  strategies.  If  May is  correct,  it  would  imply  that  what  Rancière  seeks  to
elaborate in Disagreement is not so much a descriptive analysis of the police itself, but its effects on those it
dominates,  excludes  or  neglects.  See The  Political  Thought  of  Jacques  Ranciere:  Creating  Equality
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 118. 
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In this respect, in order to sufficiently appreciate the object that Rancière
appears to organise his concept of democracy against, it becomes necessary, for the
moment, to suspend our discussion of his own work and concentrate our analysis on
another source. In his brief exposition of this more comprehensive interpretation of
the police in  Disagreement,  Rancière will  on more than one occasion appeal to
Foucault, whose later work considers this early modern incarnation of the police—
its mechanisms, jurisdiction and destinations—in the context of his own research on
governmentality. Although he would never venture to incorporate this research into
a proper volume, Foucault does address the topic in considerable detail in a series of
lectures delivered at the Collège de France at the end of the 1970s.16 Therefore, in
attempt to establish a more substantive framework for Rancière’s somewhat obscure
reference to the police, let us follow his lead and turn to the research of Foucault.
Foucault interprets the police, in the sense that Rancière will advance the
term, as a particular historical manifestation of a larger rationality he will eventually
designate and frame conceptually as “governmentality.” In attempt to displace the
centrality  of  sovereignty  in  political  analysis,  Foucault  employs  the  term
“government” with increasing abstraction to cover a sweeping range of techniques,
strategies, objects and domains which not only traverse the bounds of State and
subject,  but  a  number  of  disciplines  and  institutional  practices  ranging  from
economics to medicine to pedagogy to religion. Therefore, beyond its more familiar
16 After Foucault’s death, the topic of  governmentality would largely be taken up and developed by Anglo-
American scholarship in the social sciences, particularly Peter Miller, Graham Burchell, Nikolas Rose and
Mitchell Dean.
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references  to State  administration,  Foucault  demonstrates  that  well  into  the  18th
century, what may fall under the general category of government is actually quite
vast, including, at  different times,  topics as diverse as the ethics of the self,  the
management of the family and household, the moral guidance of the soul and the
overseeing of public health, social welfare and economic development.17 For this
reason, Foucault will often dissociate government from the comparatively narrow
confines of the State, the State remaining but a single component in a more complex
network of actors, institutions and mechanisms involved in the governing of the
conduct  of  individuals,  groups  or  populations.18 Even  with  the  advent  of  a
refurbished “absolutist” State in the 16th century, for Foucault, this merely attests to
a particular historical modification in the practices of government itself. He regards
the appearance of the modern nation State only as a type or “episode” of this larger
governmental rationality which must at all times be granted a certain theoretical
priority accordingly: the State remains an instrument or agent of government, not
the reverse.19 In this respect, very much keeping with Foucault’s analysis, perhaps
this  may  offer  fresh  insight  into  why,  unlike  Abensour,  Rancière’s  model  of
democracy will not isolate the State as the principal object of its being-against, but
rather  something  which  appears  to  remain  much  more  expansive  and  all-
encompassing: “I do not, however, identify the police with what is termed the ‘State
17 Thomas Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” Rethinking Marxism vol 14, iss. 3 (2002): 50.
18 Jonathan Xavier Inda, “Analytics of the Modern: An Introduction,” Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault,
Governmentality, and Life Politics, ed. Jonathan Xavier Inda (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 1-2.
19 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978  (New York:
Picador/Palgrave  Macmillan,  2009),  248. Also  see  Colin  Gordon,  “Governmental  Rationality:  An
Introduction,” The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds.,  Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and
Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 4.
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apparatus.’  The  notion  of  the  State  apparatus  is  in  fact  bound  up  with  the
presupposition of an opposition between State and society in which the State is
portrayed as a machine,  a ‘cold monster’ imposing its rigid order on the life of
society.”20 Indeed,  given  the  scope  of  government,  traditionally  understood,
Foucault regards the very notion of a “civil” society, as a separate or autonomous
sphere of society, as little more than a fairy tale.21 According to Foucault, it is not so
much  a  new form of  State  that  engenders  civil  society  as  a  result,  product  or
negation of itself, but a new form of  governmentalised society that organises new
relations of the State.22 
Therefore,  refusing  to  restrict  its  location  and  jurisdiction  to  the
conventional limits of the State, government will instead tend to be defined simply
in  terms  of  “conduct”  or  “the  conduct  of  conduct”  and  conceived  accordingly,
provides Foucault with a consistent theoretical schema able to trace and decipher,
under a single term, a number of practices, strategies and mechanisms applicable to
a  range  of  projects  extending  from the  governing  of  self  to  the  governing  of
others.23 By organising a working framework to consider  the underlying problems
of government—how to govern, how to be governed, by whom, how strictly, by
what  methods  and to  what  ends—what  Foucault  investigates  under  the  general
formula  of  governmentality  should  therefore  be  understood  not  as  a  competing
paradigm limited to a single historical epoch, but as a larger rationality coextensive
20 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 29. 
21 Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” 7.
22 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, 248.
23 Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” 50-1. In this regard, Foucault will make no distinction
between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” government, “consensual” and “coercive” government.
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with various modalities of governance potentially stretching across vast historical
boundaries.24 Consequently, it becomes possible for Foucault, with a certain degree
of  consistency,  to  compare  and evaluate,  for  example,  a  project  of  government
specific to Greeks (self-legislation/self-regulation), to the Christians (the directing
of the soul) and to early modernity (the management of a population). Government,
in this respect, has less to do with the imposing of laws over a sovereign territory
than it does with the active organisation and arrangement of particular objects in
order to effectuate particular ends deemed appropriate to those objects governed.25
What government ultimately concerns, Foucault infers, is “the right disposition of
things.”26 Whether  it  be the self,  the family,  workers  in  a  factory,  inmates  in  a
prison, patients in a hospital, inhabitants of a territory or members of a population,
its principal problem is one of the comportment of human beings.27 Its principal task
is one of  guidance, the structuring, ordering and shaping of the field of possible
activity.28 Such  a  rationality  could  very  well  be  epitomised  by  the  Hobbesian
conception of man outlined in the opening pages of his political treatise  On the
Citizen.  Since  the  Greeks,  Hobbes  declares,  the  history of  political  thought  has
simply assumed man naturally fit for society, but he is not: “Therefore, man is made
fit for society not by nature, but by  training (disciplina).”29 It is the business of
government  to  guide  and  shape,  organise  and  arrange,  manage  and  regulate.
24 Foucault’s earlier concept of power is likewise structured with a similar transhistorical applicability.
25 Inda, “Analytics of the Modern: An Introduction,” 4.
26 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3 (New York:
The New Press, 2000), 208.
27 Inda, “Analytics of the Modern: An Introduction,” 1.
28 Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” 52.
29 Thomas Hobbes,  On the Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 21-22, 24-5.  Disciplina
may equally be translated as “education” or “discipline.” 
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Government concerns not only the organised practices of governing in the strictest
sense, but also the active rendering of the objects of government governable in the
first place. It is precisely this active or positive quality of governing that Rancière
will associate with the police.
In  a  key  lecture  on  governmentality,30 tracing  significant  historical
developments  from the  16th to  the  18th century,  Foucault  explains  that  with  the
collapse of feudalism, the rise of the Reformation and Counter-reformation and the
emergence of a new competitive sovereign State system in early modern Europe,
the discourse on government would explode with new force.31 This extensive body
of  literature  that  appears  during  this  period  would  considerably  augment  the
knowledges, techniques and objectives of government. Not only would it address
more traditional topics of morality, family and the affairs of the State, but for the
first time, also tackle large scale problems such as national economy, public health
and  social  conditions.  As  a  result,  the  very  notion  of  government  itself  would
ultimately  become  synonymous  with  these  more  generalised forms  of
administration  and  management.32 We  find,  for  example,  detailed  theoretical
discussions considering the management of wealth and resources, production and
circulation, rates of fertility and mortality, modes of living and habitation, hygiene
and sanitation, accidents and epidemics, security and unrest.33 This is very much the
context in which the police, as a new form of governmental technology, will appear.
30 Delivered February 1, 1978 at the Collège de France as part of a course on “Security, Territory, Population.”
The topic of the police will largely be discussed on March 29 and April 5 in this lecture series.
31 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 201-2.
32 Ibid., 209.
33 Inda, “Analytics of the Modern: An Introduction,” 4-5.
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Indeed,  Foucault  will  locate  this  whole  literature  alongside  a  profound
governmentalisation of society, amalgamating a comparatively fragmented feudal
system into a centralised, bureaucratic State administration (the  absolutist State),
governing  over  a  newly  integrated  set  of  economic  practices  and  policies
(mercantilism),  analysed,  calculated  and  evaluated  according  to  a  new  set  of
rational tools, methods and strategies (particularly statistics, literally “the science of
the State”). This represents the birth of a new era of knowledges and technologies,
record  keeping  and  data  collection,  measuring  and  planning,  formalisation  and
regulation, standardisation and normalisation. Perhaps it is for this reason that when
Hegel considers the police in the Philosophy of Right, it is conceived as a “higher
guiding authority”  that  serves  to  actualise  and preserve the universal  across the
particularities constitutive of civil society.34
To facilitate the immense undertaking of such large scale national campaigns
from economy to security to public health, informed by this new  reason of State
(raison  d’État),  an  increasingly  expansive  body  of  government  would  likewise
require a new object: whereas it would customarily target the family, individual or
subject,  by  the  18th century,  government  would  now  identify  population as  its
principal aim.35 The discovery of population would considerably liberate this early
modern project of government in many respects. It would play a significant role in
the  transformation  of  the  predominant  model  of  rule  from a  more  conventional
34 G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  Right (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1962),  152,
translation slightly modified.
35 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 216-17.
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sovereign  authority  over  a  territory  to  a  more  elaborate  governmentalised
administration of a society.36 At once more specific and more totalising, it would
allow for a far more precise object of knowledge and a far more systematic means
to manage that object as a numerical and calculable system of aggregate effects.37 In
this  regard,  the  notion  of  population  represents  a  major  leap  in  the  ability  to
implicate  the  everyday conduct  of  a  mass  body in  the  exercise  of  a  sovereign
power.38 Consequently, by the end of the 18th century, it is the population that would
come  to  occupy  the  police  at  the  height  of  its  powers.39 For  Foucault,  such  a
development  is  indicative  of  the  inception  of  biopower:  the  management  of  a
population is akin to the management of life itself.40    
In his lecture, Foucault illustrates this historic transformation of government
through a  detailed  analysis  of  a  long trend of  anti-Machiavellian  literature  that
would  appear  during  this  period.  Although  revered  by  his  immediate
contemporaries,  not  long  after  Machiavelli’s  death,  his  political  writings,
particularly The Prince, would quickly fall out of favour and it would not be until
the  early  19th century  that  his  reputation  as  a  profound  political  thinker  would
largely be reestablished. As Foucault demonstrates, throughout this diverse political
36 Bruce Curtis, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery,”  The Canadian
Journal of Sociology vol. 27, no. 4 (Autumn, 2002): 506. 
37 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 216.
38 Curtis, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery,” 520.
39 Michel Foucault,  “The Political Technology of Individuals,”  Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-
1984 Volume 3, 416.
40 Foucault will often use “biopower” and “biopolitics” interchangeably. Although sympathetic to the general
concept,  Rancière  will  take  issue with  this  conflation  of  “power”  and  “politics”  insisting on  a  formal
distinction between the terms. See “Biopolitics or Politics?,”  Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. For
further analysis of Rancière’s argument see John McSweeney, “Giving Politics an Edge: Rancière and the
Anarchic Principle of Democracy,” Sofia Philosophical Review vol. 3, no. 1 (2009): 123-9.
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literature  critical  of  Machiavelli,  a  far  more  varied  and  extensive  theory  of
government would be worked out, the rule of the prince remaining but a single
form.41 Whereas Machiavelli’s “advice to the prince” would largely be interpreted to
concern  a  rather  narrow concept  of  government  limited  to  a  logic  of  territory,
subjects and the problem of a how transcendent prince may protect and retain his
sovereign principality, his many critics would be far more interested in pursuing a
theory of government able to consider the dynamics of managing a multiplicity of
complex relations immanent to society itself.42 Echoing Plato’s notorious allegory
of the State as a ship which we examined in depth at the outset of this study, now
with  reference  to  those  very  critics  of  Machiavelli,  Foucault  will  invoke  the
metaphor once again in order to exemplify the increasing complexity of this new
“art of government:”
What  does  it  mean to govern  a  ship?  It  means clearly to  take
charge of the sailors, but also of the boat and its cargo; to take
care  of  ship  means  also  to  reckon  with  the  winds,  rocks,  and
storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation
between the sailors, who are to be taken care of, and the ship,
which is to be taken care of, and the cargo, which is to be brought
safely  to  port,  and  all  those  eventualities  like  winds,  rocks,
storms, and so on. This is what characterises the government of a
ship.43 
Although  Plato  largely  employs  the  allegory  to  symbolise  the  ostracism of  the
philosopher by a savage demos whose anarchic rule over a sea vessel effectively
undermines the authority of the ship’s proper captain, epitomised by this  dyadic
41 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 205.
42 Ibid., 205-6.
43 Ibid., 209.
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relation of the captain and his crew, we implicitly accepted its basic premise of
government as the relatively straightforward problem of one ruling another, the few
ruling  the  many.  Throughout,  we  made  no  distinction  in  this  regard,  between
governing and simply ruling. Certainly, when considering democracy’s underlying
challenge to the archê—the founding principle of rule—this rather univocal account
of  government  remains  quite  appropriate.  However,  insofar  as  Ranciere  posits
democracy against the order of the police, a concept principally drawn from the
research of Foucault who centres his analysis around this dramatic expansion of the
field  of  government  in  the  early  modern  period,  it  now  becomes  necessary  to
modify and broaden our general conception of government significantly so that it
may  include  these  more  comprehensive  institutional  practices  of  governing  a
society as a multiplicity of complex relations. This is imperative if we wish grasp
the basis of Rancière’s model. 
How then are we to isolate the police in such a vast governmental project
particular  to  this  given  historical  milieu?  As  Foucault  recounts,  one  such  anti-
Machiavellian  treatise  to  consider  these  complex  relations  of  government  (La
Mothe Le Vayer) will outline a familiar topology identifying three tiers or strata of
government accordingly: individual, family and State. It is precisely the purpose of
government,  the treatise submits,  to establish and maintain a material  continuity
between  the  three  (in  both  upward  and  downward  directions).  The  upward
continuity, in which a necessary criterion to govern the family and the State is the
capacity to govern oneself, is hardly novel,  perhaps extending back to the Greeks
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themselves. However, the downward continuity, in which the effective government
of the family and the individual is facilitated by the effective government of the
State, thereby ascribing to the management of the family and to the conduct of the
individual a model  of government  isomorphic to that of State administration,  is
precisely what by the 17th century, Foucault contends, is beginning to be called “the
police.”44 The police, in its basic conception, has little to do with the application of
law. Rather, it is indicative of  an entirely new model of government in which  the
management  of  society  is  not  only  identified  as  its  primary  objective,  but  is
systematically implemented with the same precision and detail as the administration
of the State itself. Beginning in the 17th century, the police is simply the name of the
principal mode in which this management of society is carried out. The police may
therefore  be  juxtaposed  with  the  law  in  the  following  way:  whereas  the  law
concerns universals, the police concerns particulars. Much like the judiciary, army
and treasury, the police is conceived as a distinct administrative body of the State;
but unlike the judiciary, army or treasury, one whose functions remain indefinite
and whose jurisdiction remains unlimited.45 As Foucault often likes to repeat: the
true object of the police is man himself.46 
“So what the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors understand by ‘the
police’ is very different from what we put under the term. [...] What they understand
by ‘police’ is not an institution or mechanism functioning within the State, but a
44 Ibid., 206-7.
45 Michel Foucault, “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” Power: Essential Works
of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, 318-19.
46 Here Foucault quotes Turquet de Mayerne. See Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de
France 1977-1978, 322.
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governmental technology peculiar to the State—domains, techniques, targets where
the  State  intervenes.”47 The  police  operates  in  society  primarily  as  an  agent  of
intervention. It is for this reason that the police should not be confused with the
State itself. It is rather the means in which the State acts directly on society in a
non-juridical fashion. It represents the combined instruments, techniques, practices
and  strategies  in  which  the  State  identifies,  targets  and  intervenes in  a  wide
spectrum of activities, conditions and relations of human life from commerce to
infrastructure to  health  to  population management.  The police may therefore be
understood as the actualisation of this predominant theory of government particular
to  the  early  modern  period.  It  embodies  the  indispensable  technologies  and
knowledges  essential  to  a  new governmentalised  society.  It  is  what  renders  the
project of the management of society not only feasible, but effective. Whereas the
sovereign or prince would traditionally be occupied with his subjects’ status, virtue
and obedience, what is of interest to the police is simply what men do: their activity,
occupation,  production  and  reproduction.48 With  an  historically  unprecedented
degree of breadth and precision, the police functions to organise and integrate a
wide diversity of human activity into the jurisdiction, authority and influence of the
State: 
What, then, are the concrete tasks of police? As its instrument, it
will  have  to  provide  itself  with  whatever  is  necessary  and
sufficient for effectively integrating men’s activity into the State,
into its forces, and into the development of these forces, and it
will  have  to  ensure  that  the  State,  in  turn,  can  stimulate,
47 Foucault, “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” 317.
48 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, 322.
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determine, and orientate this activity in such a way that it is in
fact useful to the State.49
The goal of the police is not social repression. It is to order and shape the social in
such a manner that its activity is deemed useful to the State and increases its forces.
Rather than a punishing mechanism assembled to contend with the delinquency of a
deviant minority, the primary concern of the police is to enhance the general health,
order  and  productivity  of  society  as  a  whole.  Through  a  tripartite  strategy  of
intervention,  regulation  and  discipline—which  in  practice  quickly  loose  all
distinction—the police facilitates the rational, deliberate and calculated organisation
and management of the social. It classifies and allocates, arranges and coordinates,
administers and distributes, advocates and oversees. It is what creates and ensures a
well ordered, productive and smoothly functioning society. It is precisely against
this background that Rancière’s reference to the police must be understood. 
While Rancière will not correspond his own, somewhat nuanced concept of
the police exactly with the more descriptive historical account found in Foucault, it
is this general sense of an active agent that systematically organises, configures and
arranges  the  social—its  parts,  places,  roles  and  functions—that  gives  Rancière
cause to appeal to the term. Although abstracted from its proper historical milieu,
Rancière  clearly  identifies  something  in  our  own  society  today—and  indeed
perhaps something inherent to all societies in general—which merits the revival and
sweeping  application  of  the  term as  it  was  broadly understood  in  17 th and  18th
century Europe. What remains consistent across Foucault and Rancière’s treatment
49 Ibid., 322-3.
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of the police is the prominence granted to its underlying practice of social ordering,
to the aspiration of implementing the proper order of society.50 Rancière takes the
police as a symbol for the harmonious, productive society that functions without
interruption and without dispute. It is indicative of the well managed, well regulated
community that organises its parts and roles according to a larger administrative
framework effectively foreclosed to the complications of politics. This is why he
finds  the  police  intrinsically  hostile  to  the  agents  of  democracy.  So  whereas
Foucault  contrasts  the  police  and sovereignty,  Rancière  contrasts  the  police  and
politics.  For Rancière,  the police is  synonymous with the authority to distribute
order over a population, an authority that often remains indistinguishable from the
very order it installs. It is in this respect that he sees the police and the general
motivating principle behind it, as in no way particular to an early modern strategy
of government. Its basic formula may be found everywhere. It may be found in
ancient  oligarchies  and  in  republics;  it  may be  found  in  totalitarianism and  in
neoliberalism as well.  It  is  what  determines  in  advance modes of inclusion and
exclusion, divisions of labour, the separation between public and private. Indeed, it
appears as if  Rancière has difficulty envisioning a form of social  existence that
endures with any perpetuity outside the dictates  of a given police order.51 Even
political  philosophy,  as  Rancière  is  eager  to  demonstrate,  is  inundated  with
examples,  justifications  and  elaborate  defences  of  various  police  orders  both
50 May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality, 42.
51 Samuel A. Chambers, “Police and Oligarchy,” Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts, ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty
(Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010), 62.
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concrete and ideal.52 As we have already encountered, it is the  Republic that very
much embodies the archetype of a political philosophy whose first objective is to
substitute the order of politics with the order of the police. Plato calls the proper
order  of  society  “justice.”  It  has  many  other  names.  Regardless,  according  to
Rancière,  this  substitution  amounts  to  the  effective  elimination  of  politics  from
philosophical inquiry.53 As we have seen,  this  remains the basis  of his  principal
criticism of political philosophy.    
Therefore,  however  indebted  to  the  research  of  Foucault,  rather  than  a
governmental  technology particular  to  the  State,  Rancière  appears  to  utilise  the
concept  to  encapsulate  the  totality  of  rationalities,  mentalities,  operations  and
processes that function to systematically organise,  regulate and preserve a given
order of society (covering everything from law to coercion to education to science).
For Rancière, the police signifies the power to impose order on a social body: it is
the power to identify groups, designate parts, assign roles, allocate functions and
partition spaces. Its basic presumption is that the appropriate behaviour, activity and
thinking will follow from one’s particular allotted part, role, function and place.54 It
assumes that one’s natural  set  of abilities and capacities both determines and is
determined by one’s proper place in the larger social  order.  This is precisely its
52 Rancière writes: “The basis of the politics of the philosophers is the identity of the principle of politics as an
activity with that of the police as a way of determining the partition of the perceptible  (le partage du
sensible)  that defines the lot of individuals and parties.” See Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 63.
Also see  Jeremy Valentine, “Rancière and Contemporary Political  Problems,”  Paragraph  vol. 28, iss. 1
(March 2005): 46.
53 For  additional  insights  on  Rancière’s  position  see  May,  The  Political  Thought  of  Jacques  Rancière:
Creating Equality, 42-3 and Chambers, “The Politics of the Police: From Neoliberalism to Anarchism, and
Back to Democracy,” 28-9.
54 Davis, Jacques Rancière, 78.
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appeal  to  the  archê  which  remains  at  the  root  of  every  police  distribution.
Consequently, although he maintains that he employs the term in its most “neutral”
and “nonpejorative” sense, Rancière will identify the police in every hierarchical
structure and in every social arrangement that functions to assign, affix, restrict and
exclude.  Whereas  Foucault’s  analysis  of  the  police  tends  to  concentrate  on
technique and strategy, what appears to interest Rancière is primarily its effects on a
social body.55 It is very much from this perspective that a concept of democracy, as
the appearance of a political subject that interrupts and frustrates the logic of the
police, will be developed. 
Rancière will associate the police with the count of the community. In both
Disagreement and the closely related “Ten Theses on Politics” which largely serves
to distil and enumerate its most essential findings, the police will be distinguished
as a particular way of identifying and dividing up the parts and shares of what is
common. As opposed to a straightforward numerical (arithmetical) count, the police
engineers  various  intricate  measuring  strategies  to  evaluate  the  title,  worth  and
share  of  each  member  of  the  community.56 It  calculates,  appraises  and  assigns
according to a selected criterion, standard or judgement. Once again, this its appeal
to the archê. In a single movement, the police establishes both a common ground of
the community (that which constitutes the community as a whole) and the manner
in which the common of the community is divided (the dividing up of parts and
55 See footnote 15.
56 Gilles Labelle, “Two Refoundation Projects of Democracy in Contemporary French Philosophy: Cornelius
Castoriadis  and Jacques Rancière,”  Philosophy and Social  Criticism vol.  27,  no.  4  (2001): 88.  Labelle
appropriately titles section II of his article: “Jacques Rancière: the demos against the police.”
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shares).57 Concerned both with what can be divided and how that division is to be
carried  out,  the  police  may therefore  be  understood to  constitute,  in  Rancière’s
lexicon, a partition (le partage) of the social, determining one’s part, role and extent
to  which  one  partakes  (avoir-part)  in  the  institutions  of  society  (economic,
governmental, familial, etc.). Accordingly, as a division or partition of the social, as
a  distribution  of  parts  and shares,  the  police  offers  a  definitive  solution  to  the
longstanding problem of  separation  and exclusion,  of  who participates,  to  what
extent, under what conditions and to what ends. 
One the more predominant features to characterise the police count, if we
follow Rancière, is the manner in which it aspires to represent the community as a
body that lacks void and supplement.58 The police offers a regulatory framework
that  claims  to  encompass  the  whole  of  the  community so  that  all  its  parts  are
known, named and counted.59 On at least one occasion Rancière will describe this
process  in  terms  of  saturation:  “The  essence  of  the  police  is  the  principle  of
saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible (le partage du sensible) that
recognises neither lack nor supplement.”60 The principle of saturation signifies the
fullness  or completeness  of  society,  the  count  that  intends  to  exclude  the  very
possibility of  supplementation.  The police  order  is  emblematic  of  a  distribution
without  remainder,  without  excess  and without  omission.  It  claims  that  there is
57 See  Maarten  Simons  and  Jan  Masschelein,  “Governmental,  Political  and  Pedagogic  Subjectivation:
Foucault with Rancière,” Educational Philosophy and Theory vol. 42, no. 5/6 (2010): 592.
58 Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, 36. 
59 Davis, Jacques Rancière, 78.
60 Jacques  Rancière  and  Davide  Panagia,  “Dissenting  Words:  A Conversation  with  Jacques  Rancière,”
Diacritics vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 124.
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nothing unaccounted for, that there is nothing left over or external to its method of
accounting.61 In this regard, not only does the police embody the power to limit,
marginalise  and  exclude,  it  also  embodies  the  power  to  render  those  excluded
effectively invisible.
Therefore, beyond the count of the empirical parts of the community—the
actual groups, functions, roles and shares—what Rancière is intent on establishing
is  that  the  police  must  simultaneously  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  regime  of
representation, as an agent that functions to organise and formulate the underlying
constitution  of  society  in  a  symbolic  manner.62 This  is  a  key  component  of
Rancière’s concept:     
The police is, essentially, the law, generally implicit, that defines
a party’s share or lack of it.  But to define this,  you first  must
define the configuration of the perceptible in which one or the
other is inscribed. The police is thus first an order of bodies that
defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways
of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a
particular  place  and task;  it  is  an  order  of  the  visible  and the
sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is
not,  that  this  speech is  understood as discourse and another  as
noise. […] Policing is not so much the “disciplining” of bodies as
a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of  occupations
and  the  properties  of  the  spaces  where  these  occupations  are
distributed.63      
According to Rancière, the police cannot be reduced to a materialism of distributed
parts and shares. It is equally essential that it determine the  ineligibility of those
parts and shares distributed: how they are represented, how they are perceived and
61 Chambers, “Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics,” 306-7.
62 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 36. 
63 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 29.
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how  they  are  experienced.64 Insofar  as  the  police  stipulates  the  very  terms  of
partaking, of inclusion and exclusion, participation and marginalisation, it must first
specify the modes of perception in which those terms are inscribed. Not only does
the  police  organise the  material  divisions  of  a  shared  common  (un  commun
partagé), it likewise functions to organise the representational space in which those
divisions are articulated and deciphered.  The police constitutes both a particular
representation  of  how the  parts  of  the  community are  ordered  and  a  particular
ordering  of  how the  parts  of  the  community are  represented.  Its  mandate  is  to
establish the very parameters between the visible and the invisible, the sayable and
the unsayable, the audible and the inaudible.65 It is the power to name, to frame, to
determine what can be seen and what cannot, what can be heard (logos) and what
remains  indistinguishable  from the  incoherent  fog of  noise  (phônê).  Its  primary
concern is one of the symbolisation of society, the manner in which the sensible is
mediated according to a given framework or design: “The police is not a social
function but a symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the police lies
neither in repression nor even in control over the living. Its essence lies in a certain
way of dividing up the sensible.”66 Essential to the police order, it could therefore be
said,  is  the  governance  of  the  sensible.  For Rancière,  the  police intervention,
regulation and management of the social extends all the way to sensory experience
itself. What it governs, what it guides and shapes, is the way in which we see and
64 Chambers, “Police and Oligarchy,” 63.
65 Linsey McGoey, “Police Reinforcement: The Anti-Politics of Organizational Life,” Reading Rancière, 150.
66 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 36. 
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hear, what we see and hear and likewise, what will not be seen and not be heard at
all. Although Foucault’s general definition of government still very much applies, it
is here where Rancière will most decisively diverge from his research and venture
to cultivate a conception of the police particular to a theoretical framework all of his
own: “In ‘Omnes et Singulatim,’ Foucault conceives of the police as an institutional
apparatus that participates in power’s control over life and bodies; while, for me,
the police designates not an institution of power but a distribution of the sensible (le
partage  du  sensible)  within  which  it  becomes  possible  to  define  strategies  and
techniques  of  power.”67 It  is  Rancière’s  general  position  that  any  relation  or
mechanism of power already presupposes a particular distribution of the sensible
according to which that relation or mechanism of power is symbolically arranged.
Moreover, this position remains consistent with one of his most elementary theses:
that at the heart of every community, at the heart of every institution of the social,
lies an aesthetics, that is, a particular configuration and coordination of the field of
the sensible, of the modes of perception and forms of representation that dictate the
relations and boundaries between ways of seeing, ways of doing, ways of saying and
ways of being.68 Accordingly, what it is that ultimately constitutes the common of a
community is  not  so much a shared identity,  territory or ideology,  but a shared
distribution  of  the  sensible,  a  shared  sense  or  modality  of  sense.69 This  is  why
67 Rancière, “Biopolitics or Politics?,” 95.
68 Rancière employs the term “aesthetics” in a manner generally consistent with the Kantian notion of “ a
priori forms of sensibility.” See his essay “From Politics to Aesthetics?” Paragraph vol 28 (March 2005):
13. Also see the interviews collected in the volume  The Politics of  Aesthetics: The Distribution of the
Sensible (London: Continuum, 2004). 
69 See Katharine Wolfe, “From Aesthetics to Politics: Rancière, Kant and Deleuze,” Contemporary Aesthetics
vol. 4 (2006). 
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Rancière can speak of a “politics of aesthetics.” For what is at stake in politics is not
only the transformation of the institutions  and relations  of society,  but the very
manner  in  which  those  institutions  and  relations  are  perceived  and  rendered
intelligible.  A politics  of  aesthetics  sets  out  both  to  challenge  the  limits  of  the
perceptible and to offer new possibilities of perception, new ways of seeing and
new ways of being seen.70 In this regard, Rancière’s politics of aesthetics goes well
beyond what Gramsci describes in his  Prison Notebooks as the “war of position.”
Politics is nothing less than the war of perception itself.
And while the precise conceptual relationship between these key terms that
populate  Rancière’s  later  work (aesthetics,  the  distribution  of  the  sensible,  the
police)  may at  times  appear  frustratingly  undefined,  what  nevertheless  remains
strikingly apparent is that unless these terms remain entirely synonymous, what his
appeal to the police ultimately compels us to consider is not only that every society
is constituted in a symbolic manner, but that the symbolic is itself something with
the capacity to be governed. Perhaps this is what will most sharply distinguish the
concept of the symbolic as it appears in Rancière and Lefort. Whereas Lefort binds
a particular symbolic order to the monarchic, democratic and totalitarian regimes,
Rancière appears to ascribe a general symbolic order to the police itself (politics
always external to this symbolic order). Whereas Rancière associates this symbolic
with  saturation,  this  is  a  term  that  Lefort  would  likely  reserve  only  for
totalitarianism.  And yet,  even here,  there  is  no  suggestion  from Lefort  that  the
70 Jean-Philippe Deranty,  “Jacques Rancière’s Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition,”  Political Theory
vol. 31, no. 1 (February 2003): 137.
176
symbolic is ever itself an object of government. “The police” is Rancière’s universal
term for precisely this: the totality of systems and processes that function to govern
the  symbolic  constitution  of  society,  to  manage  and  regulate  the  modes  of
perception operative in a social field. It is for this reason that politics cannot simply
be equated with the affairs of the public.  For what is public, what is private, their
divisions and boundaries, is already symbolised in a particular way from the start.
(This is something that the Greeks appear never to have fully grasped.) Rather, for
Rancière,  integral  to  the  meaning  of  politics  is  the  conflict  over  its  very
symbolisation.71 It  is  the  initiation  of  a  controversy,  a  polemics,  in  which  the
representation of the public, the private, the organisation of the community itself, is
put into question and rendered an irreducible political problem. This is the act of
democracy. Therefore, if democracy can indeed be understood to oppose the general
order  of  the  police  as  Rancière reimagines  the term,  perhaps  what  it  ultimately
appears against is the systematic governance of the symbolic itself. For beyond its
various modes and strategies of ordering the social, assigning to each their proper
role, place and function, the police tends to reside over an underlying ontology of
closure, a closure that functions to restrict what is visible, what is thinkable and
what  is  possible.72 Although  working  through  an  entirely  different  framework,
Castoriadis will regularly identify such ontological closure as the very basis of the
heteronomous  society. For both Rancière and Castoriadis alike, democracy is the
71 Jacques Ranciere, “Introducing Disagreement,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities vol. 9, no.
3 (December 2004): 6.
72 Bram Ieven, “Heteroreductives - Ranciere’s Disagreement with Ontology,” Parallax vol. 15, no. 3 (2009):
50.
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rupture of closure. It counters this representation of society by inventing new ways
of interpreting and new ways of imagining the community,  its composition and
configuration. According to Rancière, this is the revelation of the political subject.
In  the  opening  lines  of  Aristotle’s Constitution  of  Athens,  the  demos  is
defined rather succinctly as those who have: “virtually no share in any aspect of
government.”73 On  at  least  one  occasion,  Rancière  proposes  that  his  volume
Disagreement may be  read  as  one  long  commentary  on  these  opening  lines  of
Aristotle’s text: “In a sense, one can say that politics begins when those who have
no share begin to have one.”74 According to Rancière, at the heart of this political
struggle for a share, for an opportunity to take part in the affairs of government, is a
dispute over language itself: not only who have the right to speak, but who in fact
can  be  heard  at  all,  who  have  the  capacity  for  speech  and  whose  speech  is
recognised as such. This strange intersection between language and politics is one
that may be traced across political theory from Aristotle to Arendt to Habermas.
When Aristotle defines man a political animal it is not simply because he is social,
but because he is in possession of  logos. Whereas other animals possess only the
capacity to express pleasure and pain, to growl and groan, man is unique in that he
is endowed with the capacity to speak, to discuss, to debate: what is just and what is
unjust, how the community should be organised,  what the laws that govern that
community  should  be.75 And  yet,  immediately  following  this  logical  or
73 Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 211.
74 Jacques Ranciere, “Democracy Means Equality,” Radical Philosophy vol. 82 (March 1997): 31. 
75 Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, 13.
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anthropological  definition,  Aristotle  moves  to  qualify  its  implied  universality
distinguishing those who genuinely possess logos from those, we can only assume,
who merely possess the semblance of it,  whose access  to  logos is  mediated by
memesis (slaves  and  by  extension,  we  could  add,  women,  workers,  colonised
peoples, etc.). How can this distinction be justified? The coherence of Aristotle’s
remarks depends entirely on the meaning of logos. As Rancière explains, as soon as
Aristotle isolates the basis for political participation in a logos possessed only by a
select few, it will no longer designate a generic linguistic capacity, or even reasoned
discourse, but a symbolic division.76 The question at hand is not one of biology,
physiology or cognition, but representation, a symbolic determination, a distribution
of the sensible that organises the basic relations and proximities between speech and
bodies,  logos and  subjects,  a  division  indicative  of  the  order  of  the  police.
Therefore,  if  Disagreement may  be  interpreted  as  something  of  an  extended
meditation on Aristotle’s most elementary political problem—who is in possession
of  logos,  who is entitled to a share—an interpretation that  Rancière himself will
very  much  endorse,  it  is  not  because  he  accepts  language  as  a  foundation  for
politics, but because it is language that he sees to ultimately form the implicit object
of a very particular dispute: who can be heard and who cannot, who has a share and
who does not. It is precisely the inauguration of this dispute, this disagreement, that
Rancière  identifies  with  politics.  Beyond  questions  of  justice  and  injustice,  the
organisation of the community, its laws and institutions, if politics renders  logos
76 Ranciere, “Introducing Disagreement,” 5.
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itself  an  object  of  controversy,  it  is  because  logos is  never  simply a  matter  of
speech, but a particular  account that is made of speech, of its intelligibility and
audibility.77 This is why Rancière often associates democracy with acts of revolt,
but revolt of a particular kind, a “logical revolt,” borrowing a term from Rimbaud,
that is just as much a conflict over those who speak and the account that is made of
this speech as anything else.78 Therefore, contrary to Aristotle, if language can offer
no  ground  for  politics,  it  is  because  politics  represents  a  dispute  over  the
interpretation of what constitutes language itself, over the very distinction between
logos and phônê. Whereas Aristotle appeals to language as a condition or necessary
requisite for belonging to a political community, Rancière sees language as the basis
of a disagreement regarding who belongs to such a community and who does not.
Whereas Aristotle’s political subject is the one whose words demonstrate an innate
possession of logos, Rancière’s political subject is the one whose words and indeed,
excess of words, throw the entire symbolic division of logos into question. It is this
political  subject  that  concerns  us  here,  the  subject  who represents  an  excess  of
words,  a  literary animal  rather  than an inherently political  one,79 whose speech
embodies the capacity to disrupt and modify the sensible, that which we see and
that  which  we  hear,  rendering  the  symbolic  order  of  the  police  inherently
problematic. 
77 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 22-3.
78 Arthur  Rimbaud,  “Démocratie,”  Complete  Works,  Selected  Letters:  A  Bilingual  Edition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 350. Les Révoltes logiques was also the name of an ambitious journal of
history and politics founded by Rancière and others in 1975 to which he contributed a number of articles on
various topics. It published regularly until 1985.
79 Chambers, “Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics,” 309.
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From  his  very  first  work,  perhaps  the  central  question  that  propels
Rancière’s  larger  theoretical  project  since  his  infamous  break  with  Althusser  is
precisely  that  which  his  former  teacher  systematically  failed  to  consider:  the
significance of the role of the subject in the history of social emancipation.80 For
this reason, some elect to read many of Rancière’s major works,  contra Althusser,
according to the heritage of a humanist Marxism in which the subject remains an
integral component of any effective theory of emancipation.81 And yet,  Rancière
himself is unequivocal that the political subject, as he understands the term, is not a
sociological  entity.82 Much  like  Foucault,  Rancière  will  never  presuppose  a
subject.83 The political subject does not precede itself, does not exist before it acts,
before it creates itself a manifest form. The proletariat, for example, does not exist
as a class before it imposes itself on the workings, divisions and suppositions of
industrial capitalism, before it makes itself a problem  precisely where there was
none  before.  Nor  is  the  manifestation  of  the  political  subject,  consistent  with
Abensour’s appeal to the principle of anarchy, contingent upon any particular set of
socio-historical  determinations.  Both  the  origin  and  destination  of  the  political
subject can never be known in advance. Spontaneous, unpredictable, incalculable,
Rancière  largely  considers  the  sporadic  appearance  of  the  political  subject  as
80 See Jacques Rancière,  Althusser’s Lesson (London:  Continuum, 2011).  Also see Nick Hewlett,  Badiou,
Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking Emancipation (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007),
84, 86. 
81 For example Deranty, “Jacques Rancière’s Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition,” 138-9.
82 Jacques  Rancière,  “Work,  Identity,  Subject,”  Jacques  Rancière  and  the  Contemporary  Scene:  The
Philosophy  of  Radical  Equality,  eds.  Jean-Philippe  Deranty  and  Alison  Ross (London:  Continuum
International Publishers, 2012), 213-14.
83 Todd May, “Jacques Ranciere and the Ethics of Equality,” SubStance vol. 36, no. 2, iss. 113 (2007): 30.
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something of an “accident” across a long history of various modes of domination.84
Therefore,  if  class  struggle  does  not  represent  the  underlying  social  motor  of
politics, as Marx considers it to be, it is because politics is the name of that which
sets up this conflict between classes, as parts of society, in the first place.85 Politics,
in this view, is not the clash of interests, opinions or perspectives, but describes the
process in which two opposing logics that count the parts of the community, that of
equality and that of the police, are made to encounter one another in the form of a
disagreement. The vehicle through which these two logics meet and intersect is the
political subject. The political subject is something that happens, that comes into
being  and  then  falls  away,  provisional,  local,  episodic,  transforming  both  the
identity  of  the  subject  itself  as  well  as  its  relations,  limits  and  parameters  as
prescribed by the symbolic order of the police. This is why Rancière often prefers to
speak  of  political  “subjectivation”  (la  subjectivation  politique),  a  term  more
inclined to draw its concept towards the very process in which one or many become
a political subject.86 It is precisely through this process of subjectivation that the
principal agent of democracy’s being-against the police will manifest in political
form. 
In  Hatred of Democracy, as we have seen, Rancière offers a more general
account of democracy as “political” or “anarchic” government, government based
84 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 35. 
85 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 18.
86 The term la subjectivation will also be translated as “subjectification” and “subjectivization.” For purposes
of consistency, I will be using political “subjectivation” throughout, modifying translations when necessary.
This  term should  also  not  be  confused  with  Foucault’s  own concept  of  subjectivation which  seeks  to
describe the subject that comes into being through its subjection to institutional or disciplinary practices or
power relations. 
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on the  absence  of  title  or  qualification.  But  in  Disagreement,  written  a  decade
earlier,  we  encounter  a  somewhat  different  perspective.  Here,  democracy  is
formulated  almost  exclusively  in  terms  of  its  relation  to  the  police,  or  more
specifically,  in  terms of the principal  mechanism in which a  given order  of  the
police is  effectively obstructed or suspended:  “Democracy is  more precisely the
name of a singular disruption of this order of distribution of bodies as a community
that we proposed to conceptualise in the broadest concept of the police. It is the
name of what comes and interrupts the smooth working of this order through a
singular mechanism of subjectivation.”87 In this context, democracy is conceived, in
somewhat narrow terms, as politics’ mode of subjectivation, the process in which an
excluded or marginalised people,  those previously unseen and unheard,  abandon
their  allotted  part  or  position,  challenging  the  identities,  categories  and
classifications  of  a  particular  police  distribution,  frustrating  its  basic  symbolic
representation  of  society.  Democracy  occurs  when  the  sensory  self-evidence  of
what is perceptible, intuitive, given in society is contested and called into question,
when the basis  of the natural  correspondence between bodies,  places,  roles and
functions  is  thrown  back  on  its  own  inherent  contingency.  It  reconfigures  or
redefines the dominant mode of perception operative in a social field. It draws the
voices  of  those  of  no  account,  who  have  no  right  to  speak,  into  a  space  of
perceptibility.  A democratisation of perception.  This is not an inevitable process,
whatever the conditions. Rancière maintains that the emergence of an emancipatory
87 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 99.
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politics  is  neither  necessary  nor  automatic;  it  requires  a  subject  and  it  is  only
through the agency of this subject—its acts of dissensus—that politics comes into
being in the form of democracy. Perhaps this represents one of Disagreement’s most
important theses. Democracy is the act of a subject. What makes an action political
is not its object or location, but its form: the setting up of a dispute through a defiant
demonstration  of  equality.88 It  is  to  initiate  a  controversy,  a  polemics,  that
contradicts the underlying assumptions of the police and renders new voices, new
relations and new destinations possible. To become a political subject is to make
oneself appear, to make oneself of some account, to impose oneself on those very
spaces and times where one does not belong. Democracy begins with a new people
occupying a  new sphere of  appearance.  It  is  precisely the  manifestation  of  this
sphere and this people that undermines the dictates of a given distribution of the
sensible.  
But who is this political subject whose intermittent appearance, at different
times, under different conditions, orients democracy against the police? Rancière’s
fifth thesis (Ten Theses on Politics) resolves that the subject of democracy is neither
the  collected  members  of  the  community,  nor  necessarily  a  specific  social
demographic unified by a shared experience or shared interest (for example,  the
working  class).  Rather,  the  political  subject  will  be  identified  only  as  the
supplementary part in relation to every count of the parts of the population.89 Insofar
as the police embodies the principle of saturation, a distribution of the sensible that
88 Ibid., 32.
89 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” 33. 
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structurally  precludes  lack  and  supplement, excess  and remainder, the  political
subject represents the surplus subject in this saturated field of experience.90 It is the
manifestation  of  the  uncounted,  the  invisible  remainder  become  flesh,  the  part
without  part  whose  very  appearance  makes  contentious  the  status  of  what  is
objectively  given. Therefore,  if  democracy’s  political  subject  may  be  generally
expressed as “the people,” it is the people as supplement, as surplus or residue.
Democracy occurs when this supplement is added to the symbolic constitution of
the  social  rendering  the  established  government  of  the  sensible  inherently
problematic.  Whereas  the  police  concerns  the  configuration  of  perception,
democracy  concerns  its  reconfiguration:  it  adds  something  that  was  not  there
before.91 It produces a multiple that contradicts the very logic of the count of the
police.  This  is  precisely how Rancière  understands acts  of  dissensus.  Dissensus
reveals a gap in the sensible, a miscount, an impropriety; it demonstrates that the
total is not total, the whole is not whole. It introduces a wrong (le tort), a torsion or
twisting of logics that would otherwise never meet: the logic of equality and the
logic of the police.92 Consequently, expressed in terms of a surplus subject, an agent
of dissensus, a manifestation of a wrong, the political subject will have no natural
identity and no constant body. As soon as workers, women, people of colour deviate
from their allotted place or position and emerge a political subject, everything that
90 Rancière and Panagia, “Dissenting Words: A Conversation with Jacques Rancière,” 124.
91 Simons and Masschelein, “Governmental, Political and Pedagogic Subjectivation: Foucault with Rancière,”
594.
92 Jacques Ranciere and  Kate Nash, “Post‐democracy,  Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Jacques
Rancière,”  Angelaki:  Journal  of  the  Theoretical  Humanities vol.  1,  iss.  3 (1996):  175-6.  Also  see
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, chapter 2.
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is thought to be intuitive about their identities is effectively denatured, forced out of
its obviousness.93 Emancipation means precisely this:  the escape from minority.94
Eluding the fixity of all identifiable classifications and determinations from class to
gender to ethnicity, the political subject must therefore be conceptualised formally.
The political subject is a floating subject, a fluctuating performer that no longer
coincides with the original coordinates of its assigned place, role and function as
distributed by the order of the police.95 Instead, it paradoxically inhabits two worlds
at once: the world of equality and the world of the police, the world where it is
visible and the world where it is not, the world where it belongs to the community
and  the  world  where  it  remains  a  stranger.  For  Rancière,  politics  involves  the
intersection of these worlds, the demonstration of the existence of a common world
with a shared language and a shared aisthesis.96 Such a world may only come into
being through conflict, through a certain violence to the symbolic, but it is precisely
the  invention  of  a  common world,  the  sharing  of  a  common stage,  that  allows
arguments to be heard, polemical scenes to unfold and disputes to be carried out in a
political fashion.
As I have argued throughout, politics is never simply conflict in itself. It is
what modifies or reconfigures the relations of conflict; it is the conflict that makes
conflict political. Workers, women, people of colour, politics requires a subject and
it is only through the emergence of a subject that politics is initiated and set  in
93 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 36.
94 Jacques Rancière, “The Uses of Democracy,” On the Shores of Politics (London: Verso, 2007), 48. 
95 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 89.
96 Ibid., 27, 51-2. Also see his eighth thesis in “Ten Theses on Politics,” and “The Uses of Democracy,” 49-50.
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motion. For Rancière, the name of this process of subjectivation, of becoming a
subject, is democracy. But whereas politics will have but a single democratic form,
democracy itself will witness many different actors, under various names, come to
pass as its political agent. In part, it is for this reason that the identity of the political
subject is destined to remain indeterminable. This is especially true in the modern
era. Indeed, it is largely with respect to the increasing heterogeneity of the political
subject  that  Rancière  will  draw  the  principal  distinction  between  ancient  and
modern democracy. While ancient democracy witnessed the demos, the poor, those,
as Aristotle explains, who have no share in government,  open an arena of dispute
largely  played  out  in  and  for  the  public  sphere,  modern  democracy,  Rancière
contends,  experiences  a proliferation of subjects  whose acts  of  dissensus render
litigious a vast range of objects at the most divergent regions of society.97 Modern
democracy  will  therefore  be  defined  almost  exclusively  in  terms  of  the
multiplication  of  forms  of  subjectivation  which  itself  multiplies  the  sites  of
disagreement. By contrast, Lefort will draw his own conceptual distinction between
ancient  and  modern  democracy with  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  power  is
represented symbolically. While ancient democracy perceived power as belonging
to no one, identified in the middle, between citizens and principally localised in a
well defined public sphere, modern democracy, Lefort contends, experiences power
as an empty space, occupied by a people that remain indeterminate and situated in a
field with no such boundaries or limits.98 Despite these theoretical variants, what
97 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 58-9.
98 Claude  Lefort,  “The  Permanence  of  the  Theologico-Political?”  Democracy  and  Political  Theory
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both  accounts  appear  to  emphasise  is  the  extent  to  which  modern  democracy
effectively  dislocates  and  extends  the  principal  subject,  object  and  location  of
politics. If we elaborate their very brief comments on this matter, both Rancière and
Lefort appear to understand modern democracy to augment exponentially who the
subject of democracy may be, the objects that democracy concerns and the spaces
where democracy occurs. What is public and what is private,  what constitutes a
citizen, what determines who participates, to whom equality applies: in its modern
incarnation, the solutions to these problems appear to shift and fluctuate at a far
greater  rate.  What  modern democracy challenges,  what  it  contests  and disputes,
appears  increasingly  decentred  and  diversified,  drawing  politics  into  a  vast
spectrum of spheres of life that  no doubt would have been quite foreign to the
ancient Greek experience: economic production, the family, the role of women. But
whereas Lefort’s analysis will often consider this phenomenon against the backdrop
of  a  symbolic  horizon  that  renders  the  representation  of  “the  people”  radically
indeterminate at an ontological level, Rancière’s analysis will always return those
unanticipated  moments  of  subjectivation,  the  emergence  of  a  subject  whose
emancipatory  activity,  however  regional  or  occasional,  itself  opens  up  the
representation of “the people” and perpetually modifies its meaning. If this process
appears more fragmented or discontinuous in Rancière, it is because, unlike Lefort,
he will associate no general symbolic order with democracy itself (as an asymbolic
political  form). Rather, the political subject always manifests against  a symbolic
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 225-6. Also see Bernard Flynn,  The Philosophy of
Claude Lefort: Interpreting the Political (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 158.
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order systematically organised and governed by the police.
So while democracy has always meant the power of the people, perhaps the
lesson that  modern democracy serves  to  underscore again and again  is  that  the
identity of “the people” is a question destined to remain unresolved in any absolute
sense. Perhaps we should understand this irresolution as essential to the meaning of
democracy itself.  This will only further explain why Rancière must expound the
political subject in formal terms. For although the subject of democracy is indeed
“the people,” it is a people who will invariably adopt many different names. Ancient
democracy may have transformed the class known only as “the demos” into the
name of a political  subject,  a term of controversy and dispute,  but according to
Rancière,  the demos merely represents the originary and most generic name for
such a subject. Scattered across his writings, we encounter numerous examples of
other such names drawn from history which have served a similar political function,
even if those names are not typically associated with democracy in either its ancient
or modern form. Nevertheless,  it  is  through these names that the mechanism of
subjectivation as a demonstration or verification of equality will be developed in
greater detail. 
 “Pleb.”  Rancière  will  frequently  recount  an  episode  in  Roman  history
reported  by Livy often  known as  the  secession  of  the  plebeians.  In  494
B.C.E., the plebs abandoned their place in the city and gathered en masse on
the  Aventine  Hill  demanding  a  treaty  that  would  guarantee  their  formal
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recognition  in  the  republic.  The  patricians  promptly  replied  that  all
negotiations were out of the question given that such an accord required
something impossible  for  a  class  of  men whose  cries  and screams were
indicative only of the sufferings of exhausted or mistreated animals. They
simply perceived no shared space, no shared language in which the plebs
could be engaged on common grounds.  Accordingly,  rather  than respond
with violence and aggression, the plebs discovered their power to confront
and  dispute  this  claim  with  words  alone.  By  resorting  to  dialogue,  by
demonstrating a certain equality, the plebs were able to distort the manner in
which  they,  as  a  class,  were  perceived.  Consequently,  compelled  to
recognise  the  plebs  as  speaking  beings  rather  than  simply  the  “working
parts” of the organic body of Rome, the patricians ultimately conceded and
accepted their demands for the establishment of the plebeian tribunes. But
more than the extension of citizenship, which by no means eradicated all
existing  inequalities,  for  Rancière,  the  real  achievement  of  the  plebeian
secession was the recognition of the plebs themselves. Indeed, what Livy
documents is the moment “pleb” emerges the name of a political subject.99 
 “Woman.” Rancière will  also cite  the example of French playwright  and
outspoken advocate of the rights of women Olympe de Gouges. Although
De Gouges remained a staunch proponent of the revolution, her writings and
99 Rancière  largely  reads  the  Plebeian  secession  through  the  work  of  Pierre-Simon  Ballanche.  See
Disagreement:  Politics  and  Philosophy,  23-6.  Also  see  Martin  Breaugh,  The  Plebeian  Experience:  A
Discontinuous History of Political Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 93-4.
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relentless criticisms of the methods of the Jacobins would ultimately lead to
her arrest and execution at the height of the reign of terror. Following her
sentencing at  her trial,  De Gouges famously protested that if  women are
entitled to go to the guillotine, they are also entitled to go to the assembly.
Her point is unequivocal: if women, excluded entirely from the business of
government,  properly  belong  to  the  private,  domestic  sphere  of  life,
unqualified or unfit for participating in public affairs, how is it that they may
simultaneously represent a threat to the cause of the revolution? Rancière
will elaborate this blatant contradiction that De Gouges so elegantly evokes
in terms of a disagreement, one in which the category of woman, affixed to
an  assigned  role,  function  and  place,  is  compromised  by  a  profound
demonstration of equality,  a case of verification,  a sharing of a common
stage. By enacting her paradoxical status to the court—equal to men on the
scaffold, not equal to men in the assembly—De Gouges was able to extract
“woman” from the confines of its allotted position as a gender or identity
and recast it the name of a subject with new visibility and new relations.100 
 “Proletarian.”  We discover  a similar  case with the term “proletarian.”  In
Latin, proletarii simply means “prolific people,” those who merely produce
(and reproduce) without name and without status. It thus provided a fitting
name for the industrial labourers of the 19th century. As Rancière recalls, one
100 Jacques Rancière, “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, 68.
Also see Simons and Masschelein, “Governmental, Political and Pedagogic Subjectivation: Foucault with
Rancière,” 594-6. 
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of its earliest and most notable uses in this sense was during the trial of
revolutionary  socialist  Auguste  Blanqui,  charged  with  rebellion  in  1832.
When  asked  his  profession  by  the  magistrate,  Blanqui  simply  replied
“proletarian.” When met with objection, Blanqui responded brazenly that it
is  the  profession  of  thirty  million  Frenchmen  who  live  off  their  labour
deprived of political  rights.  So once again,  we encounter something of a
contradiction: for proletarian is indeed no profession in the sense of a proper
occupation or trade and Blanqui himself, educated both in medicine and law,
was certainly no typical worker. And yet, as Rancière demonstrates, what
Blanqui’s  statement  forced  the  court  to  acknowledge  is  proletarian  as  a
class. Since his archival work in the 1970s, Rancière has long rejected the
proletariat  as  a  distinct  sociological  entity,  as  a  coherent  social  group,
culture or ethos. Rather, as Blanqui testifies, it is the name those who do not
count, those without rights, those without representation. It is not simply the
general name of manual labourers or of workers collectively, but the name
of  a  political  subject,  one  that  disturbs  the  meaning  of  “worker”  and
“labourer,”  drawing them out  of their  obviousness,  their  natural  place in
society. Proletariat is the politicisation of a class, the name that distinguishes
the working class as a political problem.101 
 “Jew.” Finally, there are also occasions when the name of a political subject
101 Jacques Rancière,  “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization.”  October vol. 61: (Summer 1992): 60-1
and Disagreement:  Politics  and  Philosophy,  37-8.  Also  see  Labelle,  “Two  Refoundation  Projects  of
Democracy in Contemporary French Philosophy: Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancière,” 91-2.
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remains entirely distinct from the identity of the group that adopts it and
puts  its  forward  as  a  political  name.  This  was  certainly  the  case  when,
during  May  ’68,  tens  of  thousands  of  French  demonstrators  marched
through Paris chanting the slogan: “We are all German Jews” (nous sommes
tous des  Juifs  allemands).  Originally something of an anti-Semitic  slight
levelled  against  Daniel  Cohn-Bendit,  a  prominent  student  organiser  with
German-Jewish  heritage,  “German  Jew”  was  quickly  reappropriated  and
universalised  by the  movement  itself,  clearly drawing on the  still  recent
memory of the profound injustices associated with this precarious status in
Nazi Germany. It was not a matter of identification, declaring all those in the
streets  victims  or  potential  victims  of  the  State.  Nor  was  it  a  matter  of
exploiting the moral atrocities of the Holocaust by associating the conditions
in  France  with  that  of  the  concentration  camps.  Far  from  a  rhetorical
strategy, for Rancière, what it signals is a process of subjectivation, one that
allowed for a defiant political entity to espouse the cause of the Other: the
Algerian, the worker, the poor. It was a way to discover a collective “we”
that was not there before. “German Jew” was simply the name to assemble
this “we” and to express this cause. Rather than a descriptive term intended
to  identify  all  those  demonstrating  in  the  streets,  for  Rancière,  what  it
designates is an “impossible identification,” functioning to declassify “Jew”
a persecuted people or ethnic group and refashion it a name for an emergent
political subject composed of a diverse body of workers, students and other
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actors. In this sense, much like “pleb,” “woman” and “proletarian,” it is the
name not of a people, class or demographic, but the name of a wrong, a gap,
a miscount that identifies a surplus or residue in the count of the police.102
Accordingly, political subjectivation should not be confused as the formula
for  an  identity  politics.  For  its  struggle  is  not  primarily  one  of  identity,  but  of
recognition.103 Rancière  maintains  that  politics  is  never  simply  an  assertion  of
identity, but at the same time its disavowal: a refusal or denial of the function, role
or place that one has been assigned. Marx clearly understands the proletariat, for
example,  as  the  name of  the  class  that  represents  the  dissolution  of  itself  as  a
class.104 The names of politics are the names of a wrong, a miscount, a misnomer.
For this reason, there are no proper names for the political subject; they must be
invented, borrowed, modified. If anything, this is a process of  declassification  or
disidentification.  When  names  become  political,  that  is  to  say,  when  particular
distributed identities stray from their allotted place, their inherent or natural station
and emerge the names of the uncounted, the excluded, contradicting the count of the
police, they shift to a space of subjectivation losing all reference to a sociological
specificity and subsequently open to anyone.105 If politics is not centred around an
102 Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 59. Also see  Kristin Ross,  May ’ 68 and its Afterlives
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 57-8.
103 Deranty, “Jacques Rancière’s Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition,” 146-7.
104 Karl Marx,  “Critique of Hegel’s  Philosophy of Right:  Introduction,”  Early Writings (London:  Penguin
Books, 1992), 256.
105 See Jacques Ranciere, Max Blechman, Anita Chari and Rafeeq Hasan, “Democracy, Dissensus and the
Aesthetics of Class Struggle: An Exchange with Jacques Rancière,” Historical Materialism vol. 13, iss. 4
(2005):  290.  This  process is not dissimilar  from what  Deleuze will  conceive as  becoming-minoritarian
(devenir-minoritaire).  See Gilles  Deleuze  and  Felix Guattari,  A  Thousand  Plateaus:  Capitalism  and
Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
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identitarian self,  it  is because it always passes through the location of the Other
(heteron) or the self as Other: the logic of subjectivation is always heterological.106
The political  subject is simply the form that binds the name of the Other to an
axiomatic  claim of  equality  (politics’ only universal).  This  is  true  even  for  the
subject  of human rights,  in which “human” corresponds not  to  the species as a
whole or to a form of bare life, but appears a litigious name of the disenfranchised,
the subaltern,  those without  part,  which may be invoked by anyone to  assert  a
fundamental equality.107 Once again, this testifies to the underlying indeterminacy of
human rights on which Lefort writes extensively. 
Therefore,  beyond his indispensable analysis  of the  archê,  what  Rancière
contributes to a theory of democracy’s against is the groundwork for a concept of
the  principal  agent  through  which  this  against  will  be  typically  expressed:  the
political  subject.  Democracy cannot be thought in terms of institutions alone.  It
requires a subject and it is only through the agency of this subject that democracy’s
opposition to what it is against will be initiated and set in motion. This is what is
essential  to  our  study  here.  In  his  own  analysis,  Rancière  explores  this  theme
primarily  in  the  context  of  the  police.  Drawing  from Foucault,  whose  research
serves to broaden our general formulation of government substantially, the police is
indicative  of  a  project  of  intervention,  of  social  ordering,  of  implementing  the
106 Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization,” 59-60.
107 Andrew Schaap, “Enacting the Right to Have Rights:  Jacques Rancière’s Critique of Hannah Arendt,”
European Journal of Political Theory vol. 10, no. 1 (January 2011): 23.
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proper order of society. For Rancière, this operation has a symbolic dimension. The
police is a regime of representation, a government of the sensible, an administration
and management  of what is visible, what is thinkable and what is possible. It not
only concerns the partition of the social, the dividing up of parts and shares, but the
very modes of  perception in  which those divisions and allocations are  rendered
intelligible. Extrapolated from a ubiquitous governmental technology particular to
early modern Europe and identified as a formula generally applicable to various
societies past and present, what Rancière understands as the police will inevitably
take on many different forms. Nevertheless, although he certainly maintains that
some orders of the police remain infinitely preferable to others, Rancière will offer
no  systematic  historical  or  typological  evaluation  of  these  significant  formal
variations, but instead concentrates his analysis exclusively on the politics in which
the police comes to be disrupted, suspended, modified. While the manifestation of
such  counter-powers  do  not  go  unnoticed  in  his  own  work,  this  is  something
Foucault himself will never adequately develop.108 
Hence, rather than a descriptive, historical or sociological analysis, Rancière
offers a consistent theoretical perspective  against the police.  And yet, despite its
more nuanced characterisation as a distribution of the sensible, Rancière is certainly
not the first to outline a detailed theoretical opposition to the police in this manner.
At the dawn of a new era that would witness the dominion of the absolutist State
108 See  Simons  and  Masschelein,  “Governmental,  Political  and  Pedagogic  Subjectivation:  Foucault  with
Rancière,”  603  and  McSweeney,  “Giving  Politics  an  Edge:  Rancière  and  the  Anarchic  Principle  of
Democracy,” 124.
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begin to fall into decline, this is a theme that extends across many of the major texts
of classical liberalism where the limits of the State are routinely called into question
and a new language of naturalism and non-interventionism is advanced.109 But what
is more unprecedented is a theory of an emancipatory politics that grounds a radical
conception  of  democracy according  to  a  definitive  challenge  to  the  police  as  a
general  state  of  society.  Rancière’s  model  of  democracy is  one  of  a  democracy
against the police, a democracy that calls into question the basis of a given social
order and tests the limits of what is perceptible in society.  This is what is entirely
new. For Rancière, the conditions for democracy are nothing beyond the general
order of the police itself. The police is at once its point of departure and its object of
dispute. As  we  have  seen,  democracy  undermines  the  police  distribution  by
introducing new subjects, new names and new voices that were not there before. It
initiates a disagreement over what it means to speak, what it means to be seen and
what it means to have a part. By dislodging subjects from their “proper place,” by
demonstrating a certain equality,  democracy may therefore be understood as the
reinvention of a relation, the rearrangement of a territory and the reconfiguration of
a sensible field. Democracy not only has the capacity to transform social relations,
but  the  very  manner  in  which  we  come  to  perceive  one  another,  our  basic
interactions and the spaces that we inhabit  in common. It  is  in this respect that
Rancière’s  democracy  against  the  police  may  be  appreciated  as  a  politics  of
aesthetics.
109 See for example Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993) and
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Books, 1985).
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And while some readers of  Disagreement find this account of democracy
rather  limited,  ultimately content with a subversive politics that appears  to only
momentarily disturb the smooth working order of a given police order, what this
familiar criticism often fails to consider is the larger perspective that orients the
general  framework  of  Rancière’s  critical  project.  From  peasants  to  artisans  to
industrial labourers to the poor, the predominate figures and themes that populate
Rancière’s political works will testify to a broader critique of domination that from
beginning to end is dedicated to a detailed examination of how the limits of what is
political  are perpetually challenged by those who are most excluded. And as an
historical  archivist  as  well  as  a  theorist  of  politics,  one  thing  that  Rancière’s
extensive  body of  research  will  demonstrate  as  a  whole is  that  emancipation is
anything but a series of fleeting rebellious acts  leading nowhere.  In response to
those critics of Disagreement Rancière thus refutes:
I don’t have a vision of history as punctuated equilibrium, where
things erupt at intervals and then lapse back into platitude. [...] I
didn’t mean to suggest that equality exists only on the barricades,
and that once the barricades come down it’s over, and we go back
to listlessness. I am not a thinker of the event, of the upsurge, but
rather of emancipation as something with its own tradition, with a
history that isn’t just made up of great striking deeds, but also of
the ongoing effort to create forms of the common different from
the ones on offer from the State [...].110   
However  fragmentary  or  intermittent,  for  Rancière,  emancipation  represents  a
protracted,  enduring  process  worthy  of  the  terms  “history”  and  “tradition.”
Accordingly, his understanding of emancipation cannot be reduced to a science of
110 Jacques  Rancière  and  Eric  Hazan,  “Democracies  Against  Democracy,” Giorgio  Agamben,  et  al.,
Democracy in What State? (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 79-80.
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isolated moments. Just as we will see with Abensour, the meaning of emancipation
is  bound  to  a  perpetual  struggle  against  strategies  of  inequality  and  modes  of
domination, some specific to modernity, some seemingly age-old. It is precisely in
this context of a broader history or tradition of emancipation that Rancière’s model
of a democracy against the police must be situated. It is precisely in this context that
we may consider Rancière’s concept of democracy according to a broader theory of
democratisation.
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5
Model II:
democracy against the State
(Abensour)
In democracy the State as particular is only particular, and as universal 
it is the real universal; i.e. it is not something determinate set off against 
other contents. In the modern times the French have understood this to 
mean that in true democracy the political State disappears.
-Karl Marx
Democracy is the determinate institution of a conflictual space, a space 
against, an agonistic stage on which two antagonistic logics confront 
one another: the autonomisation of the State as form, and the life of the 
people as action, political action.
-Miguel Abensour
Rancière’s democracy against the police theorises a democracy that opposes
a general order of society in which the coordination and classification of the social
is determined in advance. It disputes that women have a proper place, the working
class  an  inherent  function.  In  this  view,  what  democracy  rejects  is  the  very
aspiration of implementing the proper order of society, a productive, harmonious
society that functions without interruption and without dispute. This is precisely the
society that politics renders inconceivable. For Rancière, politics exists insofar as
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singular forms of subjectivation open and reveal a gap in the symbolic order of the
community.  Accordingly,  in  this  model,  democracy’s  being-against  will  be
expressed primarily through the manifestation of a political subject that challenges
the prevailing government of the sensible via a defiant demonstration of equality.
What may be extracted from Rancière’s model, therefore, is the general postulate
that the agents of democracy’s against, its powers or forces, are in no way abstract
or indeterminable, but embodied in the political acts of a subject. Even if Rancière’s
general  account  of  the  police  is  ultimately  found  to  remain  ambiguous  or
incomplete,  this  is  what  is  indispensable  to  our  concept  of  democracy  here.
Democracy is the story of how those who lack political agency come to have it.
Before the name of a regime, before a set of institutions, democracy is the act of a
subject.  Traditionally  this  subject  is  known as  the  demos.  Particularly  apparent
when his project is taken as a whole, far from a fleeting disturbance of the police
order,  Rancière will  want  to  situate  such political  acts,  as  we concluded above,
according to a broader history or tradition of emancipation. 
And  yet,  of  the  two,  perhaps  it  is  Abensour  who  will  establish  this
connection  between  democracy,  emancipation  and  being-against  in  a  more
definitive  manner.  We have  already explored  Abensour’s  vivid  interpretation  of
savage  democracy as  the  emancipatory  act  of  politics,  but  until  now,  we  have
largely only encountered Abensour as just that: an interpreter, an advocate, a reader
of Lefort and Arendt. We now have the opportunity to examine Abensour’s thought
on  democracy  in  its  own  right.  While  in  many  respects,  Abensour’s  general
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approach to  the  question  of  democracy may be  seen  to  be initiated  through an
expressly Lefortian paradigm, at the same time, his concept of democracy reveals a
decisive shift in emphasis from a form of political regime to a form of political
action.1 Abensour takes Lefort’s familiar characterisation of democracy as an open,
interminable  political  experience,  for  example,  as  a  testament  to  its  perpetual
reinvention of forms of political  action against  various  modes of  domination in
society. This is emblematic, no doubt, of Abensour’s longstanding appeal to that
savage dimension of  Lefort’s  thought,  a  dimension that  in  no  way restricts  the
construction  of  his  own conception  of  democracy,  but  quite  the  opposite,  helps
propel  that  concept  across  new  limits  and  boundaries.  In  this  respect,  with
Abensour, we can witness Lefort’s savage democracy, as an experimental strategy
to liberate democracy in thought, very much put to use in a creative and productive
way. In Abensour’s work, democracy appears not as a legitimate means to govern
another, but as an agency of transformation and democratisation in society. It is for
this  reason  that  his  theses  are  often  taken  to  parallel  those  of  Rancière.  For
Abensour, democracy is, in essence, something other than regime. It is the distinct
activity of the demos that opens up that unique political field in which conflict is
able to unfold, new social bonds are able to be forged and the desire for freedom
and autonomy is able to be expressed. As the form of collective action that seeks to
institute inclusive, participatory and non-hierarchical models of social interaction, it
binds a notion of social emancipation to that enduring political project to establish a
1 James D. Ingram, Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2013), 199.
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state of non-domination. To this vision of democracy, Abensour will at times give
the name “insurgent” democracy, a deliberately polemical term that not only intends
to mark out and distinguish his own concept of democracy from that of Lefort, but
at the same time, to identify the “natural” target of what he understands as one of
democracy’s most vital conflicts: the State itself.2 Consequently, his reference to an
insurgent democracy will at once seek to affirm two axioms:           
First,  that  democracy is not a political  regime but primarily an
action,  a  modality  of  political  agency,  characterized  by  the
irruption of the  demos,  or the people, onto the political stage in
their struggle against those whom Machiavelli calls the grandees
and for the establishment in the city of a state of non-domination.
Second, that this political  action is not confined to a particular
moment but continues through time, always ready to spring up
due  to  the  obstacles  encountered.  It  involves  the  birth  of  a
complex process, where the social is instituted and the institution
directed at  non-domination,  one permanently inventing itself  to
better  perpetuate  its  existence  and  to  defeat  the  counter-
movements that threaten to annihilate it and to effect a return to a
state of domination.3
This  is  the  democracy that  Abensour  posits  against  the concentration  of  power,
against  the  rigid  hierarchies  that  permeate  so  much  of  our  society,  against  the
underlying  logic  of  the  archê and  likewise,  against  the  State.  If  Abensour  sees
democracy and the State as fundamentally antithetical, antagonistic and ultimately
irreconcilable,  it  is  because  beyond  its  given  apparatus  or  particular  historical
incarnation, he identifies the State-form as the constitution of the social abstracted
from  the  political  dimension  of  its  very  institution.  For  Abensour,  the  State
2 See  Miguel  Abensour,  “Of  Insurgent  Democracy,”  Democracy  Against  the  State:  Marx  and  the
Machiavellian Moment (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
3 Miguel  Abensour,  “Insurgent  Democracy and Institution,”  Democracy Against the State: Marx and the
Machiavellian Moment, xxiii-xxiv.
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represents the alienation of the self-institution of the demos, the formal separation
of  the  constitution  of  the  social  from  the  originary  subject  that  institutes  it.
Democracy, conversely, is understood as the activity that opposes the autonomy of
the State, that obstructs this abstraction and monopolisation of the political moment.
Democracy is  the struggle for  the self-determination of  the  demos.  It  generates
modes of association other than those mediated by the State, inventing new and
inclusive  ways  of  engaging  collectively  in  a  distinctively  public  space.  It
transforms, as it were, the “power over men” into a “power with and among men,”
or invoking Spinoza, into the “power to act.”4 In this view, democracy’s power of
the people appears as the power to resist the State, its form, its logic, summoning
forth new and alternative possibilities of social organisation and social bonds. If
Abensour appeals to the term  insurgent to incite such a democracy, in part, it  is
because he regards the very idea of democracy to challenge what is most essential
to the State itself.    
Abensour’s model of democracy is thus explicitly expressed as a democracy
against, a democracy that both discovers its origins and determines its orientation
according  to  its  immanent  relation  to  a  particular  object  which  it  must  refute,
oppose and ultimately seek to undermine. And yet, this is precisely the account of
democracy that would give Marcel Gauchet cause, in a collection of interviews, to
completely  dismiss  and  discredit  Abensour’s  work  as  mere  “revoltism,”  as
“irresponsible  radicalism,”  an  “aesthetics  of  intransigence”  leading  to  the
4 Miguel Abensour and Michel Enaudeau,  La communauté politique des “tous uns”: désir de liberté, désir
d’utopie (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2014), 94.
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“corruption of democracy.”5 In response to these charges by his former colleague
and one time collaborator, Abensour would, in turn, pen an open letter that would
only reaffirm his commitment to a notion of modern democracy that is not only
born of a revolutionary moment, but whose very constitution remains indicative of
an ongoing revolutionary impulse to confront and contest those very institutions and
technologies  that  serve  to  obstruct  its  democratising  initiatives,  domesticate  its
savage forces and reconcile its broader objectives with those of the State:  
democracy  is  not  a  crystallised  form  [...]  that  establishes  an
organisation  of  powers  and  rules  of  the  game;  it  is  rather  a
continuous  movement,  a  political  action  that  in  its  very
manifestation  works  to  undo  the  State-form  […]  in  order  to
replace it with its own, that of the sovereign people, by struggling
against  its  mystificatory  reconciliations  and  fallacious
integrations.  Democracy  is  the  determinate  institution  of  a
conflictual space, a space against, an agonistic stage upon which
two antagonistic logics confront one another: the autonomisation
of the State as form, and the life of the people as action, political
action.6
For Abensour, democracy is the name of that which sets up this essential opposition
between the political  activity of the demos and the principles of the State.  It  is
precisely this “institution of a conflictual space, a space against” that concerns us
here. It is precisely this democracy against the State that Abensour develops in what
is often regarded as his most experimental text. Here, working primarily through the
5 Marcel Gauchet, La condition historique (Paris: Stock, 2003), 160. Also see James D. Ingram, “The Politics
of Claude Lefort’s Political: Between Liberalism and Radical Democracy,”  Thesis Eleven  vol. 87, iss. 1
(2006): 41.
6 Miguel Abensour, “Lettre d’un ‘révoltiste’ à Marcel Gauchet converti à la ‘politique normale’,” Réfractions
no. 12, 2004: 164 as quoted in Ingram, “The Politics of Claude Lefort’s Political: Between Liberalism and
Radical Democracy,” 44. For a detailed comparison of the projects of Abensour and Gauchet as “students”
of Lefort see Ingram’s article. For additional insights into Abensour’s polemical response to Gauchet  see
Warren  Breckman,  Adventures  of  the  Symbolic:  Post-Marxism  and  Radical  Democracy (New  York:
Columbia University Press, 2013), 180-1.
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writings of the young Marx, Abensour offers a detailed, rather idiosyncratic analysis
of what Marx postulates, in direct contradistinction to Hegel, as “true democracy,”
the democracy in which the State  itself,  as an abstract  or alien form, is  said to
disappear.  Ultimately  interpreted  as  the  struggle  for  self-institution  and  self-
determination in a defiantly public space, what is at stake for such a democracy,
according to Abensour, is nothing less than the autonomy of the political itself. It is
for this reason that Abensour, borrowing a phrase from J. G. A. Pocock, identifies
Marx’s early work as a “Machiavellian moment.”7 Accordingly,  it  is Abensour’s
democracy against  the  State  that  will  serve  as  our  second  theoretical  model  to
investigate democracy’s being-against.    
Insofar as Abensour situates this democracy against the State according to
the broader struggle against social domination, his writings will tend to frame the
concept  of  democracy in  terms of  a  continuous,  multifaceted  and ever-evolving
emancipatory  politics.  Indeed,  perhaps  Abensour  understands  the  meaning  of
emancipation  as  just  that:  not  so  much  as  the  state of  being  liberated  from
domination, but much like Rancière, as the ongoing process or struggle against it.
Consequently, emancipation can never be dissociated in Abensour’s work from an
enduring  project  of  democratisation,  a  project  predominantly  propelled  by  the
persistent  political  activity  of  the  demos  against  those  forms  of  domination  it
encounters, confronts and contests in society. And yet, alongside and inextricably
7 J. G. A. Pocock,  The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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interwoven  with  such  direct  political  activity,  perhaps  equally  essential  to
Abensour’s understanding of emancipation is the permanent critique of domination
itself,  the  meticulous  theoretical  evaluation  of  both  those  archaic  modes  of
domination that seem so universal throughout history as well as new strategies of
domination  that  continually  seem  to  appear  with  new  institutions  and  new
technologies.8 It  is  here  where  Abensour  locates  the  political  and emancipatory
potential of philosophy. Despite having long acknowledged the considerable deficits
of what Arendt understands as the “tradition of political philosophy” and hence, of
the so-called “return to political philosophy” which he takes to merely announce the
fashionable resurgence of  its  established practices  and attitudes  in  his  own day,
Abensour  will nevertheless  affirm  the  importance  of  a  rigorous  philosophical
analysis  of those very problems which he deciphers as central  to the matters of
politics itself, namely, the essential relation between domination and emancipation
in  society.  For  Abensour,  the  value  of  philosophy is  its  unrivalled  capacity  to
grapple  with  a  series  of  fundamental  political  questions:  what  is  the  nature  of
freedom? How do we distinguish between power, authority and domination? How
do we  distinguish  between  politics  and  the  State?  What  does  it  mean  to  think
politics in the context of a society against the State?9 Drawing heavily from Lefort’s
lengthy  interpretive  study  of  Machiavelli,  Abensour  maintains  that  if  political
philosophy cannot  be reduced to  the management  of  the established order,  it  is
8 See Martin Breaugh, “Critique de la domination, pensée de l’émancipation. Sur la philosophie politique de
Miguel Abensour,” Politique et Sociétés vol. 22, no. 3 (2003) and Gilles Labelle, “La philosophie politique
et le ‘choix du petit’ dans le travail de Miguel Abensour,” Monde Commun vol. 1, no. 1 (automne 2007).
9 Miguel Abensour, “De quel retour s’agit-il?” Les Cahiers de Philosophie no. 18 (1994): 8.
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because it  remains indispensable to the critical  reformulation of the meaning of
emancipation in the “here and now” (hic et nunc).10 It is here where Abensour will
dramatically  distinguish  his  own  approach  from  that  of  Rancière.  While  he
commends Rancière’s contribution to the critique of domination in the form of the
police,  Abensour  questions  why  Rancière  must  so  vehemently  distance  such  a
critique from political  philosophy itself,  effectively relinquishing its  critical  and
emancipatory potential on account of its traditional indictment of democracy and
customary defence of various autocratic regimes.11 Alternatively, more in the tenor
of Arendt and Lefort, Abensour will opt to pit political philosophy against its very
tradition  in  the  attempt  to  exploit  philosophy’s  unequalled  powers  of  critique,
theoretical  construction  and  interminable  interrogation  for  renewed  political
purposes.  Therefore,  contrary to  both  the  restoration  of  the  practice  of  political
philosophy in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle  and the academic revival  of a
discipline that seemingly privileges the canonical history of political thought over
the issues of the present day, Abensour calls for an engaged philosophical critique
of  social  domination  organised  specifically  to  contribute  to  the  emancipatory
struggles  of  today.12 Akin  to  Marx’s  celebrated  eleventh  thesis  on  Feuerbach,
Abensour is compelled by a notion of philosophy that not only interprets the world,
but longs to participate in changing it. This is not a philosophy that simply reflects
upon the abstract topics of politics;  this is a philosophy that must itself  become
10 Miguel Abensour, “Philosophie politique critique et émancipation?,”  Politique et Sociétés vol. 22, no. 3,
(2003): 120. 
11 Miguel  Abensour, “Pour  une  philosophie  politique  critique?,” Pour  une  philosophie  politique  critique
(Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2009), 286.
12 Patrice Vermeren, “Equality and Democracy,” Diogenes vol. 55, no. 4 (2008): 59.
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political.  While  philosophy  can  never  replace  the  necessity  of  direct  political
activity,  what it  can provide is a critical conceptual framework through which a
spectrum of  contemporary  social  and  political  problems  may  be  navigated  and
evaluated in the larger emancipatory project towards a state of non-domination. To
this end, as we have already encountered, Abensour will advance a critico-utopian
or critical political philosophy.
It  is  possible  to  isolate  and identify three facets  of Abensour’s proposed
model of political thought: a critical political philosophy is one that maintains a
tenacious orientation towards social emancipation, offers a detailed critical analysis
of the relations, institutions and technologies of domination and never obscures the
vital  distinction  between  domination  and  politics  itself.13 As  demonstrated  in  a
series  of  closely  related  essays,  Abensour  formulates  the  basis  of  his  critical
political philosophy through a unique intersection of the most constructive elements
of critical theory and political philosophy while avoiding what he understands as
the  many  pitfalls  that  plague  both  theoretical  types.  On  the  one  hand,  while
Abensour  discerns  critical  theory  (Frankfurt  School)  to  contain  a  rich,
comprehensive socio-critical evaluation of modern systems of authority that is in no
way limited  to  a  Marxist  theory of  economic  exploitation,  at  the  same time,  it
appears to suffer from a curious silence on the nature of political liberty itself, as if
it can envisage emancipation only in terms of a freedom from politics altogether.
On the other hand, while Abensour regards more traditional examples of political
13 Abensour, “Pour une philosophie politique critique?,” 267. 
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philosophy (presumably Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Rousseau, etc.) as more inclined
to consider experimental scenarios of alternative political constitutions, even if only
ideal  or imagined constructions,  at  the same time,  it  often appears incapable of
conceiving political liberty outside the context of a completely unified sovereign
space that not only mysteriously lacks any acknowledgement of social domination,
but  the  inevitable  conflict  and  division  that  may  threaten  to  disturb  its  serene
tranquillity. Accordingly, the passage through the crossroads between critical theory
and political philosophy must carefully navigate two paradigms simultaneously: a
“catastrophic” vision of domination indicative of a total  domination lacking any
conceivable opening for political transformation or means of escape and an “irenic”
vision of politics indicative of a politics that not only neglects or conceals the theme
of domination entirely, but the very conflict and division that remains so essential to
the meaning of politics itself.14 Therefore, through a series of delicate manoeuvres,
Abensour  will  distinguish  a  critical  political  philosophy as  the  philosophy that
locates the very condition of emancipation precisely in the political conflict against
social domination itself. Although he applauds the political works of Arendt and
Lefort  as prime examples of philosophies that successfully avoid the hazards of
both paradigmatic tendencies, Abensour discovers something of a rare forerunner of
the critical  political  thinker with none other than Machiavelli himself.  It  is with
Machiavelli,  Abensour contends,  that we encounter the first  traces of a political
theory able to identify the “cradle of political liberty” in the very context of the
14 Ibid., 294.  Also see Abensour and Enaudeau,  La communauté politique des “tous uns”: désir de liberté,
désir d’utopie, chapter 6.  
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struggle of the people against the dominance of the ruling classes.15 Contrary to the
still prevailing views of Machiavelli as the prototypical “realist” (Croce) or quite
simply “teacher of evil” (Strauss), Abensour regards Machiavelli as something of a
political educator who has the unique ability to help us rethink the nature of politics
anew.16 A great admirer of the tremendous achievement of Lefort’s  Le travail de
l’oeuvre, beyond the opposing architectonics of the republic and the principality,
Abensour reads Machiavelli to uncover something of the basic ontological status of
politics  itself:  rather  than identify the roots  of  political  liberty in  the unity and
harmony  of  the  well  ordered  city,  drawing  from  the  experience  of  Rome,
Machiavelli  demonstrates  that  it  is  in  fact  social  division,  conflict,  discord—
particularly the  clash  of  opposing classes  or  social  groups—that  constitutes  the
essence of an intrinsically contingent and unstable political field.17 This is the basis
of Abensour’s allusion to the “originary division of the social” that we encountered
in  chapter  3.  Much  like  Aristotle,  Machiavelli  tends  to  approach  the  general
question of the social through the seemingly universal division between rich and
poor, the few and the many, the rulers and the ruled. And yet, beyond the clash of
these  two  competing  socio-economic  groups,  in  both  The  Discourses and  The
Prince, Machiavelli will relate this division to a more underlying conflict between
15 Abensour,  “Philosophie  politique  critique  et  émancipation?,”  137  and  “Pour  une  philosophie  politique
critique?,” 311-13. 
16 Martin Breaugh, “From a Critique of Totalitarian Domination to the Utopia of Insurgent Democracy: On the
‘Political  Philosophy’ of  Miguel  Abensour,”  Thinking  Radical  Democracy:  The  Return  to  Politics  in
Postwar France, Martin Breaugh, Christopher Holman et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015),
240.
17 See Abensour’s comments in “Sur le chemin de Machiavel,” Pour une philosophie politique critique. Also
see Claude Lefort,  Machiavelli  in the Making (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012), Part  3,
chapter 3.
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two distinct  psychological  types  (umori):  the  grandees’ desire  to  command  and
dominate  and  the  people’s  desire  not  to  be  dominated.18 Note  that  the  implicit
orientation of these opposing humours or ambitions are in no way equivalent. While
one  class  is  defined  by  its  inclined  disposition  towards  social  dominance  and
ascendency,  the  other  simply  expresses  a  negation.  Perhaps  a  uniquely
Machiavellian  conception  of  democracy  could  be  said  to  begin  here:  with  the
problem of how to formally institute the desire not to be dominated. Regardless, it
is precisely this irreducible conflict of the people against the indissoluble threat of
oppression—a conflict which extends well beyond Marx’s materialist conception of
a historically resolvable class struggle—that Machiavelli  identifies as the source
and origin of the liberty and “good laws” of the Roman republic. It is for this reason
that the Florentine secretary ultimately identifies the people, rather than the wealthy
few, as the rightful guardians of liberty.19 Consequently, it is against the backdrop of
Machiavelli, or at least a Lefortian interpretation of Machiavelli, that Abensour will
frame his  construction  of  a  critical  political  philosophy specifically designed to
conceptualise the emancipatory dimension of social conflict integral to democratic
politics. For as we saw in his essay on savage democracy, for Abensour, democracy
implies  just  that:  not  only the  recognition,  but  the  elaboration of  the  originary
division of the social, the affirmation, investment and political expression of social
conflict as the “originary source of an ever renewed invention of liberty.”20      
18 Niccolò  Machiavelli,  The  Discourses (London:  Penguin  Books,  2003),  116  and  The  Prince (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1998), 39.
19 Machiavelli, The Discourses, 116.
20 Miguel Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the  ‘Principle of Anarchy’,”  Democracy Against the State:
Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 105.
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From Machiavelli  to  Arendt  and Lefort  to  the  Frankfurt  School  to  more
traditional  examples  of  political  philosophy,  Abensour  assembles  his  proposed
model of political thought from a broad range of sources. And yet, in addition to
this  rather  unique  amalgamation  of  theoretical  tools  at  his  disposal,  perhaps
Abensour would qualify that a critical political philosophy only achieves the height
of its emancipatory potential when it renders its critique utopian in form. Although
the concept of utopia understandably acquires a rather contentious status in 20th
century social and political theory, it nevertheless remains a prominent motif across
much of Abensour’s work from the very beginning.21 If we cut across his many
writings  that  touch  upon  this  theme,  Abensour  argues  that  utopian  literatures
(political, literary or otherwise) cannot ultimately be appropriated as blueprints or
programmes for the ideal society; they present no specific goals to be achieved,
places to be discovered or fantasies to be realised.22 Rather than the promise of
paradise, rather than a vision of some sheltered, static, harmonious existence, what
interests Abensour about utopia, more structurally, is precisely what it can do to
political  thought:  how  it  can  shift  our  perspective,  how  it  can  redirect  our
orientation, how it can inform our desire. Particularly in his earlier work, much of
Abensour’s study of utopia is centred around the thesis that utopia has the capacity
to both inspire and educate an emancipatory desire.23 By opening up the possibility
21 Utopia,  for  example,  is  the  principal  topic  of  Abensour’s  doctoral  thesis  “Les  Formes  de  L’Utopie
Socialiste-Communiste” completed under the supervision of Gilles Deleuze in 1973.  
22 Breaugh,  “From a  Critique  of  Totalitarian  Domination  to  the  Utopia  of  Insurgent  Democracy:  On the
‘Political Philosophy’ of Miguel Abensour,” 245. 
23 See Christine Nadir’s helpful essay “Utopian Studies, Environmental Literature, and the Legacy of an Idea:
Educating Desire in Miguel Abensour and Ursula K. Le Guin,” Utopian Studies vol. 21, no. 1 (2010). Also
see Ruth Levitas, Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society (Houndmills and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 113-16.
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of a world other than what is, by constructing a new relation between the actual and
the possible, utopias can disrupt the closure of the present and provoke a restless,
revolutionary appetite for change. For Abensour, utopias remind us that the world is
not  fixed,  not  determinate,  not  absolute.  Accordingly,  they  can  function  to
emancipate  the  imagination,  motivate  political  action  and  foster  a “stubborn
impulse toward liberty and justice.”24 Far from a sublimated expression of wish-
fulfilment,  the concept of utopia can therefore be taken as a symbol of hope in
politics, as the desire for a better world than the one we have today. In this respect,
as the perspective that adopts a critical relation to the present in the hopes of a
better future to come, what Abensour calls the  utopian will be found to resemble
what Nietzsche calls the untimely.
Of particular interest to Abensour is a distinct tendency in modern utopian
thought that he often designates the  new utopian spirit (associated primarily with
William Morris, Pierre Leroux, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Martin Buber and
Emmanuel  Levinas).25 After  the  catastrophic  failure  of  the  1848  revolutions,
Abensour detects a decisive shift in the tone of utopian literature that would extend
well  into  the  20th century  experience  of  totalitarianism  itself.  Introspective,
sceptical, self-critical, this new mode of utopian thought would not only recognise,
but  incorporate  the  criticisms  and suspicions  that  came to  surround the  utopian
movement  into  its  very  concept  of  utopia  itself,  shattering  its  mythology  and
24 Miguel Abensour, “Persistent Utopia,” Constellations vol. 15, iss. 3 (2008): 407. 
25 See Miguel Abensour, “L’histoire de l’utopie et le destin de sa critique,” Textures no. 6/7 (1973) and no. 8/9
(1974).
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refining  its  uses.26 Perhaps  most  important  for  a  critical  political  philosophy,
characteristic of this new utopian spirit is the persistent critique of how the desire
for emancipation so often turns into its opposite, how the utopian dream, as it were,
so often collapses into an authoritarian nightmare. For Abensour, this phenomenon
remains one of the prevailing political problems of our times. It is precisely for this
reason that he turns to utopian thought.  For it is the first task of the new utopian
spirit, according to Abensour, to break the circle of this “dialectic of emancipation,”
to  place  utopia  against  itself,  to  at  once  extract  its  political  and  emancipatory
potential, to draw out its revolutionary desire, while at the same time instructing this
desire in the risks of the utopia promise, thereby fashioning utopia into a critical
tool and preventing its  concept from settling into a model for society to simply
implement, realise or reproduce. What remains is the idea of utopia in pure form (as
a no-place (ou-topos), perhaps this is already inscribed in Thomas More’s original
concept  from  the  start).  By  voiding  itself  of  content—specific  goals,  designs,
destinations—utopia thus returns a strategy of critique, offering a critical evaluation
of both the conditions of our own society, as well as the desire for those conditions
to  be  otherwise.  This  is  precisely  what  interests  Abensour.  Utopias  offer  no
solutions,  no  explanations,  but  represent  a  critical  displacement  of  what  is  in
thought, inviting us to imagine the possibility of a radical alterity of the here and
now.27 As Deleuze will put it, the concept of utopia binds the critique of the present
26 Abensour, “Persistent Utopia,” 415. Also see Breaugh, “From a Critique of Totalitarian Domination to the
Utopia of Insurgent Democracy: On the ‘Political Philosophy’ of Miguel Abensour,” 247.
27 Abensour, “Persistent Utopia,” 407, 418.
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milieu to an absolute deterritorialisation of thought. Consequently, for Deleuze: “it
is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own
time to its highest point.”28 
Therefore, as the critique of our own time, as the push towards the different,
the possible, the otherwise, we may very well detect a certain  against  within the
structure of utopia itself.  If  we follow Abensour’s  analysis,  perhaps the utopian
experience could ultimately be described as  one of estrangement;  it  generates  a
certain distance, assumes a critical perspective, calls into question the status of the
existing state of affairs.29 Accordingly, utopia could be seen to initiate a mode of
political thought oriented against what is often taken as simply given in society. For
essential  to the utopian imagination is the capacity think otherwise, to resist the
present, to adopt a critical relation to what is. Utopia is the political expression of
thinking against. Although seldom a topic of utopian studies and rarely explored,
this  remains  an  indispensable  dimension of  utopian  thought.  As  soon as  utopia
breaks  with  a  representation  of  a  distant  mythical  paradise completely divorced
from our present experience and collides with the reality of our social conditions as
an instrument of critique, utopia will find expression in the distinctive form of an
against.  Perhaps  it  is  here  where Abensour  discovers  its  true political  potential.
Perhaps it is here where we will discover its connection with democracy. One of the
predominant  themes across Abensour’s work is  the precise relationship between
28 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 99.
Also see Eugene W. Holland, “The Utopian Dimension of Thought in Deleuze and Guattari,”Arena Journal
no. 25/26 (2006).
29 Levitas, Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society, 119.
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utopia and democracy,  a  problem that  is  ceaselessly being worked out  over  the
course of a series of writings.30 While Abensour clearly identifies both utopia and
democracy as examples of emancipatory projects, one at the level of thought, the
other at  the level of a social  collective,  perhaps their  most pronounced point of
intersection must ultimately be located here: with the against itself. Just as utopia
represents a distinct mode of thought oriented against the conditions of the present
and desires  their  transgression,  democracy represents  a  distinct  political  activity
oriented against the relations of domination and strives for their  transformation.
Hence, perhaps democracy could be said to be utopian insofar as it demonstrates the
capacity to think against the conditions of the present and utopia could be said to be
democratic  insofar  as  it  demonstrates  a  desire  for  a  more  participatory,  more
egalitarian society.  Although Abensour does not seek to  synthesise or assimilate
utopia  and democracy,  but  to  hold  their  intersection  perpetually in  tension,  one
drawing  from  the  other,31 this  at  least  provides  one  response  to  that  enduring
question he regards as so essential  to  modern political  thought:  how to at once
democratise utopia and utopianise (utopianiser) democracy?32 
Therefore, just as we were able to locate a savage dimension of Abensour’s
concept  of  democracy,  opening  up  that  concept  and  pushing  its  interpretation
towards its most radical point, perhaps we will likewise detect a distinct  utopian
30 Consider  for  example Abensour’s  more recent  “Utopie  et  démocratie,”  Pour une philosophie  politique
critique. Also see Paul Mazzocchi’s insightful essay “Excavating Abensour: The Dialectics of Democracy
and Utopia at a Standstill,” Constellations vol. 22, iss. 2 (June 2015).
31 Martin Breaugh, “Le lien social entre utopie et démocratie,”  Critique de la politique. Autour de Miguel
Abensour, eds. Anne Kupiec and Étienne Tassin (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2006), 91.
32 See Abensour, “Utopie et démocratie,” 350 as well as Abensour and Enaudeau,  La communauté politique
des “tous uns”: désir de liberté,  désir d’utopie,  381.  Also see  Nadir,  “Utopian Studies,  Environmental
Literature, and the Legacy of an Idea: Educating Desire in Miguel Abensour and Ursula K. Le Guin,” 28.
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dimension of that concept as well. For although utopia can provide no coherent
picture  of  the  form of  society that  democracy inevitably seeks  to  create,  if  we
follow Abensour, it  does very much embody the anatomy of the against that we
have found to be so imperative to democracy itself. Emancipatory, savage, utopian,
this  is  the  concept  of  democracy  that  Abensour’s  critical  political  philosophy
ventures to formulate. This is the democracy that he ultimately posits against the
State.  And  yet,  in  addition  to  savage  democracy  and  utopian  thought,  the
background to Abensour’s theory of democracy includes another important facet yet
be considered, namely, the source of its more comprehensive position against  the
State itself.  A decade before his  meditation on Marx’s “true democracy,” this  is
something that will first be encountered in a highly original critique of the political
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. 
The State, its origin, form and function, as well its position in the history of
political  thought,  is  a  problem  that  Abensour  will  initially  approach  via  the
anthropology of Pierre Clastres. In an important essay recently translated as “The
Counter-Hobbes of Pierre Clastres,”33 Abensour will appeal to Clastres as a means
to resist the widespread custom of political philosophy to represent the nature of
society as an experience of endless strife and instability which itself necessitates the
supremacy of the State as a separate, overarching power, a custom that Abensour
finds particularly emblematic of Hobbes’ Leviathan.34 As Abensour demonstrates,
33 Originally included in the commemorative volume edited by Abensour,  L’esprit des lois sauvages: Pierre
Clastres ou une nouvelle anthropologie politique (Paris: Seuil, 1987).
34 Miguel Abensour, “The Counter-Hobbes of Pierre Clastres,” Thinking Radical Democracy: The Return to
Politics  in  Postwar  France,  94.  For  further  elaboration  see Abensour  and  Enaudeau,  La communauté
politique des “tous uns”: désir de liberté, désir d’utopie, chapter 3.
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this counter-Hobbesian tendency that extends across Clastres’ work (perhaps most
explicit in Archaeology of Violence), can be taken to refute and even reverse many
of the English philosopher’s most underlying assumptions about societies, the State
and  societies  without  States.  From  Hobbes  to  Engels  to  many  of  his  own
contemporaries  in  the  field  of  political  anthropology,  Clastres’ work  highlights
modern political thought’s profound inability to approach those societies past and
present  that  lack a  State  from any perspective other  than that  of  State  societies
themselves.35 Perhaps this is most apparent with Hobbes himself. As is well known,
Hobbes’ contractualism moves to establish the necessity of the State by virtue of its
juxtaposition with its supposed opposite: the state of nature. Infamously defined as
the time of perpetual war of “every man against every man,” the state of nature
(which Hobbes would occasionally associate with the Indigenous peoples of the
Americas) is described as a condition marked precisely by the  absence of social
institutions, law and justice, peace and security, a condition in which human life,
plagued by constant danger and fear, is destined to remain “solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short.”36 Therefore, beyond the general distinction between instituted
society and this rather mythical state of nature, for Abensour, Hobbes can be read to
set up an even more dramatic opposition: that of the absolute sovereignty of the
State and the permanent state of war.37 Unifying the body politic in the singular will
of the sovereign,  Hobbes expounds the State as the formal transcendence of the
35 Abensour, “The Counter-Hobbes of Pierre Clastres,” 90-1.
36 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts One and Two (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), 106-7.
37 Abensour, “The Counter-Hobbes of Pierre Clastres,” 100.
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primal conditions of war; it is what abolishes, suppresses and overcomes the natural
causes  of  division,  conflict  and discord  consequential  of  human  nature.  This  is
precisely the narrative of the State that Abensour seeks to overturn. This is precisely
his  interest  in  Clastres.  As  Abensour  illustrates,  Clastres’ extensive  research  on
primitive societies in South America may be encapsulated by three theses, all of
which Abensour will frame as contrary to Hobbes in nature: 1) primitive societies,
that is,  societies without States,  are indeed societies nonetheless;  2) the political
institution of such societies is established not through the unifying principles of the
State, but through war; 3) war is not the inevitable condition of every man against
every man indicative of a brutish state of nature, but a specific political campaign of
Stateless societies aimed against the emergence of the State itself.38 Hence, Clastres’
“Copernican  revolution”  or  radical  reversal  of  the  Hobbesian  paradigm may be
expressed accordingly: if Hobbes posits the State against war, Clastres posits war
against  the  State.39 Indeed,  over  the  course  of  his  fieldwork,  Clastres  comes  to
understand war in this context neither as the condition of savage people in their
natural state (Hobbes), nor as the breakdown of exchange relations among tribes
(Levi-Strauss), but as the primary strategy of primitive societies to at once generate
social  bonds,  collectively  retain  the  social  formation  of  their  homogeneous,
indivisible communities (without  hierarchy,  coercion or formal division between
rich and poor, ruler and ruled) and to ward off the perpetual threat of the appearance
38 Ibid., 101-2.
39 Ibid., 111. Also see Abensour and Enaudeau,  La communauté politique des “tous uns”: désir de liberté,
désir d’utopie, 71.
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of a unitary, autonomous authority that remains external to the community itself.40
For Clastres, primitive societies are thus societies organised against the State. This
is the basis of their politics. As a strategy to illustrate the logic of democracy’s own
being-against,  I  have  already  implicitly  made  an  argument  for  the  analogous
structure of the against found both in primitive societies and democracy alike,41 but
in  his  own  work,  Abensour  appeals  to  Clastres  for  a  different  reason.  With
implications  extending  well  beyond  the  immediate  framework  of  the  Hobbes-
Clastres  debate,  by turning  to  Clastres  to  ground a  substantive  position  against
Hobbes, Abensour discovers a way to effectively disturb what he identifies more
generally as the paradigm of “State thought” (pensée de l’État) so pervasive across
the tradition of political  philosophy itself.42 Indeed,  working through those very
counter-Hobbesian  themes  in  Clastres  themselves,  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  in  A
Thousand Plateaus, will reflect upon philosophy’s strange fixation with the State
over the course of its long history. Not only does political philosophy tend to centre
its  analysis  around  the  relations  of  the  State  (king  and  subject,  sovereign  and
people,  governor  and governed),  it  also  appears  to  organise  its  very models  of
thought around the terms of the State itself: its principles, its mechanisms, its goals.
Thus, in both thought and analysis, political philosophy, they argue, is inclined to
adopt the perspective of the State. It props itself up with the State, draws from its
authority,  even  fashions  itself  after  the  State’s  own image  (Plato’s  philosopher-
40 Abensour, “The Counter-Hobbes of Pierre Clastres,” 104-5.
41 In chapter 3 above.
42 Breaugh, “Critique de la domination, pensée de l’émancipation. Sur la philosophie politique de Miguel
Abensour,” 56.
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rulers). In exchange, philosophy supplies the State its rationality, its universality, its
raison  d’etre.  The  State  is  presented  as  the  most  rational  and  harmonious
organisation of a community,  the greatest freedom, a moral force. Consequently,
anticipating  Abensour,  Deleuze  and  Guattari  understand  the  history  of  political
philosophy  predominately  as  a  history  of  State  thought,  this  bizarre  symbiosis
between philosophy and the State perhaps reaching its apex with Hegel (in which
the  State  is  expressed  as  a  historical  manifestation  of  absolute  spirit).43 Hence
Abensour’s  turn  to  Clastres.  Beyond  the  anthropological  argument,  Abensour
invokes Clastres in the attempt to liberate political thought from the centrality of the
State, to call into question this entire history of State thought from Plato to Hobbes
to Hegel, a philosophy in service of the State, its underlying supposition that the
State  is  not  only  inherently  legitimate,  but  the  necessary,  inevitable  and  most
desirable form of human coexistence. In so doing, Abensour ventures to rethink the
status  of  the  State  itself,  to  disentangle  politics  from  the  State  and  following
Clastres, to put forward a model of politics in opposition to the State. For regardless
of its historical incarnation, as the formal separation of the organs of power from
the whole community, the State remains for Abensour an instrument of domination,
a mode of coercion and exclusion in society. It is here, interestingly, where he will
encounter resistance from Lefort. 
In  his  own assessment,  Lefort  finds Clastres’ general  theory of  the State
43 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 374-6. Following Clastres, Deleuze and Guattari will organise their
own political philosophy in terms of the “war machine” against the State apparatus.
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rather one dimensional and limited in scope. Although he accepts many of Clastres’
basic postulates of primitive societies, Lefort rejects that the State may be theorised
as transcendent or “detached” from an otherwise integrated and undivided social
body. What Clastres ultimately fails to provide, he contends, is a sufficient account
of both what determines legitimate and illegitimate authority within society as well
as its symbolic dimension outside of it. For this reason, Lefort finds no reason to
accept Clastres’ basic conception of the State as it supposedly manifests in tribal
communities  as  its  universal  form.  While  Clastres  never  claims  that  all  State
societies suffer from one and the same oppression, the eternal risk of the mutual
exclusivity  of  primitive  and  State  societies,  according  to  Lefort,  is  that  it
inadvertently functions to render all forms of the State equivalent. The State, Lefort
claims,  possesses no such uniformity.  The State,  as it  appears  in the totalitarian
society  and  the  democratic  society,  for  example,  is  not  the  same  State.
Consequently,  contrary  to  Abensour,  Lefort  will  reject  that  the  State  may  be
epitomised by coercion and repression absolutely. For Lefort, this only obscures its
many nuances.44 As  a  result,  perhaps  this  explains  why Abensour’s  theory of  a
democracy  against the State will  move to distance itself  from Lefort  somewhat,
concluding that Lefort’s concept of democracy ultimately remains too bound up
with law and the State, its continuing struggle for new rights and more inclusion
merely serving to legitimate and expand the State’s very authority.45 And yet, at the
44 See Claude Lefort, “Dialogue with Pierre Clastres,” Writing: The Political Test (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2000). This essay also originally appeared in Abensour’s edited volume L’esprit des lois sauvages:
Pierre Clastres ou une nouvelle anthropologie politique. Also see Bernard Flynn, The Philosophy of Claude
Lefort: Interpreting the Political (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 94-98.
45 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxii. Also see Mazzocchi, “Excavating Abensour: The Dialectics of
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same time, perhaps Abensour’s criticism itself risks obscuring Lefort’s own many
nuances. In one of his last published essays “Nation et souveraineté,” Lefort may be
interpreted as offering a final meditation on how we may ultimately unravel  an
analysis of politics from that of the State.46 Indeed, although it is true that much of
Lefort’s more descriptive political analysis of the democratic society does indeed
retain a place for the State, at the same time, does it not also provide us a way to
think  democracy  outside  and  beyond  the  State  itself?47 Could  even  the  most
uncompromising demands of a savage democracy really be reconciled with a State
system  as  Abensour  eventually  suggests?  Almost  appearing  to  anticipate  such
objections, Lefort writes: “It is often said that the power of the State is increasing as
a result of these new demands, but the extent to which it is being challenged tends
to be forgotten.”48 Moreover: “Such demands are rooted in the awareness of right.
However substantial they may be, and whatever changes they might introduce into
the system of managing enterprises and into every sphere of administration, they do
not seek to be resolved by the action of State power. They stem from a domain that
the State cannot occupy.”49 Is Abensour guilty here of forgetting those moments in
Lefort that serve to challenge the sovereignty of the State, that locate the essence of
democracy in  a  domain  well  beyond  its  grasp?  Regardless,  what  remains  clear
Democracy and Utopia at a Standstill,” 293.
46 See Claude Lefort, “Nation et souveraineté,” Le temps present: Écrits 1945-2005 (Paris: Belin, 2007).
47 Marc G. Doucet, “Thinking Democracy Beyond Regimes: Untangling Political Analysis from the Nation-
State,”  Claude Lefort:  Thinker of  the Political,  ed.  Martín Plot  (Houndmills,  Basingstoke,  Hampshire:
Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2013), 170.
48 Claude Lefort,  “Human Rights  and the Welfare  State,” Democracy and Political Theory (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 43.
49 Claude  Lefort,  “Politics  and  Human  Rights,”  The  Political  Forms  of  Modern  Society:  Bureaucracy,
Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 264.
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enough is that it is not Lefort who is the source of Abensour’s concept on the State,
but  Clastres.  If  Abensour  finds  Lefort’s  treatment  of  the  State  dangerously
ambiguous,  Clastres’  political  anthropology  provides  a  more  uncompromising
picture of what is most essential to the State-form itself. Both in philosophy and in
politics, Clastres helps Abensour to think against the State. This will prove essential
to his concept of democracy.   
If, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, State thought reaches its highest point
with  Hegel,  then  perhaps  it  is  quite  fitting  that  Abensour  cultivates  his  mature
philosophy  of  democracy  not  with  Lefort  primarily,  but  with  a  young  Marx
defiantly  opposed to  Hegel’s  speculative  theory of  the  State.  In  1843,  after  the
suppression of the  Rheinische Zeitung, the liberal journal for whom he had been
writing since the completion of his doctoral thesis, Marx took the opportunity to
revisit and reevaluate Hegel’s political thought. The result was a lengthy manuscript
in which he prepared a paragraph by paragraph critique of the final section of the
Philosophy  of  Right devoted  to  the  question  of  the  State.  Although  abandoned
unpublished,  only appearing in  1927,  this  critique would showcase both Marx’s
emerging humanism as  well  as  his  increasing  distance  from the  Hegelian  roots
which  he  would  so  often  be  associated.  At  the  heart  of  the  manuscript,  Marx
challenges the cogency of Hegel’s abstract State and by reversing his very logic,
arrives  at  the position that  with “true democracy”  (wahre demokratie) the State
itself disappears. This forms the basis of Abensour’s exegetical volume Democracy
Against the State, a detailed study that may function at once as a monograph on the
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political thought of the young Marx before his so-called “economic turn” and as a
broader philosophical contribution to the theory of democracy itself, one that does
not fail to locate the against very much at its centre.           
While Abensour’s text does not seek to overturn or contradict established
Marxist scholarship, the general framework through which he approaches the young
Marx will be found to be entirely unique. Drawing from Pocock’s landmark study
which  itself  circumvents  a  predominant  State  thought  tracing  an  alternative,
republican paradigm of modern political thought from Florentine humanism to the
American  Revolution  by  way  of  Machiavelli  and  James  Harrington,  Abensour
identifies Marx as a “Machiavellian moment,” situating his early writings according
to a vibrant republican tradition of civic humanism and secular political inquiry.50 It
is this Machiavellian moment that directs Abensour’s study from beginning to end.
Contrary to Althusser, it  is not Gramsci that provides the essential  link between
Marx  and  Machiavelli.51 Even  when  Lefort  offers  his  own  reflections  on  the
parallels  between  the  two—the  decisive  break  with  idealist  philosophy,  the
denunciation of a distinctively apolitical Christian morality—he will likewise rely
on Gramsci’s  “Notes  on Machiavelli”  as  his  initial  point  of  departure.52 Rather,
Abensour detects something of Machiavelli’s critical political inquiry within Marx’s
very  writings.  Although  he  does  not  suggest  that  Marx  draws  explicitly  from
50 In addition to Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, Lefort’s Le travail de l’oeuvre undoubtedly remains a
second  major  source  for  Abensour’s  uniquely  “Machiavellian”  reading  of  Marx.  See  Farhang  Erfani,
“Fixing  Marx  with  Machiavelli:  Claude  Lefort’s  Democratic  Turn,”Journal  of  the  British  Society  for
Phenomenology vol. 39, no. 2 (May 2008): 201.
51 See Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us (London: Verso, 1999). 
52 See Claude Lefort, “Reflexions Sociologiques sur Machiavel et Marx: La Politique et le Reél,” Les formes
de l’ histoire (Paris: Gallimard, Folio-Essais, 2000).
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Machiavelli himself (throughout this early period Marx references Spinoza far more
than  Machiavelli),  Abensour  will  maintain  nevertheless  that  Marx’s  political
convictions and philosophical analyses reveal a general perspective consistent with
the  spirit  of  a  modern  republicanism  epitomised  by  the  political  thought  of
Machiavelli.  What are the markers of such a republicanism worthy of the name
“Machiavelli?” Once again, it is not a question of realism. As Abensour outlines in
the opening pages of the text, modern republican thought initiates a civic humanism
that recentres the human being as a self-determining historical subject and political
actor.  It  rehabilitates  the  ancient  virtue  of  vita  activa advocating  the  active
participation of citizens in the public affairs of the city. Refusing to deduce politics
either from theology or morality, liberating the  res publica from the bonds of the
theological-political,  it  identifies  the  political  realm  as  something in  itself,  as
something worldly, historical, contingent, rendering the organisation of society and
the  institutions  of  government  both  susceptible  to  crisis  and  available  to
modification. Against the tradition of Augustine, it therefore reorients the problems
of politics  away from the promise  of  the heavenly city of  God,  fastening them
firmly in the present, grounded in the historical conditions of the social however
rife with conflict and division. Perhaps most importantly, as best demonstrated by
Machiavelli himself, modern republican thought expressly revives a philosophical
tradition  of  radical  questioning  that  reconsiders  the  very  exercise  of  political
thinking itself: how are we to think political affairs? What are the conditions for a
comprehensive and assiduous political inquiry? What is the status of the political
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itself? What is specific to the politics of modernity?53 In his introductory essay to the
English edition of Democracy Against the State, Max Blechman regards Abensour’s
recourse to the Machiavellian moment to function as something of a test for Marx’s
thought.54 Indeed, not only does Abensour’s approach give prominence to a Marx
that can in no way be said to be ideologically bound to a metaphysics of history or
underlying  economic  foundation  of  society,  it  uncovers  a  Marx  who  has  the
capacity to offer great insight into the object of politics itself: the self-determination
of the demos, the institution of political equality and what he calls more generally in
On the Jewish Question “human emancipation.”55 In his critique of Hegel, this is
precisely what Marx associates with true democracy.56 Hence, by reading the young
Marx according to a rich tradition of modern republican thought, Abensour is able
to  bind  a  sustained  meditation  on  the  nature  of  the  political  to  a  rather
unconventional concept of democracy as human emancipation,  a democracy that
Abensour understands not only as a battle against the State, but as a battle for the
autonomy of the political itself.
In this respect, Democracy Against the State will resist an interpretation that
limits its objectives to a mere commentary on Marx, its underlying theses clearly a
testament to its author’s broader pursuit of a concept of democracy that can in no
way be restricted to Marx’s youthful criticism of Hegel. The validity of Abensour’s
53 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 2-8.
54 Max  Blechman, “To  Think  Emancipation  Otherwise,”  Democracy  Against  the  State:  Marx  and  the
Machiavellian Moment, x. 
55 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Early Writings (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 234. 
56 For a more extensive survey of Marx’s concept of democracy beyond the 1843 Critique see Vasilis Grollios,
“Marx and Engels’ Critique of  Democracy:  The Materialist  Character  of their  Concept  of  Autonomy,”
Critique vol. 39, no. 1 (2011).
228
conclusions  about  democracy,  therefore,  should  not  be  evaluated  solely  on  the
merits of his hermeneutical strategies. While his interviews repeatedly pay tribute to
Marx’s 1843 Critique as a watershed moment in his own theoretical investigation of
democracy,57 what Abensour discovers in Marx is something he undoubtedly holds
to have a far wider significance for an understanding of democracy itself. Certainly,
a theory of a democracy against the State does not ultimately rely upon Marx. For
Abensour,  Marx  simply  provides  a  compelling  political  philosophical  passage
through which it may be encountered. It is this encounter that Abensour’s volume
ventures to explore.
By any account, the evolution of Marx’s thinking in the 1840s is nothing
short of astonishing. In order to isolate and identify this purported Machiavellian
moment in Marx—a moment that  would prove to  be very momentary indeed—
Abensour  traces  the  development  of  his  early  political  thought  from the  1842
Rheinische Zeitung articles to the pivotal 1843 writings (particularly the momentous
critique of Hegel that uncovers the autonomy of the political bound to a figure of
true  democracy)  to  the  more  widely  scrutinised  Economic  and  Philosophic
Manuscripts of the following year (in which, according to Abensour, the analysis of
the political  would  be first  eclipsed by the  centrality of  the economic,  a  theme
which  would  largely  dominate  Marx’s  thought  until  the  events  of  the  Paris
Commune nearly thirty years later). If we follow Abensour’s reading, inspired by
57 See Abensour’s remarks in  Abensour and Enaudeau,  La communauté politique des “tous uns”: désir de
liberté, désir d’utopie, chapter 5 and Miguel Abensour, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Rancière, “Instances
démocratiques,” Vacarme vol. 48 (été 2009).
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the example  of  the French revolution,  the  Rheinische Zeitung  articles  assail  the
Prussian monarchy as an antiquated relic of the ancien régime, ultimately appealing
to a notion of the “rational State” emancipated from the vestiges of both religion
and absolutism as the guardian of general interest and basis and centre of modern,
secular  political  life.  Here,  therefore,  it  is  the  State,  purged  of  its  theological
dimension, that is identified and invested as the emancipatory site of politics. By
Abensour’s own account, such a position undoubtedly testifies to what Lefort could
very  well  diagnose  as  a  larger  fissure  in  the  premodern  theological-political
symbolic,  facilitating  not  only  a  new  political  discourse,  but  an  entirely  new
representation of politics itself.58 But by 1843, Abensour detects a decisive shift in
the  object  of  this  political  critique.  Whereas  the  1842  writings  are  intent  on
dismantling the theological apparatus of the Prussian Christian State, the principal
task that comes to occupy Marx a year later is more universal: namely to “unmask”
the  alienating  consequences  of  the  State  itself.59 It  is  only  through  a  critical
rereading of Hegel that Marx would encounter the problem. Although alienation
obviously  remains  a  predominant  theme  across  Feuerbach’s  widely  influential
Essence of  Christianity,  it  is  Hegel’s  utter  mystification of the State that  would
prompt Marx to grant the concept its first distinctively political treatment. In this
regard,  while  Marx’s  theory  of  alienation  is  customarily  associated  with  the
proletarian  experience  of  alienated  labour  under  the  conditions  of  capitalist
production as formulated in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Abensour
58 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 16.
59 Ibid., 32-3.
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identifies a concept of a uniquely political alienation, identically structured, at the
centre of his critique of Hegel drafted a year earlier.60 It is by way of this more
theoretical problem of political alienation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right that Marx
would come to a more systematic criticism of the modern State itself. It is here,
Abensour contends, that politics is finally disentangled from the State and appears
for the first time, as in Clastres, in opposition to it.  
If  we follow Deleuze,  the  construction  of  philosophical  concepts  always
testifies to a particular provocation, to a particular problem or set of problems of a
given historical milieu. What, we can therefore inquire, is the principal problem that
Hegel’s concept of the State intends to evaluate? A work of enormous complexity,
perhaps Hegel’s Philosophy of Right must ultimately be located between historicism
and idealism. For it is organised neither as a description or defence of the existing
institutions of modern day Prussia, nor simply as an elaborate promotion of Hegel’s
own  preferred  society.  What  it  seeks  to  establish  are  the  logical  conditions  of
rational  freedom (what  Hegel  calls  “Ethical  life”).  Its  basic  supposition  is  that
beyond abstract  right  and the  subjectivity  of  morality  (Hegel  finds  even Kant’s
moral  universalism  too  subjective),  any  manifestation  of  rational  freedom
necessarily  requires  a  society  of  rational  institutions,  a  rational  ordering  of
institutions. Following lengthy discussions of the family and civil society, this is
ultimately discovered to be realised in the supremacy of the State. At once resisting
60 Abensour is not the first to observe this theme in the 1843 Critique. Perhaps one of the earliest references to
“political alienation” in this respect appears in Ralph Miliband, “Marx and the State,” The Socialist Register
vol.  2  (1965):  280.  Nicholas  Churchich  will  devote  an  entire  chapter  to  the  concept  in  Marxism and
Alienation (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1990), chapter 9.
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the tenets of both liberalism and absolutism, Hegel’s concept of the State, said only
to manifest  at  a given historical juncture (in  a modern age having overcome or
superseded (aufheben) the conditions of slavery and feudalism), will immediately
resemble something of a  nuanced constitutional  monarchy.  And yet,  beyond the
more narrow confines of the “political State proper,” what Hegel understands the
actualisation of the Idea of the State to express, personified by the singularity of the
crown, is  the  organic  unity  of  the  institutions  of  society,  the  integration  and
realisation of the family and civil society within the State as a universal end.61 It is
therefore not difficult to determine that Hegel’s concept of the State is designed to
serve a very particular purpose within his larger political philosophy. What Hegel’s
concept of the State evidently seeks to resolve is precisely what he identifies as the
emergence of a major schism in modern Prussian society: what the State functions
to reconcile is the formal division between what he understands as political society
on the one hand (institutions of government, the administrative bureaucracy) and
what he reformulates as  civil society on the other (namely, that sphere of society
between family and government, private interests and universal ends: the society of
rational market economy organised into corporations and overseen by the police).62
Hegel conceives the State as a universal form, self-sufficient, an end in itself, that
both  logically  anticipates  and  teleologically  completes  its  finite  moments  as
61 Reconciliation is a theme that very much frames Hegel’s social and political thought in Elements of the
Philosophy of Right (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 12, 222-3. Also see Michael O. Hardimon,
“The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel’s Social Philosophy,”  Philosophy & Public Affairs vol.  21,  no.  2
(Spring, 1992). 
62 Hegel is the first to use the term “civil society” in this manner. Before Hegel, “political” and “civil” society
were terms largely employed interchangeably and simply intended to oppose what is “natural” to man. Both
Tocqueville and Marx would follow Hegel in this basic terminological distinction.
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external  necessity,  higher  authority  and  absolute  end,  unifying  particular  and
universal,  part  and whole,  in an immanent expression of its  actualised Idea.  We
have thus already arrived at the basis of Marx’s criticism.   
Although Marx readily acknowledges the materiality of the problem, clearly
appreciating the significance of an increasingly divided society, his manuscript is
quick and unreserved in its rejection of its formal resolution in the  Philosophy of
Right.  According to Marx, Hegel’s concept of the State is able to repair  such a
divide only in appearance, only at the level of abstraction. Indeed, much of Marx’s
criticism of Hegel will be devoted to what he perceives as the mystification of the
State as Idea. Rather than right, he charges, Hegel makes logic, abstract reality, his
principal subject and theorises the State according to the logical categories of this
abstract reality subsequently.63 The State thus appears not as a political institution of
society,  but  as  in  Hobbes,  as  an  autonomous  entity  eternally  set  out  against  it.
Defined in its most abstract terms, the State’s relation to the social becomes one of
externality,  of formal opposition, the family and civil society rendered but finite
moments of the finality of the State as Idea. Realised only in their transcendence,
the family and civil society exist not for themselves, but for the universality of the
State, their empirical existence governed not by themselves, but by an abstract logic
that  remains  entirely  alien to  them.64 Hegel’s  speculative  philosophy  therefore
remains for Marx an irreparable categorical inversion: it mistakes the abstract for
the concrete, the predicate for the subject. It privileges an abstract reality over the
63 Karl Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,” Early Writings, 72-3.
64 Ibid., 62-3.
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material conditions of political life. It sacrifices the self-institution of society for the
sake of the harmony of a higher form. For it is not the State that conditions the
family and civil society, Marx repeatedly interjects, but the family and civil society
that condition the State. What Hegel’s theory of the State systematically fails to
consider, Marx perhaps drawing here from Rousseau, is that it is the people—“the
whole  demos”—that  is  the  material  source  and  active  principle  of  their  very
constitution. On the contrary, according to Hegel, in the absence of the unifying
form of the State, the people are destined to remain but a “formless mass.”65 
This attitude would serve to raise two important questions for Marx that
inevitably turn his critique to the problem of the modern State itself: is sovereignty
ultimately enshrined in the monarch or in the people? And is it possible to speak of
the sovereignty of the people as opposed to the sovereignty of the monarch?66 In
what  is  undoubtedly for  Abensour  some of  the  most  revealing  passages  of  the
Critique,  Marx  will  consider  these  questions  through  a  formal  juxtaposition  of
monarchy  and  democracy.  Although  we  have  already  encountered  such  a
juxtaposition with Lefort, retracing Marx’s steps, Abensour will take this theoretical
exercise to a very different end. Insofar as Hegel establishes sovereignty proper as
internal to the State and expressed in the uniformity of the monos, he regards any
notion  of  popular  sovereignty,  as  we  encountered  in  a  previous  chapter,  to  be
founded upon a confused, “wild idea of the people.” For this reason, Hegel locates
65 See Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 183 and Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,”
86-7.
66 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,” 86.
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democracy at the limit of the sovereign and identifies its constitution as perpetually
in conflict with itself. But Marx sees the categories very much reversed: “Hegel
proceeds from the State and conceives of man as the subjectivised State; democracy
proceeds from man and conceives of the State as objectified man.”67 For if it is not
the  monos,  as an abstract part,  but  the whole demos that represents the material
source and active agent of the constitution of the social, then it is democracy and
not monarchy, that properly expresses the sovereign element both in content and in
form: “In democracy the formal principle is identical with the substantive principle.
For  this  reason  it  is  the  first  true  unity  of  the  particular  and  the  universal.”68
Following Marx’s logic, Abensour can therefore establish monarchy the constitution
in which a part, abstracted from the whole, determines the character of the whole
from a  fixed  point,  so  that  the  demos  is  subsumed  under  but  one  form of  its
existence: the constitution itself. Democracy, rather, is the constitution in which the
constitution itself remains merely a facet of the self-determination of the demos,
appearing only as a single determining moment of the people and thus not as the
State as an abstract form. Democracy, simply put, is the constitution in which the
whole  is  dominated  by  no  single  part.  According  to  Marx,  this  remains  its
distinguishing characteristic: “In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other
than what is proper to it. Each is really only a moment of the demos as a whole.”69
Therefore,  if  Marx  understands  democracy  as  the  exception  to  every  other
67 Ibid., 87.
68 Ibid., 88. Also see  Patricia Springborg, “Karl Marx on Democracy,  Participation, Voting,  and Equality,”
Political Theory vol. 12, no. 4 (November 1984): 540.
69 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,” 87.
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constitution, distinguished from both monarchy and the republic alike, it is because
the  democratic  constitution  does  not  abstract  itself  from  the  form  of  its  self-
institution,  but  remains  a  substantive  dimension  of  the  demos  as  its  originary
subject.  For  this  reason,  just  as  Spinoza  calls  democracy  the  most  “natural”
constitution,70 Marx likewise considers it  the most “generic.”  It  is  precisely this
generality that  Marx claims  will  finally resolve  the  question  of  the  constitution
itself: “Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find
the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings [...]. The constitution
is thus posited as the people’s own creation. The constitution is in appearance what
it  is  in  reality:  the  free  creation  of  man.”71 Thus  conceived,  Abensour  can
distinguish  democracy  the  political  expression  of  the  self-determination  of  the
demos;  monarchy,  its  formal  abstraction.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Marx  declares
democracy  the  truth of  monarchy  and  monarchy  democracy  falsified.  Whereas
democracy explains  itself,  only through democracy can monarchy be explained.
Whereas democracy makes the constitution for man, monarchy makes man for the
constitution.72 Against  Hegel’s  own  typology,  Marx  will  therefore  diagnose
monarchy a democracy in  degenerated form, a  democracy in  contradiction with
itself. Monarchy is the democratic constitution severed from its instituting subject.
It  remains the formal  alienation of  the self-determination of the demos.  This  is
precisely how Marx comes to understand the modern State itself:
70 Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 179.
71 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s  ‘Philosophy of Right’,” 87. Also see Abensour,  Democracy Against the State:
Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 58.
72 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,” 87.
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If  in  a  democracy the  political  State  exists  separately from its
content and is distinguished from it,  it  nevertheless exists itself
only as a  particular content, as a particular  form of existence of
the  people.  By  contrast,  e.g.  in  the  monarchy,  this  particular
moment, the political constitution, assumes the significance of the
universal,  determining  and  dominating  all  particulars.  In
democracy  the  State  as  particular  is  only particular,  and  as
universal  it  is  the  real  universal;  i.e.  it  is  not  something
determinate set off against other contents. In the modern times the
French have understood this to mean that in true democracy the
political State disappears.73
The  State  is  the  constitution  of  the  social  made  abstract.  It  not  only  assumes
autonomy over  the  demos  as  such,  but  dominates  its  particular  moments  as  a
universal  form.  This  is  ultimately  what  renders  the  State  incompatible  with
democracy. This is not merely a logical determination. Cutting through the rigidity
of  his  formalism,  Abensour  demonstrates  that  beyond  the  opposition  between
monarchy and democracy, what Marx’s critique boldly uncovers is the underlying
antagonism between democracy and the State itself. Democracy is not a State-form.
Democracy is against the State. It is in this respect, perhaps indebted to Rousseau
once  again,  that  Marx  can  proclaim  true democracy  the  State’s  formal
disappearance.74 Democracy means the State ceases to be the dominant moment.
When the State remains merely a moment, it is no longer the State. Consequently,
emblematic of a politics antithetical to the State, the very concept of true democracy
demands Marx entirely reconsider the place of politics itself. For as its association
with the State becomes no longer viable, as an abstract form, Marx will reestablish
73 Ibid., 88. For additional insights into this important passage see Simon Critchley, “True Democracy: Marx,
Political Subjectivity and Anarchic Meta-politics,”  Radical Democracy: Politics Between Abundance and
Lack, eds. Lars Tonder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
74 If we assume, not without justification, that by “the French” Marx is thinking principally of Rousseau. See
Robert Fine, Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt (London: Routledge, 2001), 75.
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the political realm precisely according to that from which the State is ultimately
abstracted: the whole demos. For Abensour, this is Marx’s Machiavellian moment.
In  this  respect,  perhaps  the  structure  of  Marx’s  argument  is  not  entirely
unique. Perhaps Marx merely repeats what is simply axiomatic to Rousseau: that
sovereignty remains in its only legitimate form an expression of the people rather
than  the  State  (indeed,  Marx  appears  to  share  a  certain  affinity  with  that
spontaneous  “democratic  moment”  of  contract  theory  in  which  the  whole
collectively institutes itself a political society). And yet, as I have suggested, while
there is little doubt of Rousseau’s importance for Marx during this period,75 only
further supporting the claim of a republican heritage,  Abensour himself  will  not
frame  Marx’s  conclusions  according  to  the  question  of  sovereignty  primarily.
Instead,  from Marx’s  critique  of  the  State,  Abensour  will  draw three  important
theses: 1) politics pertains not to the workings of the State, but to the emancipation
of the demos; 2) democracy is the form in which this emancipation takes place; 3)
in democracy, the State, as the domination of the demos, becomes a privileged site
of political conflict. This gives us much to consider. Let us begin with the demos
itself.  As  Abensour  observes,  uncovering  the  alienating  properties  of  the  State,
Marx is compelled to ground politics according to the demos as its original source
and true subject. And yet, we must proceed with care. For this does not announce
the discovery of a new archê. On this Abensour is unequivocal. As we have seen,
the archê functions to divide a social body according to an abstract principle of rule.
75 Perhaps Lucio Colletti remains the authority on the link between Rousseau and Marx. See From Rousseau
to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
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And indeed, as essential to the division between governor and governed, ruler and
ruled, Abensour does not fail to detect the workings of the archê at the foundation
of every State. However, binding a concept of politics to the demos  as a whole
rather  has the effect  of a negation:  what it  refuses is  the monopolisation of the
political  moment in  the guise of  an abstract  State.  The generality of  the demos
therefore affirms the very opposite of the specificity of the archê: that politics has
no proper subject. The true subject of politics is precisely the subject that is not a
proper subject at all. It is for this reason that the demos can never serve as a suitable
archê. This is something we have encountered before. Rather than a particular class
or disenfranchised body, Marx’s appeal to “the whole demos” will recall the demos
of Rancière’s anarchic title, the empty form that signifies that generic equality of
“anyone at all.” For Rancière, this anarchic equality is politics’ only foundation. For
the very same reasons, the same can be said of the demos as a whole. They remain
identical  expressions.  Consequently,  Rancière  would  likely  determine  such  a
concept  of  the  demos  not  a  vague  abstraction,  but  indicative  of  that  essential
anarchy beneath every hierarchical structure,  that underlying equality implicit  in
every system of inequality. Indeed, there is no true democracy, Abensour affirms,
without reactivating this anarchic impulse that rises against the archê of the State.76
As he writes elsewhere, drawing not from Marx, but from Levinas, it is precisely
the  multiplicity  of  anarchy,  the  very  plurality  intrinsic  to  the  social  itself,  that
ultimately frustrates the unity and totality of the State: “It disturbs the State in a
76 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xl-xli.
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radical way, that is to say by shaking the State in its roots and its foundation.”77 
Adopting the language of La Boétie, the formula of Abensour’s democracy
against the State can therefore be expressed in the following way: the “all ones”
(tous uns) against the “all One”  (tous Un).78 This expression allows us to further
clarify  Abensour’s  terms.  The  only  difference,  he  suggests,  between  Rancière’s
democracy against the police and the democracy against the State he attributes to
Marx  is  their  respective  objects  in  question:  whereas  the  police  refers  to
government or governmentality, a vast instrumental machinery of social partition
and allocation, the State refers to a more unified, totalising structure.79 Monolithic,
centralised, universal, the State is a system of integration and mediation, a unifying,
organising entity that posits itself as a fixed point over and beyond the plurality of
the demos. Perhaps this is why Hegel finds the State best expressed by a monarchy
and why Popper finds the totalitarian State of the 20th century to represent its logical
conclusion.80 For Abensour, the State is not only a privileged point among many, it
is the point that determines all other points through itself; it is not only the One that
isolates  itself  from the multiple,  it  is  the One that  dominates  the multiple  from
above. Whereas Foucault regards the State as but a type or episode of government
that traverses the bounds of State and society, Abensour understands the State as the
form that breaks with society and remains autonomous from it.  As in Clastres, the
77 Miguel Abensour, “An-archy Between Metapolitics and Politics,” Parallax vol. 8, iss. 3 (2002): 17.
78 Miguel Abensour, “Is There a Proper Way to use the Voluntary Servitude Hypothesis?,” Journal of Political
Ideology vol. 16, iss. 3 (2011): 341.
79 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxiv.
80 See  Karl Popper,  The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2013).
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State is therefore the form that lends itself nicely to the concentration of power, to
the isolation of the organs of power from the whole community. Indeed, this  is
intrinsic to its meaning. In contrast, Abensour associates the demos, contrary to the
State,  with  plurality,  free  creation  and  ongoing  self-institution.  In  direct
contradistinction to the rigidity and fixity of the State, he characterises the life of
the  demos,  referencing  William  Godwin,  as  dynamic,  plastic,  fluid,  a  state  of
perpetual  mutation,  everlasting  innovation.81 Although  at  times  he  finds  Marx’s
presentation of the demos to forget the insurmountable social conflict and division
so  transparent  to  Machiavelli  (where  the  whole  is  never  the  united),  Abensour
observes all these qualities in Marx’s general concept of the demos as well. Marx
speaks of the “fluidity” of the instituting activity, precisely that which becomes the
object  of  hypostasis  under  the  dictates  of  the  State-form.82 Echoing  Godwin,
Abensour  will  therefore  establish  a  stark  irreconcilable  opposition  between  two
irreducible terms: the State=the One, the total, the fixed, the demos=the multiple,
the fluid, the mutational. This is given an almost ontological expression. Democracy
posits  a  creative,  self-differentiating  multiplicity  against  a  static,  integrated
uniformity. It is the politics of becoming against being.  A Bergsonian democracy.
This is the basis and substance of its conflict with the State: “This conflict arises
from the contrast between the qualities of life - dynamism, the continuous flux of
experience, impulsion, overflowing spontaneity - and the characteristics of form as
a crystallisation that acts as a power of conservation in view of maintaining the
81 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 59.
82 Ibid., 65.
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cohesion of the whole.”83 As a moment of the demos reified, the State represents the
“crystallisation”  or  “petrification”  of  the  creative  self-instituting  activity  of  the
demos. Democracy is that which resists the predominance of this reified moment. It
seeks to restore the form of the State to the life of the demos. Its basic mechanism is
what Abensour calls reduction.
Arguably one of his most important concepts, Abensour will put forward a
theory  of  reduction  as  the  centrepiece  of  true  democracy  and  the  key  to
understanding its being-against the State: “By bringing to light reduction and its
consequences, Marx was able to show as clearly as possible that the struggle against
the State, as a form, is inscribed in the heart of democratic logic.”84 If Marx’s thesis
of democracy ultimately relies upon a notion of its constitutional exceptionality,
Abensour  finds  this  exceptionality primarily expressed in  the implementation of
reduction.85 This operation is unique to democracy alone. Here, the relation between
constitution  and  demos,  part  and  whole,  remains  distinct  from  every  other
constitution. Simply put, in democracy, the constitution—or  the objectification of
the demos in the form of a constitution—is rendered the object of a reduction.86 This
does not imply the effacement or diminishing of the constitution itself (this is where
Abensour differs from Wolin).87 Nor is it  simply a matter of the devolution of a
centralised authority to more local or regional administration. Rather, in democracy,
83 Ibid., 93.
84 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxiiii.
85 Ibid.
86 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 53.
87 See Sheldon Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalising of Democracy,” Athenian Political Thought
and the Reconstruction of American Democracy,  eds. J.  Peter Euben, John R. Wallach and Josiah Ober
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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reduction is the very mechanism through which the objectification of the demos
occurs.  Although  never  explicitly  defined,  political  objectification  may  be
appreciated as the mode in which the demos institutes, represents and encounters
itself an objective form. As with Lefort, a society cannot experience itself directly
(for Lefort,  this  is  the entrance of the symbolic).  Constitution is  the  becoming-
objective of the demos, the giving itself a form, the making itself an object of social
organisation and legislation. Reduction is the process that ensures the constitution,
this  moment  of  objectification,  remains  an  ongoing  process.  Therefore,  if
democracy  does  not  achieve  the  status  of  an  abstract  State,  it  is  because  its
constitution is perpetually subjected to reduction. This is its primary strategy against
the autonomy of the State. Democracy is not simply the name of the constitution
reduced; it is the very exercise of reduction itself. Modern democracy, it could be
said, appears as the reduction of monarchy. This is its revolutionary origin. It is
what counters the State by reducing the constitution to what it is: a single moment
of the demos and nothing more. This is how Abensour interprets Marx when he
declares democracy to make the constitution for man as opposed to man for the
constitution. Democracy means the constitution remains at all times subordinate to
the demos and thus never appears an agent of its domination. It is specifically in
this sense that the State can be said to disappear. By no means intuitive, in this
context,  the  disappearance  of  the  State does  not  attest  to  the  obsolescence  and
eventual “withering away” of the State apparatus under the conditions of a realised
communism. In true democracy, what disappears is the very presence of an abstract
243
organising  principle,  a  universal  that  monopolises  the  particular,  a  total  that
dominates its parts.88 As an instrument of the self-determination of the demos, this
is precisely what reduction seeks to preclude and forestall. How should this unique
mechanism of democracy be understood? Reduction entails  blocking  the State’s
means of transfiguration. It obstructs or impedes the very channels through which
political objectification achieves a certain independence onto itself.89 It prevents the
very basis of what constitutes the demos from becoming an integrated, organising
principle. It is here where Abensour’s democracy against the State approximates
something  of  Clastres’ society  against  the  State.  It  testifies  to  a  politics  that
demands  a  certain  institutional  acuteness,  a  constant  determination  of  limits,  a
mindfulness of the always possible threat of the emergence or reemergence of the
State. For the State will always struggle to neutralise democracy, to resist reduction,
to block blocking.  For this reason, democracy’s relation to the State must always
remain critical, one of vigilance. To be a democrat is take on the task of constantly
surveying the State, determining its limits, navigating its contours.   
Against Hegel, who renders the State a subject and Hobbes, who grants his
Leviathan the status of a “mortal god,” part of what reduction implies for Abensour
is  the  recognition that  however  alien  or  abstract  in  appearance,  the  State  itself
remains a quintessentially human object. The State is a social construct. This is why
Marx finds democracy to resolve the riddle of the constitution itself. The reduced
constitution is the constitution resolved. This alone has a liberating effect. At the
88 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 65.
89 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxiiii.
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origin of every constitution, monarchy and democracy alike, Marx discerns a trace
of the free creation of man. The difference lies in monarchy’s capacity to close off,
distort and distance this moment of free creation from its original instituting subject,
at once elevating its constitution to that of a State and diminishing the demos to a
mere moment of its  existence.90 Consequently,  the State  not  only appears  as an
independent entity that enjoys a monopoly of agency in society, it likewise appears
as  a  natural form,  situated  beyond  the  realm  of  political  intervention.  In  this
respect, much like the commodity of capitalist production, we may detect a certain
fetishism inherent to the State-form itself.  Alienation,  reification,  fetishism: before
his critique of capital, all these terms are already inscribed in Marx’s critique of the
State. As an abstract form, the State appears to dominate the demos from a place
beyond the demos itself: “Hitherto, the political constitution has always functioned
as  the  religious sphere,  the  religion of  the life  of  the  people,  the heaven of  its
universality as opposed to the earthly existence of its actual reality.”91 Democracy
dispels this mystification. In so doing, the basis of political alienation is conjured
away.  Reduction  reveals  the  State  for  what  it  is:  anthropological,  institutional,
artificial, contingent. It thereby inhibits the inclination to dissociate the State from
the original activity that institutes it. In the language of Castoriadis, it reconciles the
instituting and  instituted  moments of society. It  immerses the constitution in the
very process that produced it.92 Reduction initiates something of an eternal return,
90 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 60.
91 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,” 89.
92 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 56.
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the  perpetual  process  of  returning to  the  moment  of  institution.  Reduction  may
therefore  be  understood as  the  operation  that  exposes  the  State  to  politics,  that
renders the State a political problem precisely by reestablishing its essential relation
to the political realm, the realm of the demos as a whole. The politicisation of the
State is its restitution, its restoration to the very condition implicit in its origin: the
self-institution of the demos. The general formula for reduction may therefore be
expressed  as  follows:  reduction=recognition=resolution=restitution.  Accordingly,
Abensour finds the moment of reduction itself to be composed of several isolatable
moments: firstly, reduction is the moment of “going back,” the moment of returning
or  restoring  the  constitution  to  the  condition  of  its  original  instituting  activity;
secondly,  by redirecting the constitution back to its  origin,  it  allows for what is
realised  in  the  constitution to be  extended infinitely across  other  dimensions  of
social  life.93 Put another way, reduction contains both a negative and productive
element: the very blocking that prevents the abstraction of the political moment is at
the same time what inspires the propagation of politics itself,  its introduction or
dissemination to other objects,  parts,  places and spheres of society.94 Hence,  for
Abensour,  the  mechanism of  reduction  is  itself  the  very condition  of  extension
(irrigation): “It is as if the movement of the return to an originary subject triggers a
release,  a  retroaction  of  the  subject’s  activity  into  every  field  that  requires  its
energy.”95 This extension may be interpreted in the following manner. The reduction
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 65.
95 Ibid., 56-7.
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of the State, the very resolution of the problem of political alienation, is at once the
irrigation of politics itself, granting it new life and new energies. It sets politics in
motion, reanimates it, exposing it to institutions and relations beyond the limits of
those  traditionally  ascribed  to  the  State  itself.  For  Abensour,  a  theory  of  a
democracy  against  the  State  is  therefore  a  theory  of  democratisation.  As  that
“impetuous  river”  incessantly overflowing  its  riverbanks,  Abensour  sees
democracy’s resistance to the State constantly mutating into new challenges, new
disputes,  new  polemics  at  increasingly  diverse  corners  of  society.  Accordingly,
reduction  can  be  said  to  be  composed of  three  identifiable  moments  or  stages:
reduction,  blocking and  extension:  “It  is  this  latter  stage  which  allows  for  the
irrigation of all the other spheres of the life of a people, according to a democratic
mode of being, in such a way that we can say that all holds to democracy.”96 
Democracy is the perpetual politicisation of the objects its appears against. It
exposes, as it were, what it is against to a unique political field, calling into question
its foundations and challenging its premises. Reduction, therefore, should not be
confused as a process of relinquishing politics to the domain of civil society. This is
precisely  what  distinguishes  Abensour’s  reading  of  Marx  from  that  of  Pierre
Rosanvallon.  Offering  his  own interpretation  of  the  1843  Critique,  Rosanvallon
identifies the political with the State, the social with civil society. This results in a
reading of Marx’s true democracy as the “reabsorption” of the  political into the
social,  as  the  realisation  of  a  society  “immediate  to  itself,”  attesting  to  a
96 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxiiii.
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prototypically liberal  vision  of  the “self-sufficiency” of  a  distinctively apolitical
civil society.97 On the contrary, Abensour understands true democracy as a battle for
the autonomy of  the  political  itself.  Democracy reminds  us  that  politics  is  not
subject to the State. It has a logic all of its own. Nor is civil society quintessentially
apolitical. Politics is the very stage upon which the question of the autonomy or
heteronomy of the demos is  played out.98 It  has no proper domain.  If  anything,
Abensour submits, civil society must be repoliticised, set up as a place of conflict, a
site of confrontation between the people and the grandees.99 And while the State is a
structure  that  arguably  can  never  itself  be  democratised,  this  does  not  deter
democracy’s initiative to politicise the State, to render the State a political problem.
This is implicit in its reduction. For this reason, Abensour finds a democracy against
the State to reveal with great clarity what is at stake in the political realm itself: an
experience  of  universality,  the  negation  of  domination,  the  establishment  of  an
isonomic public space.100 Although an activity invariably wrought with permanent
struggle, he regards politics as a lived expression of the never-ending question of
how  people  can  live  together  to  achieve  liberty  and  free  will.101 This  is  not  a
question that can be monopolised by the State. 
For  Marx,  “true  democracy”  and  the  “disappearance  of  the  State”  are
expressions which amount to the same. Accordingly, the  truth of democracy will
97 Pierre  Rosanvallon,  “Marx  and  Civil  Society,”  Democracy  Past  and  Future  (New  York:  Columbia
University Press, 2006), 162-3.
98 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 71.
99 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxvii-xl.
100 Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 92.
101 Ibid., 50. 
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function  to  deny  the  very  proposition  of  a  “democratic  State.”  Indeed,  the
democratic State appears to attest to the integration, meditation and moderation of
democracy,  a  democracy reconciled  with  the  State-form (Abensour  understands
Tocqueville’s project very much in this sense). In opposition to such a notion, which
in light of Marx’s thesis can only be found inherently contradictory, Abensour will
propose an alternative: “insurgent”  democracy.102 For Abensour, this is the proper
name of a democracy against the State:
In truth, democracy is not a political regime. Beyond being the
conflictive political institution of the social, it is an action, a form
of political activity that is distinctive in its eruption of the demos
onto the public stage, its opposition to the grandees, its struggle to
end domination. It is not a matter of a momentary act, but of a
continuous activity over time, always ready to push back in the
face  of  the  obstacles  it  encounters. It  is  a  complex  process,
constantly reinventing itself in order to better persevere and defeat
the counter-movements that threaten its destruction and return to a
state of domination. This is insurgent democracy.103
If Abensour ultimately seeks, retaining his proximity to Machiavelli,  a model of
politics that locates the very possibility of emancipation precisely in that originary
division of the social, in that irreducible conflict of the plebs against the agents of
domination,  he  discovers  such  a  model  with  insurgent  democracy.  But  does
Abensour  really  require  a  new concept?  What  is  it  that  distinguishes  insurgent
democracy from savage democracy? And given savage democracy’s stubborn lack
of formula or foundation, what are the grounds for such a distinction? According to
Abensour, insurgent democracy opens up an agonistic scene that adopts the State as
102 Abensour will outline insurgent democracy in the foreword to the second French edition and preface to the
Italian edition of Democracy Against the State. 
103 Abensour, Nancy and Rancière, “Instances démocratiques” (translation by Brian Singer).
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its  “natural”  or  “favoured”  target.104 Lefort’s  savage democracy,  he  claims,
explicitly identifies no such target.  This marks a remarkable shift  in Abensour’s
appraisal of savage democracy. Here, Abensour appears to find savage democracy
to lack a certain precision or specificity. Although he accepts savage democracy as a
suitable expression for the dissolution of the markers of certainty, for the repeated
test of indeterminacy, the logic of savage democracy, he ultimately determines, is
not necessarily anti-Statist.105 It is insurgent democracy that embodies this necessity.
Perhaps insurgent democracy could therefore be thought as a savage democracy
inscribed with a new object, a new target. Perhaps it takes everything that is savage
about  democracy,  as  it  were,  to  what  Abensour  understands  as  its  logical
conclusion, its absolute end:  a being-against the State. We occasionally encounter
this  interpretation.106 At  the  same  time,  however  indebted  to  the  young  Marx,
perhaps  insurgent  democracy  signals  a  concept  of  democracy  no  longer
theoretically  dependent  on  the  critical  framework  his  1843  Critique.  In  many
respects,  Marx’s  argument  for  democracy  simply  reverses  the  formal  logic  of
Hegel’s theory of the State. Insurgent democracy is bound by no such logic. Instead,
Abensour draws its basic framework from a still relatively obscure revolutionary
tradition that repeatedly appears to manifest itself throughout modern history.107 As
a concept, insurgent democracy traces that unique political genealogy from the Paris
Commune to the German revolution of 1918 to the Spanish civil war to the council
104 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxiii-xxxiv.
105 Ibid., xxxi-xxxii. Also see Breaugh, “Le lien social entre utopie et démocratie,” 87.
106 See  for  example  Mazzocchi,  “Excavating  Abensour:  The  Dialectics  of  Democracy  and  Utopia  at  a
Standstill,” 295.
107 Abensour and Enaudeau, La communauté politique des “tous uns”: désir de liberté, désir d’utopie, 136.
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movement of the Hungarian revolution to the May ’68 revolts. We could no doubt
add a number of other examples to this list as well. For Abensour, what defines each
of these events is a spontaneous irruption of the demos against the agents of the
State in order to establish a state of non-domination. What we find at the root of
insurgent democracy, therefore, is a rejection of the State as the natural or inevitable
basis  of  social  organisation.  It  invites  us  to  consider  the  very  possibility  of  a
political  community  founded  upon  something  other  than  the  State:  the  self-
determination of the demos, isonomy, an ongoing experiment in political freedom.
As a resistance to the existing order,  as a desire  to  live otherwise,  perhaps this
represents its utopian dimension.      
Insurgent democracy conceives a democracy in perpetual conflict with the
State, a democracy that not only accommodates conflict, but embraces, compounds
and multiplies it. This is its defining attribute. Nevertheless, Abensour will carefully
distinguish insurgent democracy from “conflictual” democracy (in which conflict is
institutionally confined to the limits of the State itself).108 For insurgent democracy
does  not  situate  itself  immanent  to  the  State,  but  identifies  its  primary  site  of
conflict in an altogether different space: outside, beyond and against the State. It is
the democracy that occurs in the streets and public squares, precisely that which is
often regarded illegitimate or irrelevant by the State itself. It is what opens up a
space for political action. It is what sets up the essential opposition between the
people and the State:  “In a Rousseauist vocabulary,  insurgent democracy can be
108 Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xl.
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defined as an arising of the body of the people against the body of the State; in other
words, the expression of the political rapport as it proceeds from the true subject,
the  ‘whole  demos’.”109 Insurgent democracy represents the irreconcilable clash of
two distinct bodies, the demos and the State. And yet, always maintaining a relation
of externality, insurgent democracy does not ultimately seek to  seize the State or
occupy its institutions, but to resist it,  carving out new political spaces, devising
alternative social structures and generating new forms of social bonds. Insurgent
democracy  is  not  a  theory  of  revolution.  It  is  the  endless  quest  to  discover
horizontal,  non-hierarchical,  non-contractual modes of what Arendt calls  “being-
together.”  It  is  therefore  a  question  of  creating  the  very conditions  of  new and
inclusive ways of engaging collectively in the public realm.110 
Occupying an entirely different space than the State, insurgent democracy
likewise has a temporality all of its own. Clearly drawing conceptually from that
pivotal  moment of the French revolution,  that brief  interval  between regimes,  it
corresponds to the time in between two State forms; it struggles against the State on
two fronts at once: the State of the ancien régime and the new State to come.111 To
some  extent,  Abensour  contends,  even  beyond  those  exceptional  moments  of
revolution, every political community struggles with the State of the old regime, its
history,  its  burdens,  its  relics.  At  the  same  time,  we  appear  to  be  constantly
confronted with the State’s perpetual restructuring and reform, its  modernisation
109 Ibid.
110  Breaugh,  “From a Critique of Totalitarian Domination to  the  Utopia of Insurgent  Democracy:  On the
‘Political Philosophy’ of Miguel Abensour,” 242-3.
111  Abensour, “Of Insurgent Democracy,” xxxxv.
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and rationalisation (in Max Weber’s sense of the term). Insurgent democracy installs
itself precisely in the  caesura between these two incarnations of the State, in that
very opening, paradoxically, that defies installation and refuses permanent forms.112
It  occupies,  as  it  were,  that  revolutionary  moment,  a  time  between  the  radical
opening up of a system and its rapid reconsolidation. This is a temporality that lacks
all  reference  to  identity  and  self-presence.  It  is  an  experience  defined  only  by
incessant conflict on all sides, at all fronts: the true meaning of Lefort’s permanent
contestation. For Abensour, it is the first task of insurgent democracy to preserve
this caesura, to maintain this rupture or opening for political action. It is precisely
through this window that social transformation and democratisation may take place.
Although insurgent democracy may appear to maintain a rather precarious
status, eternally anchored in the present, between regimes, destined to lack a certain
stability  or  constancy,  Abensour  finds  no  reason  to  presume  its  inherent
incompatibility  or  outright  antagonism with  institutions.113 What  is  democracy’s
relationship  to  its  institutions?  This  is  a  question we  have  largely  neglected
throughout this study. We cannot do it justice here. But Abensour’s comments will
certainly help  frame and orient  this  question for  future  consideration.  Abensour
remarks that his  critics often take issue with what is  perceived to be his  purely
negative conception  of  democracy (a  democracy  against),  one  that  disregards
positive institutions for the sake of binding democracy to the insurrectionary event.
But this is to misunderstand Abensour and indeed, the nature of the against itself.
112 Ibid.
113  Abensour, “Insurgent Democracy and Institution,” xxv.
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Nevertheless, this is a criticism that legitimately raises a whole series of questions
regarding  the  institution  of  insurgent  democracy,  a  topic  that  Abensour  would
eventually  address  in  a  subsequent  preface  to  Democracy  Against  the  State.  In
principle, Abensour maintains, insurgent democracy is neither hostile nor resistant
to  institutional  engagement.  A democracy against  the  State  is  not  necessarily  a
democracy against  institutions.  On the  contrary,  institutions  can  endow political
experience with a certain sustainability. They can help insurgence to endure over
time, to connect its present moment to events of the past and even to anticipate and
prepare  for  events  of  the  future.  And  yet, given  its  objectives  and  orientation,
insurgent  democracy’s engagement  with  institutions  must  naturally  remain
selective.  Even so,  Abensour’s criteria is  relatively intuitive and straightforward:
insurgent democracy distinguishes between those institutions that promote, support
and advance the political action of the demos and those that discourage, prohibit or
suppress  it,  those  institutions  that  subscribe  to  a  politics  of  liberty  and  non-
domination and those that retreat from such a politics, those institutions that block
and inhibit the desire of the grandees and those that allow their ambition to circulate
freely.114 This is not the meeting or convergence of a vital, transient insurgence and
a  stable,  institutional  framework.  It  is  not  the  old  question  of  spontaneity  and
organisation. Institutions do not function to legislate or govern insurgence, giving it
shape or direction. Their interaction is far more nuanced. Here, Abensour finds its
helpful to distinguish between institutions and laws. Turning to an early essay by
114 Ibid., xxvi.  As something of an archetypal example, Abensour sites the people’s guarantee to the right to
insurrection included in the stillborn French constitution of 1793. 
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Deleuze, who himself draws principally from Hume (a great thinker of institutions),
Abensour explains that an institution is more of a matrix than a framework, a model
or  blueprint  that  engenders,  creates  and  develops.115 Deleuze  understands  an
institution  as  a  system of  anticipation:  whereas  laws  intend to  limit  or  prohibit
action, institutions provide a positive model for it, whereas laws rely on penalty,
institutions appeal to freedom: “Such a theory will afford us the following political
criteria:  tyranny is  a regime in which there are many laws and few institutions;
democracy is a regime in which there are many institutions and few laws.”116 For
Deleuze,  an  institution  is  an  organisation  of  means.  It  is  essentially  positive,
innovative, a  way of acting or acting in concert.  This is the basic concept of an
institution best suited to insurgent democracy. Far from an obstacle or obstruction to
its cause, Abensour sees institutions as something of a launchpad for democracy,
their  durability  and  continuity  allowing  for  new  possibilities  of  invention  and
intervention.117 While institutions can inform and sustain insurgence, insurgence can
direct and orient institutions. Institutions can be a friend of the against. They can
themselves  be  placed  against  the  State.  This  is  just  as  true  for  Abensour  and
democracy as it is for Clastres and primitive societies.
In  his  conclusion  to  Democracy  Against  the  State,  Abensour  returns  his
inquiry to the present, to the  here and now: “Are we at a Machiavellian moment
115 Ibid., xxvii.
116  Gilles Deleuze, “Instincts and Institutions,” Desert Islands and Other Texts  (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e),
2004), 19-20.
117  Abensour, “Insurgent Democracy and Institution,” xxviii.
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today?”118 Do we have the capacity,  as Machiavelli  did, to think political affairs
politically? For  Abensour,  figures  such  as  Arendt,  Merleau-Ponty  and  Lefort
suggest a Machiavellian moment is indeed upon us. It is not a matter of returning to
Marx or  even to  Machiavelli,  but  rather  of  returning to  politics itself. Before a
question  of  government,  politics  is  a  question  of  emancipation. This  is  the
fundamental  link  Abensour’s  work  attempts  to  reestablish.  Emancipation  is  the
object  of  politics,  democracy its  form. Unlike  Castoriadis  and Lefort,  Abensour
does not draw a consistent conceptual distinction between politics and the political.
It is qualified simply as the ongoing project to establish a state of non-domination.
For Abensour, the State presents an enduring problem for such a project. In this
regard, perhaps Marx’s revelation of the essential conflict between democracy and
the State becomes an indispensable facet of what a contemporary Machiavellian
moment must express.119 On the problem of the State, Abensour often finds Lefort’s
formal opposition between democracy and totalitarianism at once too limited and
too absolute. For the State is certainly not democratic if it  is not totalitarian. At
times, he rather finds its necessary to introduce a third term: the authoritarian State,
that which is neither democratic or totalitarian, but signals the degeneration of our
own political institutions without falling into totalitarianism absolutely.120 A rapidly
changing world inevitably brings with it the potential for new authorities and new
instruments of repression. For Abensour, this is the use of philosophy. Abensour
118Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 89.
119  Ibid., 91.
120 Abensour, “Pour une philosophie politique critique?,” 314-15. 
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envisions  the  critical  political  philosopher  as  something  of  a  “watchman”  of
authoritarian tendencies in  society.121 The philosopher patrols,  surveys,  identifies
and diagnoses the spaces, relations and technologies of domination, their emergence
and  evolution.  Accordingly,  a  critical  political  philosophy  can  reveal  just  how
exposed the so-called democratic form of society often is to subversion, corruption
and  authoritarianism.  Not  only  from  without,  but  from  within.  For  Abensour,
perhaps  this  only  further  demonstrates  the  necessity  of  a  robust  and  vigilant
insurgent democracy.        
Although  Abensour  ultimately  distinguishes  the  two,  where  insurgent
democracy and true democracy inevitably collide and intersect is in their conception
of a democracy explicitly oriented against the State.122 Indeed, this is a theme that
Marx would eventually return to himself in 1871 following the events of the Paris
Commune. However, in contrast to his early critique of Hegel, now it is no longer a
question of the formal “disappearance” of the State, but as Abensour does not fail to
observe, of a political programme to “break” or “smash” the “modern State power”
itself.123 Now it is not simply monarchy, but every form of State that is explicitly
called into question. The State is the entity that not only unifies, reconciles and
integrates the plurality of the demos into itself, but at the same time isolates and
consolidates the organs of power into the hands of a few. As demonstrated by the
121 Breaugh, “Critique de la domination, pensée de l’émancipation. Sur la philosophie politique de Miguel
Abensour,” 69.
122 For a broader discussion on the relation between insurgent democracy and true democracy see Abensour
and Enaudeau, La communauté politique des “tous uns”: désir de liberté, désir d’utopie, chapter 5.
123 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” Later Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 186. Also see Abensour, Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, chapter
6 and Patrick Cingolani, “Interprétation de l’insurrection communale. La démocratie, l’etat et la politique,”
Critique de la politique. Autour de Miguel Abensour.
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fate of the Paris Commune, this can be an egregiously violent act. The State-form is
neither neutral nor instrumental. It contains no revolutionary potential. For Marx,
perhaps  this  is  the  lesson  of  the  Paris  Commune.  It  was  the  position  of  the
anarchists  from  the  beginning.  Ultimately  a  struggle  for  self-determination,  a
democracy  against  the  State  strives  to  reduce the  State,  to  generate  modes  of
association other than those on offer by the State, creating new and inclusive ways
of engaging collectively in  a distinctively public  space.  As he defiantly informs
Gauchet, Abensour is committed to such a concept of democracy, a democracy that
embraces conflict rather than conceals it,  that multiplies the spaces of collective
invention,  that  circulates  the  desire  for  autonomy and  provokes  experiences  of
political  freedom.124 In  this  respect,  perhaps  we should  take  care  not  to  oppose
Marx’s true democracy to some false or incomplete notion of democracy, but to
understand  its  “truth”  to  reveal  and  call  attention  to  something  essential  about
democracy itself:  that  democracy is  not  a  State-form;  democracy is  against  the
State.    
We have now encountered two contemporary models of democracy’s being-
against: Rancière’s democracy against the police and Abensour’s democracy against
the State. My aim has neither been one of comparison, charting out affinities and
points  of  disagreements  between  the  two,  nor  a  straightforward  survey of  their
theses in an additive fashion. Although we have observed many parallels, crossings
and points of intersection, in each case we have largely situated our analysis within
124 Abensour,  “Lettre d’un  ‘révoltiste’ à Marcel Gauchet converti  à la  ‘politique normale’,” 162. Also see
Ingram, “The Politics of Claude Lefort’s Political: Between Liberalism and Radical Democracy,” 41.
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the  conceptual  framework  of  each  author,  as  a  visitor  or  traveller,  evaluating
concepts,  establishing  relations,  testing  limits  and  boundaries.  Our  goal  has
ultimately been one of extraction: to isolate and draw out a general theory of the
against intrinsic to democracy in order to consider its logic, objectives and broader
social and political implications. The against is not a consequence of democracy. It
is immanent to its very form.  Whether it identifies the police or the State as its
primary object, democracy is always generated in the form of an against, an against
which  is  at  all  times  integral  to  its  composition,  orientation  and  institutional
expression. A theory of a democracy against is therefore a theory of a politics of
transformation,  a  politics  that  initiates  change  precisely  through  its  immanent
resistance to that which it is against.  Both Rancière and Abensour are exceptional
thinkers  of  democracy  in  that  the  against  is  never  overlooked,  concealed  or
marginalised in their work. While their respective theories of democracy differ in
many respects, by fixing the against at the centre of its concept, they help us think
democracy in new and productive ways: not as a regime, government or institution
primarily, but as a profound challenge to oppressive, hierarchical and exclusionary
arrangements and practices in society. Perhaps in many ways, they compliment each
other well. Against the backdrop of Foucault’s concept of governmentality, Rancière
provides a critique of the police organised around the problem of the proper order of
society. Against the backdrop of Marx’s concept of sovereignty, Abensour provides
a critique of the State organised around the problem of political alienation. While
Rancière  sees  democracy as  the  disruption of  the  police,  Abensour  understands
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democracy as the reduction of the State. While Rancière grounds politics according
to  the  claim  of  equality,  Abensour  centres  politics  around  the  question  of
emancipation. Whereas Abensour lacks a detailed account of the political subject as
the primary agent or actor of democracy, this can readily be found in Rancière.
Whereas  Rancière  is  curiously  reticent  on  the  ultimate  goals  and  objectives  of
democracy, this is something Abensour is only too willing to articulate. Although
both  offer  a  substantive  critique  of  what  Arendt  calls  the  tradition  of  political
philosophy, while Rancière elects to circumvent and abandon the discipline entirely,
Abensour endeavours to refashion and reconstruct it a critical political philosophy.
Ultimately, the object is not to synthesise or harmonise the two or to overlook their
many tensions  and discrepancies,  but  to  gather  from each new insights into the
forms  and  practices  of  democracy’s  emancipatory,  transformative  politics.
Democracy is the democratisation of society, of its institutions and relations. But
this democratisation is neither a natural or inevitable process. It often occurs only
through conflict, that is, in the form of a being-against. Both Rancière and Abensour
help us to understand this.
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Conclusion
“Hic et nunc:”
thinking democracy as
a critique of the present
When someone asks “what’s the use of philosophy?” the reply must be 
aggressive, since the question tries to be ironic and caustic. Philosophy 
does not serve the State or the Church, who have other concerns. […] 
Philosophy is at its most positive as critique, as an enterprise of 
demystification.
-Gilles Deleuze
In  a  perceptive,  but  now  completely  obscure  lecture  on  the  issues  of
democracy, theologian and utopian socialist Henry James Sr (father of philosopher
William James and author  Henry James)  will  introduce  the  topic of  democracy
according to what it “protests.” For the elder James, what democracy opposes and
inherently contradicts are those all too familiar claims to rule epitomised by the
regimes of monarchy and aristocracy: “Against these two claims, Democracy is a
protest. It denies the claim of any one man to govern other men, and the right of any
one class to govern other classes. [...] Thus the Democratic idea exhibits a purely
negative  development.  It  is  revolutionary,  not  formative.  It  is  born  of  denial.”1
1 Henry James, “Democracy and its Issues,” Lectures and Miscellanies (New York: Redfield, 1852), 1-2.
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Rather  than a form, James sees democracy a destroyer  of forms,  rather  than an
institution, a way to deny established institutions. This denial is inscribed in its very
origins and indeed, for James, what must define democracy itself.  He continues:
“Democracy  is  not  so  much  a  new  form  of  political  life  as  a  dissolution  or
disorganisation of the old forms. It is simply a resolution of government into the
hands of the people,  a taking down of that  which has before existed,  and a re-
commitment of it to its original sources […].”2 Thus, however rudimentary in its
presentation and at times utopian in its outlook, James is able to see something in
democracy that many cannot: the against that remains indispensable to the idea of
democracy  itself. It  is  precisely  this  against,  so  often  neglected,  forgotten,
overlooked,  that  has  occupied our study throughout.  While  the against  certainly
does not encompass the totality of what democracy means, it is perhaps what is
most often lacking from its analysis and history. It is this lack of analysis that has
compelled this study. Democracy is not simply a question of a particular society or
institution. It is a question of how societies and institutions that are not democratic
become so. It is a question of democratisation. Democracy is never constituted in a
void. It appears as a particular encounter or confrontation. It appears in the form of
a being-against. It is this against that propels democracy forward, that informs its
targets and objectives, that galvanises its resolve towards a more participatory, more
egalitarian society. Democracy initiates a unique political controversy and dispute;
it introduces a polemics to the polis. It throws what it means to govern and what it
2 Ibid., 4.
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means to be governed into question. It renders the foundations of a given social
order intrinsically problematic. This is not a natural or inevitable process. It requires
a subject,  the demos being simply its original and most generic name.  Thinking
democracy  according  to  what  it  is  against therefore  necessitates  a  concept  of
democracy  that  binds  the  persistent  democratisation  of  society  to  that  distinct
challenge of the demos, the excluded, those who do not count and do not have a
voice. Democracy is the story of how those who lack political agency come to have
it.  Rather  than a  grand revolutionary moment,  it  testifies to  a  long trajectory,  a
becoming, a history or tradition of emancipation. Democracy is the democratisation
of society,  of its  institutions and relations. This is  the strange tautology through
which democracy must ultimately be understood. 
Developed through a series of immanent critiques, of Rancière, Lefort and
Abensour,  this  is  the  basic  concept  of  democracy  I  have  sought  to  advance.
Although  their  projects  differ  considerably,  bound  to  no  single  theoretical
framework,  each  of  these  authors  offer a  certain  resistance  to  the  customary
strategies of distinguishing, formulating and evaluating what is called democracy
today.  Indeed,  reading these figures,  each individually and all  together,  a whole
discourse on democracy appears  to  be  called  into  question.  Democracy will  no
longer correspond to a State-form, collection of institutions or style of government.
Rather, their writings  provide us the necessary tools to effectively disentangle its
concept, so that it may be thought anew and put to use in creative and productive
ways.  Their  work challenges us to explore the limits  and potentials of what the
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power of the people can mean. At the same time, it invites us to reexamine those
structures  in  our  own society  that  claim to  be  “democratic.”  Inscribed  in  their
respective theories of democracy, therefore, is a sustained critique of the present and
the way in which our concept of democracy is appropriated and understood today. It
is this resistance, this critique of the present, that renders their work on democracy
political.
From Plato to Hobbes to Hegel, it quickly became apparent that much of
what  comes  down  to  us  under  the  guise  of  political  philosophy is  not  in  fact
political at all. Rather, in the assessment of Arendt, Castoriadis, Rancière, Abensour
and others we have encountered, political philosophy is routinely found to conceal
and obscure the political question, to  neutralise its polemics, to resolve what it is
that makes it inherently controversial. At least since Plato, that this tradition begins
with a tenacious campaign against democracy is no coincidence. With but a few
exceptions,  political  philosophy  consistently  functions  to  shelter  rule  from  the
problems of politics, to supplant politics with reason, order, absolution, to supply it
a rational foundation, to undermine its anarchic condition. This is emblematic of the
paradigm that Abensour associates with State thought, the philosophy that organises
its models and analyses around the terms and relations of the State, the sovereign,
governor and governed, ruler and ruled. And yet, notwithstanding this antipolitical
propensity so pervasive across its history, contrary to Rancière, I have made the
case that political philosophy’s critical and emancipatory potential should not be
discounted too hastily. Indeed, as we have seen, against the predominance of State
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thought, political philosophy can itself be placed against its very tradition, making
another political philosophy possible, one that returns not to the foundations of its
tradition, but as Abensour has appealed, to the matters of politics themselves, to the
problems  of  the  present  time,  our  own  institutions,  modes  of  domination  and
possibilities of emancipation. Abensour is not alone in this view. Castoriadis would
likely remind us that it is no accident that politics and philosophy have a common
origin, a common birthplace. They are but two expressions of an ongoing project of
autonomy,  a  project  first  betrayed  by Plato  himself.3 Throughout  this  study we
encountered  three  general  interpretations  of  philosophy  useful  for  politics:
philosophy as concept construction (Deleuze), as interminable questioning (Lefort),
as permanent critique (Abensour). For our purposes here, these interpretations need
not conflict. But for Deleuze, what ultimately makes philosophy political is less the
topics and themes it considers, than the manner in which the concepts it generates
can be engaged and put to use in a critical and political way. According to Deleuze,
philosophy is not a descriptive science. It does not strive to represent the world in
thought. Philosophy invents concepts to navigate and evaluate particular problems
of its  own time, its  own historical  milieu.  Lefort  is  therefore entirely correct  to
locate the point of departure for political inquiry in the here and now, but this in no
way limits the work of philosophy to a simple matter of grasping the conditions of
the present state of affairs. Rather, following Nietzsche, Deleuze understands the
first task of philosophy to counter, to challenge the present time and help us to think
3 See for example the essays contained in Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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against it. This is the basis of what we found Nietzsche to call  the untimely and
Abensour  the utopian.  In each case, what is realised is a political expression of
thinking against, a resistance to what is, a critique of the present in the hopes of a
better future to come. This is the use of philosophy. As Deleuze affirms: “When
someone asks  ‘what’s the use of philosophy?’ the reply must be aggressive, since
the question tries to be ironic and caustic. Philosophy does not serve the State or the
Church, who have other concerns. […] Philosophy is at its most positive as critique,
as  an  enterprise  of  demystification.”4 It  is  here  that  philosophy  itself  becomes
political.
Thus,  in  the  sense  that  it  represents  a  prolonged  exercise  in  concept
construction,  perhaps  this  study  of  democracy  may  ultimately  be  considered
Deleuzian. Perhaps there is something of our own present time, our own here and
now, that desperately calls for a new concept of democracy. By placing the against
at the centre of its concept, my hope is that we may think democracy—its origins,
aspirations  and  institutions—in  new  and  productive  ways.  To  think  democracy
according to what it is against is therefore an attempt to think democracy anew or
think democracy otherwise. Along with a whole language of rights and equality, the
concept  of  democracy  can  itself  be  fashioned  an  instrument  through  which  a
comprehensive  critique  of  the  present  may  be  initiated  and  carried  out.  For
Abensour, essential to the meaning of emancipation is the permanent critique of
domination. It is in this respect that he envisions political philosophy not simply as
4 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 106.
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a theoretical discipline, but like Marx, as a tool with the power to change. This is
the first objective of his own critical political philosophy.
Perhaps the problem of democracy inevitably becomes a philosophical one
as soon as we arrive at  that  inescapable and interminable question:  how should
democracy be thought? This is the broader theme that underlies the entire study. It
is a question we have returned to again and again. As we discovered with Lefort,
part  of  what  democracy  means  is  that  there  is  no  final  word  on  the  meaning
democracy itself. Democracy will refuse its mastery or monopolisation by a given
authority or  class  of  purported experts.  This  is  precisely what  we found savage
democracy to express. My use of Lefort in this project may be found rather peculiar.
Although he can certainly be read to theorise a democracy against the regimes of
monarchy and totalitarianism, I have not drawn on Lefort to consider yet another
model of democracy’s being-against. Instead, I have revisited those rather enigmatic
references  to  “savage”  democracy  as  an  occasion  to  reflect  upon  the  larger
philosophical problem of  thinking democracy itself, of organising its concept for
political  use.  As  Abensour  testifies,  savage  democracy  highlights  the
indetermination  that  stubbornly refuses  to  grant democracy  finality,  closure  or
resolution,  raising  the  whole  question over  and  over  again.  Loosening the
constraints  that  so often determine its  limits,  rather  than define democracy with
greater precision, we found savage democracy to  throw the concept into question,
keeping the idea of democracy unsettled and perpetually open. In Deleuze’s terms,
savage  democracy  signifies  a  democracy  deterritorialised. From  the  French
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Revolution to May ’68, while Lefort tends to utilise the savage qualifier to incite
those  more  revolutionary  moments  that  punctuate  the  history  of  democracy’s
modern incarnation, its sheer indeterminacy must compel his readers to incessantly
return to the question of what is most essential to democracy itself, its powers and
potentials. “It is as if  ‘savage’ connotes the inexhaustible reserve of turmoil that
soars above democracy.”5 It cautions us not to reduce democracy to a government
or institution too quickly. It prompts us to conceive democracy in terms of what it
can  do,  what  it  can  become  and  what  it  can  transform.  Accordingly,  savage
democracy not only functions to  keep the question of  democracy unresolved,  it
urges us to perpetually push our thinking of democracy ever further. By evoking
everything  that  is  revolutionary  about  democracy,  the  savage  emancipates  the
concept from all the limitations that typically restrict and confine what democracy
can be and what it can mean, allowing us to reimagine it anew according to its most
creative  and  transformative  dimensions  and  capacities.  It  is  in  this  respect  that
savage democracy can be taken as something of a heuristic device, an exercise of
thought. What savage democracy demands is that we think democracy in a savage
way.  It  is  a  symbol  for  the  ambition,  experimentation  and  indeed,  the  risk  of
thinking democracy in unconventional and challenging ways. It means distancing
its  concept  from those  mitigated,  domesticated  representations  of  democracy so
ubiquitous  today.  It  means  constructing  its  concept  according  to  its  most
uncompromised  and  resilient  incarnation:  its  political  acts  of  emancipation,  its
5 Miguel Abensour, “‘Savage Democracy’ and the  ‘Principle of Anarchy’,”  Democracy Against the State:
Marx and the Machiavellian Moment (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 106.
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endless capacity for conflict and contestation, its enduring momentum towards a
more inclusive, participatory and egalitarian society. This is imperative for a theory
of democracy’s being-against. 
Perhaps one of the first implications of such a theory is that it necessitates a
complete revision of our general approach to politics. This was very much implicit
in our initial point of departure. As Arendt recounts, where the tradition of political
philosophy systematically fails is in its almost methodical obscuration of politics
itself,  its  routine  displacement  of  the  problems  of  politics  for  the  problems  of
government, sovereignty, the management of society and affairs of the State. For
Arendt, this underlying fixation with rule effectively cancels out the very basis of
political  inquiry from philosophy altogether, creating considerable challenges for
thinking  about  politics  in  its  own  right.  Against  this  tradition,  she  therefore
advocates  the  extraction  of  politics  from its  conceptual  confinement  to  various
theories of rule. This is just as essential to her own phenomenology of political
activity as it is to our theory of democracy here. Politics  cannot be reduced to a
general framework dictated solely by the problem of how a given class of rulers,
governors,  sovereigns  and  kings  are  to  exercise  their  rule  over  the  community.
Rather,  following  the  example  of  Arendt,  by  circumventing  the  philosophical
tradition entirely and revisiting the ancient Greek origins of the term, we found that
in its original inception, politics describes something quite different. Politics is not
the  foundation  upon  which  one  rules  another.  It  is  the  condition  in  which  the
foundation of rule is called into question. Politics is that which renders the polis, the
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organisation of the social,  its laws and institutions, inherently controversial. It is
what renders problematic the very nature of government and who has the right to
govern. Here, I have tried to draw a connection between the etymology of  polis,
politics and  polemics. As for Christian Meier, politics implies the  politicisation of
that  which was not  political  before:  it  widens the community’s  inclusion in  the
affairs of the polis, it  makes public the question of what is public, common the
question of what is common. Politics reveals that there is no proper order of society,
that  the  problem  of  the  organisation  of  the  social  is  one  destined  to  remain
unresolved in any absolute sense.  To Castoriadis’ point, there is no abstract model
of society provided by nature or intended by the gods. There is no ultimate closure
to the question of the good, the just, the true. What is so profound about the Greek
invention  of  politics,  therefore,  is  precisely what  Plato  cannot  tolerate  about  it:
politics exposes the polis and the representation of the polis to an irreducible field
dictated only by the rule of  doxa and  agon. What  doxa and  agon unconditionally
refuse is  that  there somewhere  exists  an underlying  truth of  society,  accessible,
decipherable, realisable. The political society is the one that recognises, represents
and  indeed  explicitly  institutes  the  condition  of  its  very  indeterminacy,  the
contingency of the social, the lack of an absolute foundation. This is precisely the
impetuous, unpredictable experience aboard Plato’s allegorical ship of democracy.
As Lefort illustrates so successfully, democracy’s only foundation is the experience
of indeterminacy itself, that which is not a proper foundation at all. This is why
beyond the politicisation of the polis, the making political what was not political
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before,  politics  can  also  describe  a  condition,  the  very  condition  that  remains
particular to democracy itself. This is the condition that Plato decries as anarchy.
As we discovered, what isolates democracy from every other regime is its
merciless  dissolution  of  the  archê. This  is  the  universal  of  democracy’s  being-
against.  Wherever  and whenever  it  appears,  democracy is  against  the  archê.  No
meaningful  sense  of  equality  is  possible  as  long  as  the  archê  remains  intact,
unchallenged.  Equality  is  anarchic  or  it  is  nothing  at  all.  The  archê  is  that
mysterious principle that haunts so much of political thought and analysis. At the
basis of every hierarchy, every claim of privilege and priority, of a proper order of
society,  a  proper  allocation  of  parts  and  roles,  it  is  there:  posited,  imposed,
naturalised, rationalised. It functions not only to formally divide the categories of
governor  and governed,  ruler  and ruled,  but  at  the  same time,  to  distribute  the
community across these categories according to some given standard or criterion.
The archê therefore intends to resolve the problem of qualification, of entitlement,
of who is entitled to rule. It claims to discover a basis, a genuine foundation for the
reason why one rules another, the few rule the many. For this reason, it represents
the closure  of  politics,  the  effacement  of  its  condition.  As soon as  the  archê  is
postulated  theoretically,  the  organisation  of  the  social  is  discerned  a  rational
problem as opposed to a political one. This inaugurates a philosophical project of
deciphering  the  grounds,  the  underlying  principles,  which  claim to  account  for
various hierarchical relations and systems of rule. But as Plato observes with great
clarity,  democracy is  that  strange anomaly which not  only lacks  a  proper archê
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itself, but operates to undermine the archê of every other order.  What it disputes,
what it  renders intrinsically problematic,  is  the very basis upon which any such
entitlement  to rule may be ultimately established.  By disrupting the foundations
upon  which  rulers  distinguish  themselves  from  the  rest  of  the  community,
democracy reveals the inherent artificiality and arbitrariness of every hierarchical
relation. By exposing the essential groundlessness upon which the apparatus of rule
is constructed, it reveals the sheer contingency of every social order. As John Keane
will  attest,  democracy involves  the “denaturing of power.”6 It  demonstrates that
whether it be birth, wealth, virtue or expertise, every conventional standard to rule
is just that: convention and convention alone. This is why Rancière can uncover an
essential  anarchy  beneath  every  hierarchical  relation,  an  underlying  equality
implicit in every system of inequality. Democracy is that which replaces the order
of the archê with the order of politics. It not only deposits the problems of the polis
in the hands of the community itself, it institutes those problems in such a way that
they remain political and ultimately irreducible. Democracy is not the rule of the
demos. It is that which challenges the very division between ruler and ruled. This is
what it means to be against the archê.
As preserved in its  very name, democracy is  that without archê,  without
measure. As such, it can make no claim, no reference to any principle or standard of
rule. Beyond the field of politics itself, it has recourse to no foundation, no frame of
reference which may validate its claims or justify its institutions. Democracy can
6 John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), xii.
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provide no absolution, no guarantee. There is simply no proper archê of the demos
to which it may appeal. Indeed, the generality or indecipherability of the demos as a
category renders the very logic of the archê inoperative. This is precisely what is
inscribed in Rancière’s “anarchic title” and Abensour’s “demos as a whole.” Rather,
from ancient times, democracy means only this: the power of the people (the kratos
of the demos). But in this respect, what exactly is meant by “power” and perhaps
more importantly, what is meant by “people” is something that appears destined to
remain indeterminate. This is not simply a consequence of democracy. This is the
basis of its very strategy. Accordingly, perhaps this entire study could be read as a
series of interpretations of what the  power of  the people can mean,  in different
contexts,  at  different  moments:  the  power  of  the  people is  the  power  of  those
without title or qualification to subvert and destroy the archê of every other order,
making problematic the very foundation that divides governor and governed, ruler
and ruled, revealing an underlying anarchic equality (chapter 2); the power of the
people is the power of the excluded, the marginalised, the  invisible to manifest a
political subject and dispute the categories, classifications and distributions of the
police,  frustrating  its symbolic  representation  of  society  and  creating  new
possibilities of perception (chapter 4); the power of the people is the power of those
subject  to  the  State  to  reduce its  unifying,  totalising  structure  to  but  a  single
moment  of  the  demos,  generating  alternative  social  arrangements,  new  public
spaces and new forms of social bonds (chapter 5).  These interpretations are in no
way contradictory.  Nor are  they exhaustive.  On the  contrary,  particularly in  the
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modern age, the expression of the power of the people appears to take on multiple
forms, in different places, at different times. As Lefort and Rancière seem to concur,
the  experience  of  modern  democracy  is  one  of  increasing political  conflicts
engendered  by an  increasingly diverse  body of  actors  unfolding at  increasingly
divergent regions of society. Who the subject of democracy may be, the objects that
democracy  concerns  and  the  spaces  where  democracy  occurs  all  appear,  in  its
modern incarnation, to be broadened exponentially. Perhaps this is what ultimately
distinguishes modern democracy from its ancient antecedent. In this regard, perhaps
the precise meaning of the power of the people can only be appreciated against the
backdrop of its particular struggle, its particular objective, its particular mode of
being-against.  Beyond  the  politics  of  Athens,  this  remains  a  testament  to  the
proliferation of the against and its forms in the modern world. 
And yet, as the power of the people, democracy cannot be thought a natural
or inevitable process of a society. It requires a subject and it is only through the
agency of a subject that its challenge to what it is against may be initiated and set in
motion.  This  is  particularly  important  for  Rancière.  In  Disagreement,  Rancière
defines democracy in terms of a political mode of subjectivation, the appearance of
a subject that disputes the prevailing distribution of the social via a defiant claim of
equality. Although at times this may appear rather narrow, it serves as an important
reminder  that  the  underlying  agents  of  democracy,  its  powers  or  forces,  must
ultimately be located in the political activity of a subject. Traditionally this subject
is known as the demos, but as Rancière demonstrates, it may take many names.
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According to Rancière, the political subject is not a sociological entity; it cannot be
ascertained by demographic, identity or interest. Nor is the political subject bound
necessarily to a specific set of conditions, social, historical, economic. Akin to the
“principle of anarchy” to which Abensour appeals, both its origin and destination
can never be known in advance. Rather, Rancière regards the manifestation of the
political subject as something unpredictable, incalculable, accidental. Whenever the
marginalised,  the  excluded,  abandon  their  allotted  status,  part  or  position  and
challenge  the  prevailing  categories  of  a  given  social  order,  a  distinct  political
subject comes into being. The political subject is that which imposes itself on those
very places and times where it does not belong. It is that which makes itself of some
account.  It  makes  problematic  what  was  not  problematic  before.  It  throws  the
established correspondence between bodies, spaces, roles and functions back on its
own inherent contingency, transforming at once the identity of the subject itself as
well as its prescribed relations, limits and parameters in society. For Rancière, this
is  an  act  of  dissensus,  the  enactment  of  a  wrong.  What  Rancière  supplies  this
project, therefore, is a working theory of the subject. It concerns the question of
agency,  of  instrumentality.  Even  beyond  the  scope of  Rancière’s  model,  this  is
essential  for  locating  the  against  more  generally.  In  democracy,  more  than  an
institution, the against is embodied in the activity of a subject. It is through the
subject that the against primarily finds expression. Being-against is a subject acting.
It is therefore quite phenomenal. It can be seen and it can be heard. It has a name
and it has a face.  It is voiced, demonstrated, performed, by one or by many, in
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public buildings or in the streets. It intervenes, opposes, contests and protests. It
calls into question and it holds to account. In this regard, if Abensour associates
democracy  with  the  qualities  of  spontaneity,  free  creation and  ongoing  self-
institution, it is because democracy remains inextricably bound to the demos as a
living subject.
At the same time, this emphasis on the subject and the agency of the subject
does  not  intend  to  diminish  the  significance  of  institutions.  As  we  saw  with
Abensour,  even  an  “insurgent”  democracy  is  aided  by  a  robust  institutional
engagement. An institution is a system of anticipation, an organisation of means; it
provides a positive model for action,  a  way of acting or acting in concert.7 It is
therefore quite senseless to oppose democracy and institutions in general. Rather,
the argument is that democracy remains irreducible to its institutions and cannot
simply be defined by them. However its institutions are organised and arranged,
there  is  always  something  of  democracy  that  exceeds  them.  Consequently,  the
institutional  question  is  one  that  does  not  anticipate  democracy,  but  logically
follows from it. The problem must be framed in terms of  which institutions best
serve democracy and which do not, which institutions best express democracy and
which do not. When can an institution be considered democratic? Quite simply, a
“democratic”  institution  is  one  that  facilitates,  fosters  and  sustains  democracy’s
radical democratising initiatives as opposed to neutralising, curtailing or inhibiting
them.  Democracy  seeks  institutions  that  bolster  and  broaden  its  project  of
7 Once again, I am relying on Deleuze. See “Instincts and Institutions,” Desert Islands and Other Texts (Los
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004).
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democratisation.  The very concept  of  democratisation implies  that  the  limits  of
democracy  are  never  absolute,  never  determined  in  advance.  As  a  politics  of
transformation,  democratisation means just  that:  perpetually confronting its  own
arbitrary limits. The impetus of this process, its motive force, is the against. The
against,  it  could  be said,  situates  democracy precisely according to  its  margins,
according to what obstructs, denies or negates it. This is why it is so crucial for a
theory of democracy to closely consider the objects it  confronts and disputes in
society. In the final chapters, we considered two such objects in detail:  the police
and the State. While other various models of democracy’s being-against could have
been  considered,  there  is  something  of  these  two  objects  that  appears  to  merit
particular  attention.  As  theorised  by  Rancière,  the  problem  of  the  police  is
emblematic of the aspiration to implement the proper order of society. The police
can be taken as a symbol for the harmonious, productive society sheltered from the
complications  of  politics,  the  well  managed,  well  regulated  community  that
functions without disruption or dispute. It determines what is public and what is
private, who is included and who is excluded, who can be seen and heard and who
remains invisible.  The police is a regime of representation,  a government of the
sensible, an administration and  management  of what is visible, what is thinkable
and what  is  possible. It  not  only concerns  the distribution of the social,  but its
symbolic constitution, the very modes of perception that render a social distribution
intelligible.  Likewise,  as  theorised  by  Abensour,  the  problem  of  the  State  is
emblematic of the socio-historical phenomenon of political alienation. The State is
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the constitution of the social  abstracted from the political  dimension of its  very
institution and thus, from the demos as its originary subject.  As a moment of the
demos reified, it represents the crystallisation of its creative, self-instituting activity,
its  everlasting  invention  and  innovation.  The  State is  a  system  of  integration,
unification and mediation that elevates itself over and beyond the plurality of the
demos. As an abstract organising principle, a total that dominates its parts, it not
only assumes autonomy over the demos, but monopolises its particular moments as
a  universal  form.  For  this  reason,  it  is  a form  that  very  much  facilitates  the
concentration  of  power,  the  isolation  of  the  organs  of  power  from  the  whole
community.  Clearly,  the  challenges  that  the  police  and  the  State  present  to  the
project of democracy are considerable. And yet, for Rancière and Abensour, they
are precisely what animate and reanimate a defiant and resilient democracy against.
As  Abensour  reminds us  on  more  than  one  occasion,  democracy is  the  always
possible emergence of human struggle.8 
Perhaps  the  lesson of  Machiavelli  is  that  politics  must  always  remain  a
question particular to the here and now (hic et nunc). It must be grounded firmly in
the present, according to the conditions and situations of today. Likewise, perhaps
the  lesson  of  Nietzsche  is  that  philosophy must  always  remain  contrary  to  the
present. It must counter  what is and help us to think against it. As I have argued
throughout,  this  is  precisely how the  exercise of  political philosophy should  be
approached. A political philosophy is one that puts its concepts to use, as a critical
8 See for example Abensour,  Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment, 100 and
“‘Savage Democracy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy’,” 123. 
278
tool,  as  a  means  to  critique  the  present.  The  concept  of  democracy  must  be
organised  accordingly.  As  a  concept,  democracy need  not  simply  represent  the
society that  so  boastfully  calls  itself  a  “democracy”  today.  It  can  be  forged an
instrument of critique. It can help us evaluate the present state of our institutions
and  relations.  It  can  help  us  identify  modes  of  domination  and  strategies  of
emancipation. It can help us clarify how we desire the future of our society to be. It
can help us resist the existing order and participate in its transformation. When this
project commenced, the events of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street were still
very  much  in  their  infancy;  it  concludes  under  the  shadow  of  the  reactionary
departure of Britain from the European Union, the absurd accession of a wildly
populist  American president,  the widespread vilification of Muslims, immigrants
and refugees and the increasing prominence of so-called “alt-right” nationalism. It
would appear, therefore, that for the present moment and for the foreseeable future,
we will have much to critique. And democracy will have much to be  against. To
recite Whitman once again: Strike with vengeful stroke!
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